Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of securities fraud and theft based on his alleged operation of a Ponzi scheme. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that eight of the ten charges were time barred under the applicable statutes of limitations. The district court denied the motion, concluding that securities fraud and theft are continuing offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s conclusion was in error because neither securities fraud nor theft is a continuing offense. Remanded for the district court to re-evaluate the timeliness of the charges. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, the State charged Defendant with multiple counts of communications fraud and one count of a pattern of unlawful activity. The district court (1) dismissed the first case on statute-of-limitations grounds after concluding that communications fraud is not a continuing offense; and (2) dismissed the second case as an improper attempt to prosecute Defendant for the same substantive offense as in the previous case. The State appealed both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of both cases, holding (1) in the first case, the statute of limitations had run for the charged crimes; and (2) in the second case, the State failed to separately challenge the district court’s dismissal, and therefore, the dismissal of the second case is also affirmed. View "State v. Kay" on Justia Law

While Mother was incarcerated, Father cared for the couple’s children. Following an adjudication of neglect, the district court approved a service plan for Father that included reunification services but did not order that reunification services be provided to Mother. After Father was incarcerated, the juvenile court established a primary permanency goal of adoption and terminated Father’s reunification services. After a termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a juvenile court is required to order reasonable reunification services to an incarcerated parent unless it determines that those services would be detrimental to the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, if a child’s primary permanency goal does not contemplate reunification with an incarcerated parent, the juvenile court need not order reunification services. Remanded. View "L.G. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was seventeen and a half when he murdered a staff member of the residential treatment center for youth where he was temporarily residing. Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder. The jury, after considering the mitigating circumstances inherent to Defendant’s youth, nevertheless sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, bringing numerous constitutional challenges to his sentence and alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the sentencing proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was constitutional and that Defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

Appellant was seventeen and one-half years old when he murdered the victim in this case. Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, and the parties proceeded to a sentencing hearing before a jury. Following the sentencing hearing, eleven of the twelve jurors voted to sentence Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant appealed, bringing several constitutional challenges to his sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s sentence, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was constitutional; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

David Garver and Katheryn Garver filed a medical malpractice action against several medical providers. The claims brought by David were referred to arbitration. The Garvers filed an appeal after the arbitration panel issued its decision but before the district court issued a judgment conforming to the arbitration award. The district court subsequently dismissed the Garvers’ claims. The Garvers filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) arguing that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction by their premature notice of appeal, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The district court agreed and purported to reissue the judgment. The Garvers then filed another notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to issue its original judgment and erred in assuming it was divested of jurisdiction by the Garvers’ premature notice of appeal; and (2) because the Garvers failed to timely appeal the original judgment, the Court lacked jurisdiction to address any challenge to the merits. View "Garver v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

A police officer filed a citation issued against Appellant for an open container offense in justice court, thus initiating a criminal case against Appellant. After Appellant failed to appear or forfeit bail on her justice court charge, prosecutors filed an information in district court charging Appellant with DUI, an alcohol-restricted driver offense, and an open container violation. Appellant subsequently paid her justice court fine, thus accepting a conviction in justice court on the open container offense. Despite the justice court conviction, prosecutors moved forward on the information filed in the district court. Defendant moved to dismiss. The district court (1) dismissed the open container charge, determining that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited a serial prosecution on that charge; but (2) denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss the other two charges, concluding that the charges were not precluded by Utah Code 76-1-403, which adopts a principle of criminal claim preclusion for offenses arising out of a “single criminal episode.” The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss the remaining two charges, holding that the preclusion principle in section 403 was inapplicable in this case because there was no “prosecuting attorney” involved in Appellant’s first offense. View "State v. Ririe" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After appealing, Appellant began pursuing postconviction relief. More than two years after Appellant’s second petition for postconviction relief under Utah’s Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) was denied, Appellant filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the denial of the second petition on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The district court denied Appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion as untimely. Appellant subsequently filed a new petition for postconviction relief based upon the same newly discovered evidence presented in his Rule 60(b) motion. The clerk of court, however, did not assign the third petition a new case number but instead filed it under the case number already assigned to the second petition. As a result, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the third petition for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant appealed from both the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion and the dismissal of his third petition. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion; but (2) reversed the court’s dismissal of the third petition, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the third petition regardless of the case number assigned to it. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Father and Mother conceived a child together in Pennsylvania. Due to their age difference, the sexual relationship between Mother and Father was prohibited by Pennsylvania criminal law. Mother placed the child for adoption in Utah. After Father became aware of the adoptive parents’ adoption petition he filed a motion to intervene in the Utah adoption proceedings. The district court denied the motion to intervene, citing Utah Code 78B-6-111, which forbids a biological father from challenging an adoption when his child was conceived as a result of conduct that “would constitute any sexual offense” described in the Utah Criminal Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 78B-6-111 does not apply in this case because the statute does not apply to sexual conduct lacking any jurisdiction nexus in Utah. View "In re Adoption of J.M.S." on Justia Law

Duane Serrano was injured in a car accident while driving a truck within the scope of his employment with Provo City. More than four years later, Serrano quit his job. Serrano subsequently applied for permanent total disability compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act. On remand, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Serrano was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his accident and awarded him permanent disability payments. The Utah Labor Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Serrano proved the elements of a permanent total disability claim; (2) the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by initially denying Serrano’s claim but then awarding benefits after the Labor Commission instructed her to reconsider the evidence; and (3) award of benefits should not commence on the date that Serrano was deemed to be permanently and totally disabled because of the extraordinary delay in resolving Serrano’s claim. View "Provo City v. Utah Labor Comm’n" on Justia Law