Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer, she prepared a testamentary appointment of guardianship and conservatorship of Child in favor of Grandparents. After Mother's death and upon a petition by Grandparents, the district court confirmed Grandparents' appointment of guardianship. Child's alleged father (Father) subsequently filed a motion to vacate the guardianship appointment, arguing that he had not received notice of Grandparents' guardianship petition as required under the Court Appointment Statute. The district court denied Father's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father had standing to bring this appeal even though he did not formally intervene in this case, but (2) none of the issues raised in Father's appeals were preserved for appeal or warranted reversal under plain error review. View "In re A.T.I.G." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of four counts of sodomy on a child and one count of sexual abuse of a child. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Approximately a dozen years later, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act's one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner appealed, arguing that applying the one-year statute of limitations to his petition violated the Utah Constitution under the "egregious injustice" exception set forth in Gardner v. State. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of all but one of the claims alleged in Petitioner's petition; but (2) vacated the district court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process, as Defendant may have a newly-recognized claim under the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lafler v. Cooper, which could extend the statute of limitations on his claim. Remanded. View "Winward v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a disgorgement order issued by the district court requiring Attorney to disgorge $30,000 in legal fees he received for his representation of the Utah Down Syndrome Association and its founders and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation. The order stemmed from a dispute between the founders of the Association and the Foundation. In the second of two lawsuits, the Foundation sued the Association and its founders. After discovering that some of the funds taken from the Foundation's disputed accounts were used to pay Attorney for his representation of the Association and its founders, the Foundation filed successive motions for disgorgement. The motion was granted. Attorney filed a motion to vacate the disgorgement order, which the district court dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed Attorney's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because, as a nonparty to this lawsuit, Attorney was not entitled to an appeal as of right. View "Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine when a well "started" under Utah Code 59-5-102. Although that statute imposes a severance tax on oil or gas produced from a well, section 59-5-102(5)(c) permits an exemption for "the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." Summit Operating, LLC argued that a well starts when it begins commercial production. Under this interpretation, Summit asserted that it was entitled to a six-month tax exemption for its well, which started commercial production in 2008. The Utah State Tax Commission asserted that a well starts on the date that drilling begins, and thus, Summit was not entitled to the tax exemption because drilling for Summit's well began in 1983. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order granting summary judgment to the Auditing Division of the Commission, holding that under the Tax Exemption Statute, a well "starts" when drilling begins. View "Summit Operating v. State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, sodomy on a child, and attempted rape of a child. The court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, Petitioner argued that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that the state was not required to make a separate showing of good cause to admit the alleged victim's recorded statements under Utah R. Crim. P. 15.5. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) a separate showing of good cause to admit a recorded statement is not required under rule 15.5; and (2) rather, good cause is established when the trial court considers all the factors in the rule and determines that the recorded statement is accurate, reliable, and trustworthy, and that admission of the recorded statement is in the interest of justice. View "State v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

After the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct began an attorney discipline proceeding against Donald Gilbert, Gilbert moved to implead the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a). The district court granted the motion. The Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment challenging the propriety of impleader and claiming that res judicata barred the causes of action in Gilbert's third-party complaint. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding (1) the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline do not permit litigation of collateral matters in attorney discipline proceedings; and (2) therefore, impleader was improper in this case. View "In re Gilbert" on Justia Law

Appellee claimed an exemption in bankruptcy for seventy-five percent of wages that he earned prior to filing his bankruptcy petition but that were either paid to or still owing to Appellee after the date of the petition. Appellee based his claim on section 1673 of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and, alternatively, on section 103 of the Utah Consumer Credit Code. The trustee of Appellee's bankruptcy estate (Trustee) opposed the claimed exemption. The bankruptcy court permitted the exemption, the district court summarily affirmed, and the Trustee appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 1673 did not permit Appellee's claimed exemption. To resolve the state law question presented under section 103, the appeals court certified a question of law to the Utah Supreme Court. The Court answered that Appellee could not rely on section 103 to assert an exemption in bankruptcy, as section 103 does not create an exemption in bankruptcy and, instead, limits garnishment of a debtor's disposable earnings under narrow circumstances. View "Gladwell v. Reinhart" on Justia Law

Appellant, the biological father of Baby Girl T., challenged the district court's determination of his rights as a birth father and its grant of a motion in limine preventing his presentation of evidence. The court concluded that Appellant did not comply with the provisions of the Utah Adoption Act and therefore waived the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of Baby Girl T., as well as the right to refuse to consent to her adoption. It also barred Appellant from presenting evidence that the reason he failed to comply with requirements of the Act was because state employees negligently failed to register his notice of paternity proceedings prior to the birth mother's execution of a consent to adoption. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Act was constitutionally defective as applied to Appellant and deprived him of a meaningful chance to preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. View "In re Baby Girl T" on Justia Law

This appeal resulted from an action in eminent domain in which the Utah Department of Transportation sought to condemn an access point easement on property owned by FPA West Point. FPA's codefendant and lessee, Kmart Corporation, also claimed an interest in the access. Because of the different interests claimed by FPA and Kmart, FPA filed a motion asking the court to order separate just compensation determinations. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court was correct in determining that the values of respective interests in a parcel of condemned property must be individually assessed; (2) the value of respective interests may be individually assessed in either separate or consolidated proceedings; (3) accordingly, the district court has discretion to order separate proceedings in an action involving multiple interest holders in a condemned parcel of property; and (4) because it was unclear whether the district court intended that FPA's and Kmart's interests be assessed through separate or through consolidated proceedings, the case was remanded with instructions to determine whether to order separate or consolidated proceedings in this matter. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of assault. He appeared for a jury trial and was subsequently convicted of a misdemeanor assault. Defendant appealed, claiming that his jury was assembled in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to timely preserve his Batson challenge, (2) the trial court did not err when it did not make findings or rule on the Batson challenge, and (3) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel's failure to timely preserve his Batson challenge failed under Washington v. Strickland. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law