Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a summary judgment ruling but did not enter an order implementing the summary judgment ruling. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification of final judgment. The district court entered a certification order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. Operating under the assumption that the two orders were still forthcoming - a Utah R. Civ. p. 7(f)(2) order implementing the court’s summary judgment ruling and a rule 54(b) certifying order - Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal, instead filing a “motion to proceed with appeal.” The district court denied the motion. Plaintiff stated her intent to appeal the ruling on her motion to proceed with her appeal and the underlying summary judgment ruling. Both parties filed motions for summary disposition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) all orders, including interlocutory orders, must satisfy rule 7(f)(2); (2) entry of an order that is rule 7(f)(2) compliant is a prerequisite to rule 54(b) certification; (3) a single order may satisfy both rules 7(f)(2) and 54(b), but to do so it must strictly comply with the requirements of both rules; and (4) the certification order in this case did not meet the requirements of a combined rule 7(f) and rule 54(b) order. View "Butler v. Hon. Thomas L. Kay" on Justia Law

Nearly twenty years ago Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. After Appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Appellant unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Appellant’s post-conviction petition and allowed him to amend his petition. Ultimately, Appellant filed a fifth amended petition for relief under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), which the post-conviction court (PCC) denied. Appellant appealed the denial of his fifth amended petition, raising numerous claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA failed because he did not establish he had a constitutional right to funded post-conviction counsel, and the PCC did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant further PCRA funding; (2) the PCC did not err in rejecting several of Appellant’s post-conviction motions; and (3) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-phase, penalty-phase, or appellate proceedings. View "Menzies v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five securities law violations and one count of maintaining a pattern of unlawful activity related to an investment scheme. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s five securities law convictions, concluding that Defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to a jury instruction stating that a “note is presumed to be a security” because that instruction impermissibly relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of the securities crimes with which Defendant was charged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s five securities law convictions, holding that the instruction at issue was an accurate statement of law and not a burden-shifting evidentiary presumption. View "State v. Kelson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction because the court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah’s aggravated kidnapping statute. The court of appeals upheld Petitioner’s LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner’s sentence of LWOP, holding that the district court erred when it considered only those aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission instead of broadly considering the interests of justice required by the aggravated kidnapping statute. Remanded. View "State v. Lebeau" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to patronizing a prostitute in Layton City after negotiating a plea in abeyance agreement. The agreement contained the condition that Defendant would commit “no violations of law.” Defendant was subsequently charged in Sunset City with sexual solicitation. The action was dismissed after Defendant entered into a diversion agreement with Sunset City. Thereafter, the Second District Court held a hearing to determine whether Defendant violated the plea in abeyance agreement condition requiring that he commit no further violations of law. The district court concluded that the “no violations of law” condition in the plea abeyance agreement required a conviction, and entering into the diversion agreement did not constitute a conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecution may show that the defendant failed to comply with the condition through evidence of misconduct other than a conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution need not provide proof of a conviction to establish that a defendant failed to comply with a plea in abeyance condition prohibiting further violations of law; and (2) the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant failed to comply with a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement. View "Layton City v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner entered a plea in abeyance to a charge of lewdness that ultimately culminated in a conviction. In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of a second act of lewdness. In 2011 and 2012, Petitioner was subject to further lewdness charges. Petitioner was charged with felonies in light of his prior convictions. At this point, Petitioner sought to challenge his 2010 conviction, alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal the 2010 decision under the standards set forth in Utah R. App. P. 4(f) and Manning v. State. The justice court denied Petitioner’s motion. On de novo appeal to the district court, the court determined that Petitioner had waived the right to assert the denial of his right to appeal under Manning by waiting too long to assert that claim. Petitioner sought extraordinary relief challenging the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Rule 4(f) governed Petitioner’s motion to reinstate his appeal from justice court to district court in a manner foreclosing the district court’s waiver analysis; (2) the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion; and (3) the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable. View "Ralphs v. District Court" on Justia Law

James Garside acquired shares in South Despain Ditch Company in contravention of corporate restrictions on transferability of South Despain shares. After the sale, South Despain refused to issue certificates in Garside’s name and recognize him as a shareholder, claiming that the sale violated the transfer restrictions and was therefore was void. Garside filed suit, challenging the enforceability of the restrictions and asserting that their enforcement put South Despain in breach of its obligations in contract, fiduciary duty and the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of South Despain. Garside died during litigation, and Paul Southam proceeded on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the restrictions on the transfer of South Despain shares were enforceable, and thus, Southam acquired no viable rights as a shareholder. Absent a shareholder interest in the corporation, Southam lacked standing to pursue any of his claims. View "Southam v. S. Despain Ditch Co." on Justia Law

Under the terms of a plea agreement Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a second-degree felony. Defendant and his wife appeared in court for their joint preliminary hearing, but a preliminary hearing never occurred. Eventually, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that because he was never bound over following either a preliminary hearing or an express waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, the district court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant, determining that the guilty plea was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is error for a district court to accept a guilty plea without holding a preliminary hearing or obtaining an express waiver from the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing, but (2) such an error does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The district court neither conducted a preliminary hearing nor obtained a waiver of Defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter his guilty plea because he was neither afforded the right to a preliminary hearing nor did he expressly waive his right to a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as set forth in State v. Smith, which the Court also issued today, a district court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing, obtain a waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, or issue a bindover order is a nonjurisdictional defect. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two siblings owned certain parcels of land in Park City as tenants in common with United Park City Mines (UPCM). Appellant and UPCM decided jointly to develop the parcels, and Wasatch County approved the parties’ development plan. UPCM was subsequently acquired by Mountain Resort Developments’ (MRD) parent company. MRD and Appellant could not agree how to jointly develop the property or on a purchase price for Appellant’s interest in the parcels. The parties ultimately entered a settlement agreement and exchanged interests in the parcels. After the exchange of deeds under the settlement agreement, MRD asserted that Appellant had not retained development rights under the development plan. Appellant sued for breach of contract, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for MRD on all of Appellant’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s breach of contract claim failed because Appellant and MRD did not agree to continue to develop their properties in compliance with the development plan, and therefore, there was no reasonable basis for Appellant to believe she would retain development rights as detailed in that plan; and (2) the remainder of Appellant’s claims failed because Appellant did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of those causes of action. View "Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., LLC " on Justia Law