Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An injunction was entered against Ogden Trece, a criminal street gang, prohibiting Trece members from associating with one another; possessing a firearm in a public place; and harassing or assaulting a witness or victim of any activity of Trece. Weber County filed the complaint for permanent injunction to abate a public nuisance. The County personally served certain gang members as well as published service of process in the local newspaper and on a website. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction. Specifically, the Court held that although Trece was an unincorporated association and amenable to suit, service on Trece was improper where the County did not serve any of Trece's officers or managing or general agents or their functional equivalent and did not establish a sufficient factual basis for service by publication. View "Weber County v. Odgen Trece" on Justia Law

After Larry Sewell fell into a service pit at Xpress Lube, Sewell filed suit against Xpress Lube. A process server left copies of the summons and complaint with an Xpress Lube employee. Bruce Anderson, the sole proprietor of Xpress Lube, later found the summons and complaint and sent them to his insurance agent, who, in turn, attempted to fax the complaint to Travelers Insurance, Anderson's insurance carrier. Travelers, however, never received the fax. Sewell later filed a motion for default judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment against Xpress Lube. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment, holding (1) there was no proper service on Xpress Lube because the sole proprietor was not served in this case, and therefore, the default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction; (2) the district court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; and (3) the district court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. View "Sewell v. Xpress Lube" on Justia Law

In 1993, Jed Gressman was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a term of five years to life. In 1996, Gressman moved to dismiss the charges against him based on newly-discovered evidence. The district court vacated Gressman's conviction based on the newly-discovered evidence. In 2009, Gressman filed suit under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) seeking to obtain his factual innocence and obtain financial assistance. Gressman died during pendency of the suit, so counsel moved to substitute Gressman's widow. The district court substituted Gressman's widow, granted Gressman's widow's motion for summary judgment, and awarded Gressman's widow PCRA assistance payments, including prejudgment interest. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed for further proceedings, holding (1) Gressman's PCRA claims survived his death, and thus, the district court properly substituted Gressman's widow as the plaintiff in this suit; (2) the district court erred when it found that the vacatur of Gressman's conviction conclusively established his factual innocence as defined by the PCRA; and (3) the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Gressman v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a condominium resident, was injured when she tripped on tree root offshoots within the common area of her complex. Plaintiff sued the complex's contract property management company, claiming that the company was negligent in the performance of its maintenance and landscaping responsibilities at the condominium. The district court concluded that the company owed the resident no duty of care and granted the company's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the company lived up to its obligations under the maintenance contract, exercised insufficient control to be treated as a possessor of land, and did not voluntarily undertake root maintenance activities, the company did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care and thus was not negligent. View "Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs." on Justia Law

Susie Stohm, the one-time CFO of ClearOne Communications, was charged with eight federal criminal counts relating to an investigation into certain accounting practices at ClearOne. Strohm was eventually acquitted of all but one count. Strohm and her counsel (Counsel) filed this action against ClearOne, alleging that ClearOne was required to indemnify Strohm for her criminal defense costs. The district court (1) ordered ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for her defense costs subject to certain restrictions, and (2) found that a contract between the parties entitled Counsel to charge ClearOne eighteen percent interests on the amounts that were billed to ClearOne but not timely paid and to collect the costs it expended in enforcing ClearOne's contractual obligation to indemnify Strohm. A unanimous court affirmed the district court affirmed the district court's indemnification decisions in large part, its rulings relating to contract termination rights, its reasonableness determination for fees in the criminal case, and its decision to enforce the eighteen percent interest rate. A majority of the court, however, reversed the district court's decision to allow Counsel to recoup its fees in the collection matter. Remanded.View "Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable.View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for stabbing the victim. At trial, the district court instructed the jury on self-defense. However, the court refused to instruct the jury on defense of a third person because it determined that Defendant's theory that he stabbed the victim in defense of a third person was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a jury could not reasonably have concluded that the third person was in imminent danger at the time of the assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis in the evidence to support Defendant's theory that he acted in defense of the third person when he stabbed the victim.View "State v. Berriel" on Justia Law

In 1999, Greg Schenk purchased shares in Cookietree, Inc. in violation of a 1991 shareholder agreement (agreement). In 2005, Cookietree's board of directors, including Schenk, voted to waive the provisions of the agreement that precluded the stock purchase. Shareholders representing ninety percent of Cookietree's shares, including Schenk, ratified the 1991 stock purchase (collectively, the 2005 waivers). A minority shareholder, Samuel McLaughlin, brought suit challenging the stock purchase. The Supreme Court held that the 2005 waivers were tainted by Schenk's participation in the votes and remanded for a fairness hearing. Cookietree then took several corporate actions it intended to have the same effect of a fairness hearing. Thereafter, the district court held that McLaughlin was still entitled to a fairness hearing. When the case was reassigned to another district court judge, the replacement judge disagreed with the determination that a fairness hearing was necessary and entered summary judgment in favor of Cookietree and Schenk. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate the law of the case doctrine; (2) the court did not violate the Court's mandate in McLaughlin I by declining to hold a fairness hearing; and (3) post-remand corporate action mooted the need for a fairness hearing.View "McLaughlin v. Schenk" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone and was sentenced to a term of incarceration for five years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search was unlawful because, among other reasons, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in his vehicle when they stopped him for a traffic infraction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, as the officers, who had possessed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity, improperly extended the original purpose of the stop, which was to investigate a minor traffic infraction, and instead undertook a prolonged investigation into Defendant's possible drug activity. Remanded. View "State v. Gurule" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, filed a negligence action against a water conservancy district (the District) after one of its water pipelines broke, resulting in damage to Plaintiffs' home. The district court granted summary judgment for the District, concluding that Plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim because they had failed to designate an expert to testify regarding the applicable standard of care. The court of appeals reversed, finding expert testimony was unnecessary because the District's previous internal decision that the pipeline should be replaced sustained a standard of care calling for replacement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the District's determination recommending replacement did not establish that replacement was required by the standard of care; and (2) Plaintiffs' failure to designate an expert to establish a basis for a duty to replace a pipeline was fatal to their negligence claim. View "Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist." on Justia Law