Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Officer Dennis Nelson, a police officer with the Orem City Police Department (OCPD), was terminated from his position for using excessive force during a booking at the Orem City Jail. The Orem City Employee Appeals Board (Board) upheld the termination. The court of appeals upheld the Board's decision, concluding (1) the OCPD's decision to terminate Nelson was not inconsistent with prior instances of discipline under OCPD's excessive force policy; (2) alternatively, the Board justified any disparate application of OCPD's policy; and (3) the Board did not violate Nelson's procedural due process rights at his hearing before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review; and (2) the court of appeals correctly found that any procedural due process violations at the hearing were harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Orem" on Justia Law

Appellants, several irrigation companies, and Appellee, a family ranch, were water-rights holders in the Sevier River system. Appellants filed a complaint in district court alleging that Appellee's water right had been partially forfeited and partially abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, finding (1) Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture or partial abandonment prior to 2002, and (2) Appellee was protected from partial forfeiture and abandonment after 2002 by a statutory exception. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the post-2002 partial-forfeiture claim, holding that partial forfeiture has always been available in Utah; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment on the abandonment claim, holding that the district court erred in treating the abandonment claim as a claim under the forfeiture statute, as abandonment of a water right is a common-law claim, not a statutory claim. Remanded. View "Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC " on Justia Law

The City police department fired a police officer (Plaintiff) for reporting for duty while under the influence of alcohol. The board of appeals and court of appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the City's alcohol policy, as the portable breath test administered to Plaintiff accurately measured Plaintiff's breath alcohol and blood alcohol content; and (2) Utah Code 34-38-7 does not prohibit the City from deviating from its specified procedure of testing urine to establish blood alcohol content, as the statute does not apply to the City. View "Becker v. Sunset City" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of vaginal rape and forcible anal sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court's exclusion prior instances of sexual conduct between Defendant and the victim under Utah R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(A) was error. Specifically, Defendant unsuccessfully sought to offer evidence that he and the victim had previously engaged in consensual oral and anal sex through his own testimony and the testimony of witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of Defendant's proffered sexual history evidence under Rule 412(b)(2)(A) was error that undermined the jury's verdict. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Wayne Torrie's mother asked law enforcement officers to locate Wayne, who had left home in his family's vehicle, and bring him into custody. A Weber County sheriff's deputy spotted Wayne and pursued him until Wayne reached speeds up to ninety-nine miles per hour. Wayne's vehicle then left the road and rolled over, ejecting Wayne, who ultimately died from his injuries. Wayne's parents filed a lawsuit against the deputy and the county, alleging various theories of negligence in connection with the deputy's pursuit of their son. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants owed no duty to Wayne. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment for the deputy, holding that law enforcement officers engaged in pursuit owe a duty of care to all persons, including fleeing suspects; and (2) affirmed summary judgment for the county, holding that the Torries failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the district court erred in ruling that the county owes a fleeing suspect a duty of care with respect to its law enforcement agency's implementation of policies and procedures regarding vehicular pursuits and with regard to the supervision and training provided to its officers. Remanded. View "Torrie v. Weber County" on Justia Law

In 2004, Sellers entered into a real estate purchase contract with Buyers. A portion of the purchase price was to be financed through a third-party purchase money mortgage by Bank. Another portion of the purchase price was to be provided through seller financing, known as vendor purchase money mortgage. Sellers executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Buyers. Buyers executed a deed of trust naming Bank as beneficiary and a trust deed evidencing Seller financing. Bank's trust deed was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank. After closing, Buyers defaulted on their obligations to both Bank and Sellers. In 2005, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property. The property was then ultimately conveyed to Defendant. In 2009, Sellers assigned their interest in the outstanding Sellers trust deed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a notice of default, stating that it had elected to sell the property to satisfy the amount owing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant had taken the property as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff, as vendor purchase money mortgagee, may have a superior claim of right, but its claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias" on Justia Law

William Hannifin took Willis Nakai when he was fourteen years old and raised him as his own child. Nakai's biological parents did not assert parental control over him or support him financially. Hannifin and Nakai referred to each other as father and son and held themselves out to the community as such. When Hannifin died, he was intestate and had no spouse or biological descendants. Nakai petitioned to be appointed as personal representative of Hannifin's estate, and the district court granted the petition. Max Hill, acting on behalf of himself and other collateral relatives of Hannifin, contested Nakai's claim to the estate. The trial court held that under the doctrine of equitable adoption, Nakai was entitled to inherit from Hannifin's estate as though he were Hannifin's legally adopted son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law doctrine of equitable adoption has been preempted by Utah's enactment of the Probate Code; and (2) because Nakai did not qualify under the Probate Code's intestate succession provisions, the district court erred in concluding that he was entitled to inherit from Hannifin. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Hannifin" on Justia Law

Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Appellant, claiming ownership of Appellant's home pursuant to a trustee's deed it obtained from ReconTrust, a national bank that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in its capacity as trustee of the trust deed that Appellant had executed to secure her mortgage. After an immediate occupancy hearing, the district court entered an order of restitution requiring that Appellant vacate her home. At issue on appeal was whether ReconTrust had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and convey Appellant's home to the FNMA where Utah Code 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limits the power of sale to trustees who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in Utah. The district court concluded that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct the sale under federal law and that federal law preempted Utah law. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order of restitution, holding that the relevant Utah statutes were not preempted by federal law, and therefore, a national bank seeking to foreclose real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. Remanded. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist" on Justia Law

Defendant, a New Mexico resident, was arrested in Utah and indicted on federal charges of coercion and enticement of a fifteen-year-old. Defendant was returned to New Mexico to await trial and remained there for more than two years, returning to Utah on a few occasions to attend proceedings in federal court. The federal charges were subsequently dismissed. Thereafter, the State of Utah charged Defendant with enticement of a minor. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The district court denied Defendant's motion. At issue on appeal was the applicability of the criminal tolling statute, which tolls the limitations period while a defendant is out of the state. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the criminal tolling statute applied to Defendant even though he was present in Utah during the course of the federal court proceedings, as (1) Defendant was only loosely subject to the authority of the State during the federal proceedings against him; and (2) applying the statute to Defendant did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution. View "State v. Canton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were camping with their young son, Sam, when a bear pulled Sam from out of his tent and killed him. The bear was the same bear that had attacked another camper in the same campsite earlier that day. Plaintiffs sued the State, alleging that the State negligently failed to warn them of the dangerous condition created by the bear. The district court initially dismissed Plaintiffs' claims under the permit exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, raising two alternative arguments that the Supreme Court declined to address in Francis I. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the State on both duty and immunity grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State was entitled to present its alternative arguments on remand; (2) the State owed Plaintiffs a duty because it undertook no specific action to protect them as the next group to use the campsite; and (3) the natural condition exception to the Immunity Act did not immunize the State from liability because a bear is not a "natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands." View "Francis v. State" on Justia Law