Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit related to her husband’s exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff served numerous defendants within within 120 days of filing in accordance with the service-of-process provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) but did not serve defendant Kerr Corporation until five years later. Kerr filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it had not been timely served. The district court denied the motion. At issue in this appeal was Rule 4(b)’s provision that “where one defendant in a case is served, other defendants may be served at any time prior to trial.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff complied with Rule 4(b)’s service of process requirements because she served Kerr prior to trial and while previously served defendants remained parties to the action. View "St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp." on Justia Law

Law Firm represented an employee in a workers’ compensation claim. Under a settlement agreement, the employee received a disability payment, part of which was earmarked as attorney fees. Defendant also agreed to pay the employee’s medical bills, which included bills from the University of Utah Health Care (Hospital). Law Firm sought to secure additional attorney fees from Hospital and filed an action alleging that it was entitled under a “common fund” theory to recover a percentage of the payments Hospital had received as a result of Law Firm’s efforts in pursuing the employee’s claim. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the issue was a matter for the Labor Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. Law Firm subsequently asserted a claim before the Labor Commission against Hospital, again arguing for a right to recover fees on a common fund theory. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the claim, concluding that Law Firm had received all the fees it was statutorily due. Thereafter, Law Firm filed a further attempt at a common fund claim in the district court. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that further litigation of the matter was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the elements of the doctrine of issue preclusion were amply satisfied in this case. View "Davis & Sanchez, PLLC v. Univ. of Utah Health Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several entities she believed to be responsible for her husband’s death. As required by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Plaintiff first presented her malpractice claims to a prelitigation panel. During the ensuing litigation, designated her expert witnesses. The district court struck the witnesses because Plaintiff’s attorney revealed confidential information about them about the proceedings before the panel. Plaintiff then named two additional expert witnesses. The district court struck the replacement experts because they were designated after the cutoff date established by the scheduling order. Because Plaintiff was then deprived of any experts to establish the necessary elements of her malpractice claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by striking the original experts without inquiring whether the confidential information revealed to them influenced their opinions; and (2) erred when it excluded the second set of witnesses because it applied the wrong rule when it sanctioned Plaintiff for violating the scheduling order, and moreover, the sanction of witness exclusion was not warranted in this case. View "Coroles v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, possession of a weapon by a restricted person, and obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s request for lesser-included-offense jury instructions on several variants of unintentional homicide, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err by preventing Defendant from asking twelve questions during voir dire; (3) evidence that Defendant was arrested with a stolen rifle in his car one month after the murder was properly admitted; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the weapons charge from the other charges. View "State v. Reece" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the effect of a subordination agreement between fewer than all of the creditors who hold an interest in the same collateral. Appellant VCS, Inc. provided labor and materials to improve real property located in a planned unit development. The developer, Acord Meadows, secured funding for the project from America West Bank and Utah Funding Commercial. The loans were secured with trust deeds to the development properties, and the lenders entered into subordination agreements among themselves that altered the priority arrangement of their trust deeds. Because VCS was never paid for its work, it filed a mechanic’s lien covering several lots of the development, four of which were sold through a foreclosure sale after Acord defaulted on its loans from Utah Funding. VCS claimed it was entitled to payment of its mechanic’s lien because its lien had priority over Utah Funding’s liens. The district court ruled that VCS’s mechanic’s lien was extinguished by the foreclosure of Utah Funding’s liens. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the partial subordination approach to the issue in this case, holding that under the partial subordination approach, VCS’s mechanic’s lien was extinguished once Utah Funding’s lien was foreclosed upon. View "VCS Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of securities fraud and theft based on his alleged operation of a Ponzi scheme. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that eight of the ten charges were time barred under the applicable statutes of limitations. The district court denied the motion, concluding that securities fraud and theft are continuing offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s conclusion was in error because neither securities fraud nor theft is a continuing offense. Remanded for the district court to re-evaluate the timeliness of the charges. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, the State charged Defendant with multiple counts of communications fraud and one count of a pattern of unlawful activity. The district court (1) dismissed the first case on statute-of-limitations grounds after concluding that communications fraud is not a continuing offense; and (2) dismissed the second case as an improper attempt to prosecute Defendant for the same substantive offense as in the previous case. The State appealed both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of both cases, holding (1) in the first case, the statute of limitations had run for the charged crimes; and (2) in the second case, the State failed to separately challenge the district court’s dismissal, and therefore, the dismissal of the second case is also affirmed. View "State v. Kay" on Justia Law

While Mother was incarcerated, Father cared for the couple’s children. Following an adjudication of neglect, the district court approved a service plan for Father that included reunification services but did not order that reunification services be provided to Mother. After Father was incarcerated, the juvenile court established a primary permanency goal of adoption and terminated Father’s reunification services. After a termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a juvenile court is required to order reasonable reunification services to an incarcerated parent unless it determines that those services would be detrimental to the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, if a child’s primary permanency goal does not contemplate reunification with an incarcerated parent, the juvenile court need not order reunification services. Remanded. View "L.G. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was seventeen and a half when he murdered a staff member of the residential treatment center for youth where he was temporarily residing. Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder. The jury, after considering the mitigating circumstances inherent to Defendant’s youth, nevertheless sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, bringing numerous constitutional challenges to his sentence and alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the sentencing proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was constitutional and that Defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

Appellant was seventeen and one-half years old when he murdered the victim in this case. Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, and the parties proceeded to a sentencing hearing before a jury. Following the sentencing hearing, eleven of the twelve jurors voted to sentence Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant appealed, bringing several constitutional challenges to his sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s sentence, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was constitutional; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law