Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Twelve years ago, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants. The district court eventually dismissed the case for failure to prosecute but did not indicate whether the case was dismissed without prejudice or pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a new action asserting the same claims against the same defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the dismissal operated as a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b). The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the decision in Panos v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc. was controlling. In Panos, the court of appeals held that when a judge dismisses a case for failure to prosecute but fails to explicitly provide that the case is dismissed with prejudice or pursuant to Rule 41(b), the presumption is that the case is dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court overruled Panos and held (1) the plain text of Rule 41(b) is clear that the presumption of prejudice applies broadly in most cases; (2) in this case, in the absence of a showing that he relied on Panos, Plaintiff was not entitled to a prospective-application of the ruling; and (3) this case should have been dismissed with prejudice. View "Cannon v. Holmes" on Justia Law

In 2005, Connor Libby and Elena Chapa (collectively, Defendants) signed credit card agreements with Federated Capital Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The agreements contained a forum selection clause and choice of law provision that adopted Utah substantive and procedural law to govern any dispute under the contract. The agreements required Defendants to make monthly payments to the address specific on their billings statements, and each billing statement required Defendants to send their payments to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendants defaulted in 2006. In 2012, Federated filed separate claims in separate proceedings against Defendants. In each proceeding, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, ruling that Utah’s borrowing statute required the court to apply Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations, thereby barring Federated’s claims. Federated appealed, arguing that the agreement’s forum selection clause precluded the application of Utah’s borrowing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the borrowing statute applied to and barred Federated’s causes of action. View "Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby" on Justia Law

Rufus Call Willey, the founder of R.C. Willey & Son, died in 1954. The day before he died, he signed a last will and testament. In 2011, two of the decedent’s grandchildren, Helen Immelt and Don McBroom, filed a complaint against their grandmother; their uncle, his brother, and his attorney; and a bank. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had deprived Plaintiffs of their rightful inheritance under the terms of the decedent’s will. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all of Immelt’s claims and most of Broom’s claims were barred by the terms of a 1973 agreement; and (2) McBroom’s breach of fiduciary duty claims were circular and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "McBroom v. Child" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action seeking to establish his paternity in and custody over a child he believed to be his son (Child). Both Plaintiff and Mother were residents of Colorado. Mother travelled to Utah two days before Child’s birth and gave birth to Child in Utah. Mother then relinquished Child to a Utah-based adoption agency. For reasons unrelated to this appeal, the district court dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. After remand, Adoptive Couple intervened in Plaintiff’s action to request that his suit be dismissed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Utah was not Child’s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing Plaintiff’s case on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. View "Nevares v. Adoptive Couple" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a tort suit against Provo City under the Governmental Immunity Act. The complaint was dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to submit an undertaking or bond as required by the statute. Plaintiffs filed a second complaint, this time with the bond required by statute, but by the time the case was refiled, it was untimely under the Act. Provo City moved to dismiss. In response, Plaintiffs pointed to the Savings Statute, a provision outside the Governmental Immunity Act that generally extends the statute of limitations for plaintiffs when a complaint is dismissed other than on the merits. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Act was complementary to other laws like the Savings Statute, and thus the Savings Statue was applicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act forecloses the applicability of the Savings Statute. View "Craig v. Provo City" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old student at Juan Diego Catholic High School suffered serious and life-threatening injuries while using a lift to replace light bulbs in the auditorium, during his drama class. The lift tipped over as students pushed it from one light fixture to another, causing him to suffer life-threatening injuries, including traumatic brain injury. His parents filed a lawsuit, individually and as parents and guardians of the student, claiming negligence and vicarious liability, and seeking to bring a personal claim for loss of filial consortium. The district court dismissed the loss of filial consortium claim and certified the dismissal as final. The Utah Supreme Court vacated, adopting a cause of action for loss of filial consortium to allow parents to recover for loss of filial consortium due to tortious injury to a minor child in cases where the injury meets the definition set forth in Utah Code section 30-2-11, the spousal consortium statute. The court concluded that such a cause of action is not legislatively preempted. View "Benda v. Catholic Diocese of Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Alan Peterson, the former president of The Layton Companies, Inc. and Layton Construction Co. (Layton), had a falling out with Layton management and later founded SIRQ, a competing construction company. Alleging that Layton exhibited a malicious, wrongful intent in its interactions with SIRQ and Peterson (collectively, Plaintiffs), Plaintiffs sued Layton for intentional interference with economic relations and “false light” invasion of privacy. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the intentional interference and false light claims. While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court revised the common law of intentional interference with economic relations. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the tortious interference claim, holding that parties to cases pending on appeal are entitled to the benefit of an alteration of the common law; and (2) reversed and remanded on the “false light” invasion of privacy claim, holding that the trial judge in this case failed to fulfill the gatekeeping role of assuring that the jury considers only statements that are capable of defamatory meaning. View "SIRQ, Inc. v. Layton Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the child of Mother and Father was born, a process server personally delivered a prebirth notice (“the Notice”) to Father informing him that Mother intended to place Child up for adoption. The Notice advised Father that he may lose all rights relating to Child if he did not take certain steps within thirty days. Forty-two days after he received the Notice, Father filed a paternity action and affidavit with the district court. Adoptive Parents subsequently petitioned to adopt Child. Mother then gave birth to Child, and Mother and Father executed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity naming Father as Child’s father. The next day, Mother relinquished her parental rights and surrendered Child to Adoptive Parents. Father filed a motion to intervene in Child’s adoption proceeding. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Father did not meet the requirements of the Prebirth Notice Statute by pursuing his rights within the Statute’s thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Notice did not contain all of the information the Statute requires, Father’s failure to comply within the thirty-day time frame did not deprive him of his ability to contest Child’s adoption. View "In re Baby Q." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In the course of one day, Defendant entered her initial appearance in district court, was appointed counsel, waived her right to a preliminary hearing, pled guilty, waived the minimum two-day waiting period for sentencing, and received judgment and sentence. Defendant filed a notice of appeal without filing a motion to withdraw her plea, challenging her plea as unknowingly and involuntary. Although the plea withdrawal statute cuts of a defendant’s right to a direct appeal once sentencing is announced, Defendant argued that the plea withdrawal statute merely allows a defendant to pursue either a direct appeal or postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with caselaw, the plea withdrawal statute bars direct appeals once sentencing takes place, thus requiring defendants to pursue post-conviction relief; and (2) because Defendant had not pursued a Post-Conviction Remedies Act proceeding, her claims were not ripe for review. View "State v. Gailey" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Power is required by governing regulations to provide “indicative pricing” to a producer seeking to pursue a power purchase agreement. In 2012, Ellis-Hall Consultants, which is involved in the development of wind power projects and sought to sell power to PacifiCorp through its Rocky Mountain Power division, received an indicative pricing proposal. Rocky Mountain Power later rescinded that proposal and refused to proceed with negotiations on a power purchase agreement under its earlier indicative pricing because the Utah Public Service Commission had since adopted new pricing methodology. The Commission concluded that Ellis-Hall was not entitled to continue to rely on the methodology used in Rocky Mountain Power’s indicative pricing proposal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ellis-Hall was entitled to proceed in reliance on the methodology set forth in the indicative pricing proposal it received from Rocky Mountain Power. View "Ellis-Hall v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law