Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Fourteen years later, Defendant filed a petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence pursuant to Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court vacated Defendant's murder conviction, determining (1) the PCRA allows a determination of factual innocence to be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence; and (2) Defendant established her factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a post-conviction determination of factual innocence can be based on both newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence; and (2) the State did not properly challenge the post-conviction court's factual findings, and therefore, the post-conviction court's ultimate determination that Defendant was factually innocent was affirmed. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

In connection with the Utah Transit Authority's construction of a high-speed commuter rail line, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) classified a certain railroad crossing as public. The Public Service Commission upheld the classification. Union Pacific Railroad sought review of the Commission's decision upholding UDOT's public classification. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in determining that UDOT correctly classified the crossing as public, as Union Pacific failed to present enough evidence to support its arguments that the crossing was formally vacated or abandoned or that the crossing was a new road that never became public. View "Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Petitioner was traveling home from work in his personal vehicle when he sustained back injuries in a car accident. Petitioner applied for workers' compensation benefits, but his application was denied under the "going and coming rule," which deems injuries occurring during a work commute outside the course of employment and thus not compensable. Petitioner appealed, arguing that in light of the benefits his employer received through various work-related uses of his vehicle, he was "in the course of employment" during the accident. The labor commission and court of appeals rejected Petitioner's claim that he qualified under the "instrumentality" exception of the going and coming rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner fell within the rule and not the exception. View "Jex v. Utah Labor Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellants were defrauded by an individual on parole from a Utah prison. Appellants filed a complaint alleging causes of action against the State for negligent supervision, gross negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation. Under the Governmental Immunity Act, the State is immune from a suit where the injury arises out of deceit. The district court dismissed the case based on the State's governmental immunity, finding that Appellants' injury was the result of a third-party's deceit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's deceit exception; and (2) the dismissal of Appellants' complaint on the basis of governmental immunity was timely. View "Van De Grift v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to disorderly conduct in the justice county and was sentenced to ninety days in jail and ordered to pay a fine. After conducting a trial de novo, the district court convicted Defendant of the original charge, sentenced him to 180 days in jail, and imposed a higher fine. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for extraordinary relief, arguing that the district court violated Utah Code 76-3-405 when it imposed a more severe punishment than the one originally imposed by the justice court. The court of appeals denied the requested relief, reasoning that although the statute generally prohibits the imposition of a greater sentence after a defendant appeals, Defendant's case fell outside of the general rule because his original conviction and sentence resulted from a plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the section 76-3-405(2)(b) exception against imposing a harsher sentence on appeal when a defendant has entered into a plea agreement applies to justice court proceedings. View "Vorher v. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

This appeal centered a film created by SummitWorks and Supernova Media. SummitWorks and Supernova formed LLCs in several states. Supernova and SummitWorks later litigated the issue of who had the right to control the LLCs. The law firm PADRM served as counsel for the LLCs. After PADRM stopped receiving legal fees it tried to foreclose on two liens on the film. PADRM sued SummitWorks and the LLCs (the first case) seeking a declaration the liens were valid. In response, SummitWorks filed a separate action (the second case) against PADRM seeking a declaration that the liens were invalid and a preliminary injunction against the sale of the firm. Supernova moved to intervene in both cases. In the second case, SummitWorks and PADRM were granted a motion to close the preliminary injunction hearing and to seal the related records. Supernova filed a motion to unseal the record. PADRM and SummitWorks subsequently signed a settlement agreement, and the district court dismissed both cases. The court also denied Supernova's motions. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motions to intervene and set aside the sealing order, holding (1) Supernova had a right to intervene in this litigation; and (2) the public had a right to access the court records related to the preliminary injunction hearing until they were properly sealed. View "Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC" on Justia Law

The Utah Highway Patrol performed a drug interdiction exercise on a rural stretch of the interstate. UHP chose to focus the bulk of its enforcement efforts on cars bearing out-of-state license plates. Defendant's California-plated vehicle was stopped during the exercise, and the traffic stop yielded evidence of illegal drugs. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Defendant filed two suppression motions - one based on the Equal Protection Clause and right to travel and the other rooted in the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied both motions, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the traffic stop did not restrict Defendant's movement in a manner implicating his fundamental right to travel; (2) because there was a rational basis for UHP's selective enforcement of traffic laws - by choosing to stop vehicles licensed outside of Utah - Defendant's equal protection claim was meritless; and (3) to the extent the district court erred in failing to consider any evidence of relevance to the Fourth Amendment motion to suppress, it was harmless error. View "State v. Chettero" on Justia Law

Michael Howe, an employee of Peak Alarm Company, filed a complaint against the City and several of its employees, presenting ten federal and state claims, including false arrest and defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on these and other state claims on the ground that Howe failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). The supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims were timely brought under the UGIA. On remand, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state defamation and false arrest claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the claims had been timely brought under the UGIA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the UGIA comprehensively governs claims against governmental parties such that plaintiffs are not bound to observe the statute of limitations that would apply to claims against private parties. View "Peak Alarm v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Basic Research, LLC marketed the weight-loss product Akavar. Customers who purchased Akavar filed lawsuits against Basic Research claiming false advertising, defective product, and failure to perform as promised. Basic Research was insured by Admiral Insurance under a policy that provided coverage for "personal and advertising injury." After the underlying claims were filed, Basic Research invoked its coverage and asked Admiral to defend it. Admiral refused to defend, alleging that the underlying claims were not covered by the terms of the policy. Thereafter, Basic Research brought this suit for declaratory relief. The district court granted Admiral's motion for summary judgment, finding that the underlying claims were specifically excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the asserted claims were not covered by the policy and were in fact squarely excluded by its terms; and (2) therefore, Admiral had no duty to defend Basic Research. View "Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law