Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 8, 2012, legislative amendments to the Indigent Defense Act (IDA) became effective. The amendments override the Supreme Court’s construction of the prior version of the IDA by precluding an indigent defendant in a criminal action from retaining private counsel while requesting public defense resources from the government. In the instant criminal case, Defendant was charged with object rape, a first-degree felony. Defendant retained private counsel and, in April 2012, filed a motion requesting the provision of government-funded defense resources. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Defendant was entitled to the pre-amendment of the IDA applied because Defendant was entitled to the version of the IDA in effect at the time he filed his motion requesting defense resources. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the pre-amendment version of the IDA should apply in this case because the conduct being regulated by the IDA is the exercise of a mature right to indigent defense resources, and the law in effect at the time that Defendant exercised that mature right was the unamended version of the IDA. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2012, legislative amendments to the Indigent Defense Act (IDA) became effective. The amendments override the Supreme Court’s construction of the prior version of the IDA by precluding an indigent defendant in a criminal action from retaining private counsel while requesting public defense resources from the government. In the instant criminal case, Defendant was charged with murder. Defendant retained private counsel, and, on May 3, 2012, filed a motion asking the district court to order the provision of government-funded defense resources. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the IDA regulated a matter of procedure, and thus, the amended statute applied retroactively to cases pending on its effective date. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that on the date Defendant filed his motion requesting the provision of defense resources, his right to request those resources was fully vested. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the law in place on May 3, 2012, and subsequent changes to the law could not be applied retroactively to undermine his motion. Remanded. View "State v. Folsom" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2012, legislative amendments to the Indigent Defense Act (IDA) became effective. The amendments override the Supreme Court’s construction of the prior version of the IDA by precluding an indigent defendant in a criminal action from retaining private counsel while requesting public defense resources from the government. In the instant criminal case, Defendant was charged with four first-degree felonies. About one month after the 2012 amendments to the IDA became effective, Defendant, who was represented by private counsel, filed a motion requesting government-funded defense resources under the pre-amendment version of the IDA. The district court granted the motion, determining that the earlier version of the statute applied because the IDA amendments were substantive and because the pre-amendment version was the one in effect at the time of Defendant’s alleged offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2012 version of the IDA should apply in this case because the conduct being regulated by the IDA is the exercise of a mature right to indigent defense resources, and the law in effect at the time that Defendant exercised that mature right was the amended version of the IDA; and (2) the 2012 amendments, as applied to this case, are constitutional. View "State v. Steinly" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sodomy on a child and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The criminal information was filed on May 25, 2012. After retaining private counsel, Defendant filed a motion for funding for necessary defense resources, asserting that he was indigent and that the version of the Indigent Defense Act (IDA) in effect at the time of his alleged offenses controlled the disposition of his motion for funding. Salt Lake County opposed the motion, arguing that the amendments to the IDA that became effective on May 8, 2012, which foreclose an indigent defendant in a criminal action from retaining private counsel while requesting public defense resources from the government, applied to this case. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the 2012 amendments were procedural, and therefore, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed but on a different ground, holding that the conduct being regulated by the IDA is the exercise of a mature right to indigent defense resources, and the law in effect at the time that Defendant exercised that right was the amended version of the IDA. View "State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez" on Justia Law

After being injured in an automobile accident, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the other driver, who was uninsured. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff owned an insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers intervened in the lawsuit, thus becoming a defendant. The parties later stipulated to dismissing the uninsured driver. Farmers sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Plaintiff’s policy. The district court granted Farmers’ motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory review of the district court’s order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that because Plaintiff had not filed a notice of appeal, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider her case. View "McGibbon v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

In 1985, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later filed two claims under Utah’s Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). The first petition was denied, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The second petition was also denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the second petition in October 2012. While Appellant’s appeal of the second petition was pending, he filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the district court’s denial of the second petition, alleging newly discovered evidence. The district court denied the motion as untimely. In March 2012, Appellant filed a third PCRA petition. The clerk of court did not ultimately assign the third petition a new case number but filed it under the case number already assigned to the second petition. The district court dismissed the third petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s rule 60(b) motion on grounds that it was untimely; but (2) reversed the court’s dismissal of the third petition, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the third petition regardless of the case number assigned to it. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, two counts of unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, possession of an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, and failure to signal. Defendant appealed his convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish Defendant’s possession of the contraband; and (2) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible conduct during trial. View "State v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a plea agreement and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to remand for appointment of counsel. Shortly thereafter, Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on an “irreparable breakdown in the attorney client relationship.” The Supreme Court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw. The district court appointed two new attorneys to represent Defendant on appeal. Defendant then filed another pro se motion to remove his new counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion and directed that any further motions seeking to disqualify counsel be supported by adequately documented allegations. Defendant filed three more pro se motions to remove counsel. The motions were deemed denied. Defendant’s new counsel then filed this motion to withdraw, making allegations similar to the motion to withdraw filed by Defendant’s first appellate attorney. The Supreme Court granted the motion and held that, by repeatedly engaging in extreme dilatory, disruptive, and threatening conduct, Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel for the remainder of the appellate proceedings. View "State v. Allgier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop, a third degree felony under Utah Code 41-6a-210. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the mental state required for the conviction. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The court of appeals did not, however, provide guidance on remand regarding a correct jury instruction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction because the instruction given to the jury did not specify the essential mens rea elements of the failure-to-respond charge; and (2) held that the court of appeals did not err in asking the trial court to determine, in the first instance, the proper mens rea instruction. The Court then exercised its discretion to provide such guidance. View "State v. Bird" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Campbell sold investments in Beverly Hills Development Corporation (BHDC) while he was a registered agent of Horner, Townsend & Kent, Inc. (HTK), a broker-dealer licensed to sell securities in the state. After resigning from HTK, Campbell began soliciting investments from and selling BHDC notes to Plaintiffs. When they discovered that they had been scammed, Plaintiffs filed suit against Campbell and HTK. During discovery, Campbell pleaded no contest to selling unregistered securities and was ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted summary judgment for HTK on Plaintiffs’ claims of securities violations, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent training and supervision, and regarding a release signed by one investor; and (2) denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in which they alleged negligence, control-person liability, and material aid. The Supreme Court remanded in part, holding that the district court erred when it denied all of Plaintiffs’ requests for attorney fees. The Court otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Burdick v. Townsend" on Justia Law