Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district court plainly erred and Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the investigative detective's testimony on redirect examination about other allegations of sexual misconduct against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in referencing and admitting the Utah R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, and the district court did not commit plain error in allowing the evidence to be presented. In so holding, the Court did not address the State's argument that a gap in the record of a criminal trial should always be interpreted in favor of the State. View "State v. Bedell" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and removed from a home he owned with his wife. Soon afterwards, Defendant's wife obtained a restraining order that prohibited Defendant from going to the family home for 150 days. About three weeks after the restraining order expired, Defendant entered the home and brandished a rifle. Defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child. A magistrate found Defendant could not be bound over on the aggravated burglary charge because there was insufficient evidence that Defendant had relinquished his possessory interest in the family home to render his entry unlawful under Utah's burglary statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an estranged spouse may implicitly relinquish his or her possessory rights to the marital home by voluntarily establishing a separate residence; but (2) in this case, the State did not produce sufficient evidence of voluntary relinquishment. Remanded. View "State v. Machan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of dealing in material harmful to a minor. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor prejudiced the jury by making several improper comments during closing arguments. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his arguments based on prosecutorial misconduct for appeal; but (2) nevertheless, defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's conduct at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Larrabee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of robbery for the 1996 attack and sexual assault of a twenty-three-year-old woman. On appeal, Appellant contended that the statute of limitations had run before the State commenced its prosecution of Appellant and, alternatively, that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that the State commenced Appellant's prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations and that Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, where, while this case involved an extraordinary delay, the delay was not the fault of the State and Appellant was not prejudiced. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

From 2009 onward, Judge Kevin Christensen was employed as a justice court judge by four Utah municipalities. Following an investigation, the Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) found that the salary of Judge Christensen exceeded the statutory cap on the salaries of justice court judges who are employed by more than one municipality. The JCC recommended that Judge Christensen be censured and ordered to repay the excess amounts. Before the Supreme Court, Judge Christensen argued that the statutory provision he stipulated to having violated was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of the JCC, holding (1) Judge Christensen cannot challenge for the first time in a disciplinary hearing the constitutionality of a statute he has violated; and (2) none of the mitigating factors offered by Judge Christensen would render the proposed sanctions unjust or improper, and the ordered repayments would not violate Utah law. View "In re Judge Christensen" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were several nonprofit Utah corporations that distributed water to their shareholders for irrigation of agricultural land (collectively, Irrigation Companies). The Irrigation Companies filed a complaint alleging that the water right of Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC (Vincent) had been partially forfeited and partially abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment to Vincent, holding that Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture or abandonment before 2002 and that Vincent was protected from partial forfeiture and abandonment after 2002 by an exception located in Utah Code 73-1-4(3)(f)(i). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the pre-2002 Forfeiture Statute unambiguously permitted partial forfeiture; (2) the exception located in section 73-1-4(3)(f)(i) is not a rule that forfeiture can never occur when a water right is not fully satisfied; and (3) abandonment is a common-law cause of action that requires a showing of intent to relinquish. Remanded. View "Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC" on Justia Law

The Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) entered into an agreement with three canal companies to improve irrigation structures belonging to the canal companies in exchange for rights to the increased water flow arising from the improvements. CUWCD failed to complete its obligations under the agreement and filed a declaratory action to establish its contractual rights. The district court determined that because CUWCD breached its obligations under the agreement, two of the canal companies were entitled to enforce the bargained-for damages provisions, which resulted in CUWCD's losing its prospective water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUWCD's breach was material, and the breach was not excused by the doctrine of impracticability or CUWCD's tender of cash in lieu of performance. View "Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. Upper East Union Irrigation Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for each aggravated murder conviction and three years to life for each attempted murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court erred when it limited and excluded the testimony of the defense's expert witnesses, these errors were harmless; (2) the combined result of these errors did not undermine the Court's confidence in the verdict; and (3) Utah Code 76-3-207.7, which provides the sentencing scheme for first degree felony aggravated murder, is constitutional on its face and was constitutionally applied to Defendant. View "State v. Perea" on Justia Law

In 1990, Chin Lee established a defined-benefit plan, which he converted in 1996 into a profit-sharing plan, both of which were qualified plans. Chin's sole proprietorship contributed funds to the Plan from 1990 to 1995. These funds were invested entirely in U.S. government obligations, the interest on which was tax-exempt. In their 2005 and 2006 tax filings, Chin and Yvonne Lee reported Plan distributions and claimed deductions for federal obligation interest that the Plan earned in those and in earlier years. The Utah State Tax Commission disallowed these deductions, concluding that the Lees' distributions from the Plan were not exempt from state taxation even though the Plan assets were invested solely in U.S. government obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no portion of the Plan distributions was tax-exempt, as (1) the distributions from the Plan qualified for a tax exemption only if the Plan acted as a conduit, allowing the funds to retain their tax-exempt character after distribution; and (2) the Lees' qualified profit-sharing plan was a non-conduit entity, and thus, the funds did not retain their character as interest on U.S. obligations upon distribution to the Lees. Therefore, the distributions were fully taxable by Utah.View "Lee v. Utah State Tax Comm'n " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, who was temporarily staying in the spare bedroom of the victim's father's house, was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Defendant's conviction was based on the holding that he occupied a "position of special trust" in relation to the victim under Utah Code 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The district court and court of appeals both held Defendant was an "adult cohabitant" of a parent of the child, which was one of several positions specifically referenced in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction and remanded, holding (1) the fact that a defendant occupies one of the positions listed in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h) is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the crime of aggravated sexual abuse of a child; (2) for the State to establish aggravated sexual abuse of a child under subsection 4(h), it must prove both that the defendant occupied a "position of authority" over the victim and that the position gave the defendant the ability to "exercise undue influence" over the victim; and (3) because the lower courts did not require the State to establish both elements, Defendant's conviction must be vacated.View "State v. Watkins" on Justia Law