Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a tort suit against Provo City under the Governmental Immunity Act. The complaint was dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to submit an undertaking or bond as required by the statute. Plaintiffs filed a second complaint, this time with the bond required by statute, but by the time the case was refiled, it was untimely under the Act. Provo City moved to dismiss. In response, Plaintiffs pointed to the Savings Statute, a provision outside the Governmental Immunity Act that generally extends the statute of limitations for plaintiffs when a complaint is dismissed other than on the merits. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Act was complementary to other laws like the Savings Statute, and thus the Savings Statue was applicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act forecloses the applicability of the Savings Statute. View "Craig v. Provo City" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old student at Juan Diego Catholic High School suffered serious and life-threatening injuries while using a lift to replace light bulbs in the auditorium, during his drama class. The lift tipped over as students pushed it from one light fixture to another, causing him to suffer life-threatening injuries, including traumatic brain injury. His parents filed a lawsuit, individually and as parents and guardians of the student, claiming negligence and vicarious liability, and seeking to bring a personal claim for loss of filial consortium. The district court dismissed the loss of filial consortium claim and certified the dismissal as final. The Utah Supreme Court vacated, adopting a cause of action for loss of filial consortium to allow parents to recover for loss of filial consortium due to tortious injury to a minor child in cases where the injury meets the definition set forth in Utah Code section 30-2-11, the spousal consortium statute. The court concluded that such a cause of action is not legislatively preempted. View "Benda v. Catholic Diocese of Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Alan Peterson, the former president of The Layton Companies, Inc. and Layton Construction Co. (Layton), had a falling out with Layton management and later founded SIRQ, a competing construction company. Alleging that Layton exhibited a malicious, wrongful intent in its interactions with SIRQ and Peterson (collectively, Plaintiffs), Plaintiffs sued Layton for intentional interference with economic relations and “false light” invasion of privacy. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the intentional interference and false light claims. While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court revised the common law of intentional interference with economic relations. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the tortious interference claim, holding that parties to cases pending on appeal are entitled to the benefit of an alteration of the common law; and (2) reversed and remanded on the “false light” invasion of privacy claim, holding that the trial judge in this case failed to fulfill the gatekeeping role of assuring that the jury considers only statements that are capable of defamatory meaning. View "SIRQ, Inc. v. Layton Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the child of Mother and Father was born, a process server personally delivered a prebirth notice (“the Notice”) to Father informing him that Mother intended to place Child up for adoption. The Notice advised Father that he may lose all rights relating to Child if he did not take certain steps within thirty days. Forty-two days after he received the Notice, Father filed a paternity action and affidavit with the district court. Adoptive Parents subsequently petitioned to adopt Child. Mother then gave birth to Child, and Mother and Father executed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity naming Father as Child’s father. The next day, Mother relinquished her parental rights and surrendered Child to Adoptive Parents. Father filed a motion to intervene in Child’s adoption proceeding. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Father did not meet the requirements of the Prebirth Notice Statute by pursuing his rights within the Statute’s thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Notice did not contain all of the information the Statute requires, Father’s failure to comply within the thirty-day time frame did not deprive him of his ability to contest Child’s adoption. View "In re Baby Q." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In the course of one day, Defendant entered her initial appearance in district court, was appointed counsel, waived her right to a preliminary hearing, pled guilty, waived the minimum two-day waiting period for sentencing, and received judgment and sentence. Defendant filed a notice of appeal without filing a motion to withdraw her plea, challenging her plea as unknowingly and involuntary. Although the plea withdrawal statute cuts of a defendant’s right to a direct appeal once sentencing is announced, Defendant argued that the plea withdrawal statute merely allows a defendant to pursue either a direct appeal or postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with caselaw, the plea withdrawal statute bars direct appeals once sentencing takes place, thus requiring defendants to pursue post-conviction relief; and (2) because Defendant had not pursued a Post-Conviction Remedies Act proceeding, her claims were not ripe for review. View "State v. Gailey" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Power is required by governing regulations to provide “indicative pricing” to a producer seeking to pursue a power purchase agreement. In 2012, Ellis-Hall Consultants, which is involved in the development of wind power projects and sought to sell power to PacifiCorp through its Rocky Mountain Power division, received an indicative pricing proposal. Rocky Mountain Power later rescinded that proposal and refused to proceed with negotiations on a power purchase agreement under its earlier indicative pricing because the Utah Public Service Commission had since adopted new pricing methodology. The Commission concluded that Ellis-Hall was not entitled to continue to rely on the methodology used in Rocky Mountain Power’s indicative pricing proposal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ellis-Hall was entitled to proceed in reliance on the methodology set forth in the indicative pricing proposal it received from Rocky Mountain Power. View "Ellis-Hall v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The jury imposed a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a rule 23B hearing addressing Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court stayed the remainder of Defendant’s appeal pending the outcome of those proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain DNA and mtDNA evidence; (2) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (3) even if the remainder of Defendant’s claims established errors, any such errors would not have resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Attorney Donald Gilbert represented the Utah Down Syndrome Association and several of its founders in litigation between the Association and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. Gilbert filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging (1) a 2008 district court judgment ordering Gilbert to disgorge $30,000 taken from Foundation bank accounts to pay his attorney fees, (2) an injunction that originally barred Gilbert’s clients from paying him with Foundation funds, (3) an order denying Gilbert’s motion to vacate the 2008 judgment, and (4) an order denying Gilbert’s motion for relief from the 2008 judgment. The Supreme Court denied Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) Gilbert unreasonably delayed seeking extraordinary relief from the injunction, the disgorgement order, and the denial of his motion to vacate; and (2) Gilbert failed to pursue the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. View "Gilbert v. Third Dist. Court Judges" on Justia Law

In this, the second appeal arising out of a lawsuit against Westgate Resorts alleging violations of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Westgate challenged an arbitration panel’s award of attorney fees to Shawn Adel and Consumer Protection Group, LLC (collectively, CPG). In the first appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the panel’s award of damages against Westgate. Here, Westgate argued, inter alia, that the arbitration panel had no authority to award attorney fees for the court proceedings that confirmed the panel’s decision on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel’s award of fees for court proceedings confirming the panel’s own decisions is void because the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act does not authorize attorney fees for such proceedings; (2) the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act allows the panel’s award of attorney fees expended during arbitration; and (3) CPG is entitled to attorney fees for this appeal. View "Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law

Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares’ application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law