Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife divorced in 2005. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Wife brought a separate civil suit seeking various forms of equitable relief and monetary damages, which the district court granted. At issue in the civil suit was certain property on which the couple ran an equestrian business but which a Husband's corporation owned. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously found that an express oral agreement existed between Husband and Wife to purchase, hold, and develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing a constructive trust and declaring the property part of the marital estate; but (2) the district court erred in its determination that an enforceable agreement existed, as the purported agreement lacked sufficient specificity. Remanded. View "Goggin v. Goggin" on Justia Law

Utah's exemption statute provides that a retirement plan "that is described in" I.R.C. 401(a) is exempt from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Upon filing for bankruptcy, Douglas Reinhart claimed that the funds in his Keogh retirement plan were exempt from bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that the Keogh plan was not technically tax qualified under I.R.C. 401(a) due to certain operational defects. Although the Keogh plan was operationally in default, the bankruptcy court found the plan was described in section 401(a), and thus, the funds in the plan were exempt under the exemption statute. The bankruptcy court entered an exemption order, and the trustee of Reinhart's bankruptcy estate appealed. The U.S. district court affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer the question of whether a retirement plan can be "described in" section 401(a) when it fails to fulfill that section's requirements for tax qualification. The Court held that a retirement plan is "described in" section 401(a) if it substantially complies with that section. View "Gladwell v. Reinhart" on Justia Law

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that a seventeen-year-old girl had engaged in criminal solicitation to commit murder after she asked a stranger to punch her in the stomach to terminate her pregnancy. The juvenile court (1) held that an assault of a woman by punching her in the stomach was a "procedure" intended to terminate her pregnancy and therefore qualified as an abortion under statute; and (2) dismissed the State's petition against the minor because a woman cannot be held criminally liable for seeking an abortion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the solicited assault of a woman to terminate her pregnancy was not a "procedure" as contemplated by statute and therefore did not constitute an abortion. Remanded. View "State v. J.M.S." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder of the unborn child of a juvenile mother. The charge and plea were based on the allegation that Defendant tried to kill the child by punching Mother in the abdomen in exchange for a payment by Mother. At Defendant's sentencing, the district court sua sponte found him ineligible for conviction of attempted murder under the standard set forth in State v. Shondel and sentenced him instead to the lesser charge of attempted killing an unborn child by abortion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State had a statutory right of appeal from the district court's holding because the court implemented the decision to effect a "final judgment of dismissal" of the murder charge; (2) the Court's reconsideration of the district court's decision did not raise double jeopardy concerns because a reversal would not subject Defendant to successive prosecution but merely reinstate Defendant's guilty plea on the attempted murder charge; and (3) there was no Shondel bar to Defendant's sentencing on the charge of attempted murder because the elements of attempted murder differ from the elements of attempted killing of an unborn child by abortion. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Father and Mother, who were not married, gave birth to a child. Father filed a paternity petition but failed to include a sworn affidavit stating that he was willing to pay child support and take custody of the child. Mother subsequently executed her consent to an adoption. Father then amended his original petition to include the sworn affidavit. The district court dismissed the amended petition as being untimely. Father appealed, arguing that Utah R. Civ. P. 15 permitted amendment of his paternity petition and that his amended petition related back to the date of his original petition. The issues on appeal centered on Utah Code 78B-6-121, which requires that an unwed father file a paternity petition and a sworn affidavit stating his willingness to pay child support and take custody of the child before the mother executes her consent to the adoption The Supreme Court affirmed, holding because section 78B-6-120 requires strict compliance with the affidavit requirement, a paternity petition cannot be amended to include a sworn affidavit after the mother has executed her consent to adoption. View "Donjuan v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Michael Archuleta was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. This opinion consolidated analysis from the fourth and fifth times the Supreme Court entertained appeals by Archuleta. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Archuleta's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the habeas court properly found that Archuleta's substantive challenges to his conviction and sentence were procedurally barred, and the habeas court correctly determined that Archuleta could not demonstrate his counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Archuleta's Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion because (i) Archuleta's rule 60(b)(1) motion was time-barred, and (ii) rule 60(b)(6)'s provision stating that judgment will be set aside for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" applies only in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case. View "Archuleta v. Galetka" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over a parcel of land situated between adjoining landowners, Defendant and Plaintiff. Plaintiff was the record owner of the property, but Defendant and its predecessors-in-interest occupied the properly for approximately fifty years. The district court quieted title to the property in favor of Defendants after finding that the parties' predecessors-in-interest mutually acquiesced to a boundary marked by an old barbed wire fence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is clear and convincing evidence; (2) acquiescence does not require any degree of subjective intent; and (3) Defendant's predecessors-in-interest acquiesced to the original barbed wire fence as the boundary between the properties. View "Essential Botanical v. Kay" on Justia Law

Victor Hernandez was charged with four Class A misdemeanor offenses. Hernandez filed a request for a preliminary hearing. The district court denied Hernandez's request because it concluded that the right to a preliminary hearing under Utah Const. art. I, 13 did not apply to Class A misdemeanors. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court, holding (1) article I section 13 grants the right to a preliminary hearing for indictable offenses, including Class A misdemeanors; and (2) because Hernandez was charged with Class A misdemeanors, the district court erred in not granting his request for a preliminary hearing. Remanded. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Marilyn Hamblin, the owner of a water right as an alleged tenant in common, filed a permanent change application with the state engineer, seeking to change her water right's place of use and point of diversion. The engineer rejected Hamblin's application because Hamblin had established no beneficial use under the water right since at least 1980. The district court granted the engineer's motion for summary judgment, basing its decision primarily on the determination that Hamblin's water right had been forfeited by operation of law through nonuse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the state engineer lacked the authority to adjudicate water rights, and therefore, could not consider non-adjudicated forfeiture when reviewing a change application; and (2) instead, the engineer was limited to considering factors presented in Utah Code Ann. 73-3-8(1) when deciding whether to approve or deny a change application, but could stay change application proceedings while pursuing an adjudication of forfeiture. View "Jensen v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ira Warne executed a partial revocation of and amendment to the Ira Warne Family Protection Trust, the purpose of which was to terminate the interest of one of Ira's sons, Tom Warne, who had been designated as a beneficiary in the original trust instrument. On summary judgment, the district court (1) invalidated the partial revocation based on the Supreme Court's holding in Banks v. Means, and (2) held that Tom was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to the distribution provisions of Ira's will. The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, holding (1) the partial revocation complied with Utah Code Ann. 75-7-605, which statutorily overruled the Court's holding in Banks; and (2) the distribution of Ira's personal property was governed by the terms of the Trust, rather than by Ira's will, and therefore, Tom was not entitled to one-half of that property. Remanded. View "Warne v. Warne" on Justia Law