Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was (1) how Utah Code 30-3-5(1)(e) should be interpreted in correlation with Utah Code 75-2-804, and (2) the proper interpretation of “express terms” in section 75-2-804(2). Tyler Hertzske and Linda Snyder each claimed sole entitlement to the death benefits of a life insurance policy held by Edward Hertzske, deceased. The district court granted summary judgment to Tyler, concluding that Tyler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In so holding, the judge concluded (1) where section 30-3-5(1)(e) was not considered or included in the divorce proceedings, it did not apply, and (2) the Policy did not contain “express terms” that would except it from revocation under section 75-2-804(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 75-2-804(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy is revoked upon divorce; (2) section 30-3-5(1)(e) does not apply in this instance, and, rather, section 75-2-804 governs; (3) a life insurance policy must contain “express terms” referring to divorce in order for the beneficiary designation of a former spouse to survive revocation by section 75-2-804(2); and (4) the Policy did not contain “express terms” that would except it from revocation under section 75-2-804(2). View "Snyder v. Hertzske" on Justia Law

Utah Code 57-1-21 requires the trustee of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to maintain a physical office location within the state. In this case, Samuel Adamson refinanced his home through a deed of trust and then defaulted on the loan. ReconTrust sold property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to BAC Home Loans Services, LP. Distressed Asset eventually purchased the property. When Distressed Asset filed an unlawful detainer action against the Adamsons, the Adamsons argued that the trustee’s sale was defective because ReconTrust violated section 57-1-21. The district court dismissed the unlawful detainer action, concluding that the failure to satisfy section 57-1-21 rendered the trustee sale void ab initio. Here, the Supreme Court clarified the differences between void, voidable, and valid trustee’s deeds under Utah law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the action because, under the circumstances of this case, the violation of the statute did not result in a void or voidable trustee’s deed. Remanded. View "Bank of America v. Adamson" on Justia Law

Melvin Brown, who lost his Republic Primary election for the Utah House of Representatives by nine votes, contested the results of the primary election under Utah Code 20A-4-403(2) - Utah’s election contest statute - arguing that certain ballots were improperly disqualified. Logan Wilde, the winner of the primary election, argued that the election contest statute is an unconstitutional expansion of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed and issued a per curiam order holding that Utah Code 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii), which purports to provide the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over multi-county election contests, was unconstitutional. The Court then issued this opinion to more fully explain the basis for the order, holding that section 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii) cannot extend the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to adjudicate multi-county election disputes, and that provision of the elections code is struck as unconstitutional. View "Brown v. Cox" on Justia Law

In 2000, Uintah County conducted a tax sale but failed to provide the record mineral interest owners notice of the sale. More than a decade later, the individuals who were the record owners of the mineral interest prior to the tax sale and the purchaser of the tax title disputed who lawfully owned the mineral reserve. The district court granted summary judgment to the record mineral interest owners. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Utah Code 78B-2-206 was triggered by the County’s tax sale, which was conducted in violation of the Due Process Clause, the Court cannot apply that limitations statute to bar the record mineral interest owners’ suit; and (2) because a failure to provide notice to an interested party of a tax sale also serves as a jurisdictional defect, the County failed to obtain jurisdiction over the mineral interest, thereby preventing that property interest from passing at the tax sale. View "Jordan v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Father’s parental rights with respect to his child, making the child legally available for adoption by her stepfather. Father appealed the termination order. The court of appeals certified the case for transfer to the Supreme Court. At issue before the Supreme Court were Father’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and claims to the right to counsel under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Father had a federal due process right to counsel in the district court proceedings and that that right was erroneously denied in violation of Father’s federal due process rights. View "In re K.A.S." on Justia Law

Mother’s parental rights to her daughter were terminated. During the termination proceedings at the juvenile court, Mother was unrepresented by counsel. At the end of the proceeding, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit as a parent and that it was in the best interests of the child to be placed with Adoptive Parents. Mother appealed, challenging on multiple constitutional grounds Utah Code 78A-6-1111(2), the statutory scheme that provides appointed counsel for indigent parents in state-initiated parental termination proceedings while denying such counsel for indigent parents in privately initiated proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) section 78A-6-1111(2) is not facially unconstitutional; but (2) the court erred in relying on the statute to deny Mother’s request for counsel without considering Mother’s circumstances and due process rights. View "In re E.K.S." on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child. In 2007, Appellant was released on parole. As a condition of parole, Appellant was required to successfully complete a sex offender program. The State subsequently sought to revoke Appellant’s parole on the grounds that Appellant failed to disclose his entire sexual history, including any uncharged sexual crimes, as part of his sex offender treatment. Appellant filed a petition for extraordinary relief claiming that the sex offender program unconstitutionally required him to incriminate himself. The district court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there are genuine disputes of material facts that preclude summary judgment. Remanded. View "Bennett v. Bigelow" on Justia Law

In 2014, Don McBroom, grandson of Rufus Call Willey, founder of R.C. Willey, filed a petition with the Second District Court to review his motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking to set aside two Second District Court orders relating to McBroom’s interests in the business. The orders were entered in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The district court denied McBroom’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying McBroom’s Rule 60(b) motion because (1) McBroom did not appropriately file for relief under paragraph (6), and, instead, his claims fall under paragraphs (3) and (4); (2) McBroom’s claims under paragraph (b)(3) are untimely; and (3) McBroom’s claims under paragraph (b)(4) fail on their merits. View "In re Estate of Rufus C. Willey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count each of aggravated murder and child kidnapping, each a first degree felony. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without parole for the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Utah’s noncapital aggravated murder sentencing statute is not constitutionally deficient; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to various evidentiary rulings Defendant challenged on appeal, including the court’s admission into evidence of two photographs, although in reaching that decision the Court abandoned its prior test that determined the threshold for the admission of potentially gruesome photographs; (3) the district court did not err in declining to merge Defendant’s child kidnapping conviction with his aggravated murder conviction; and (4) even assuming Defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, counsel’s performance did not prejudice Defendant. The sentencing court, however, incorrectly stated that the presumptive sentence for Defendant’s aggravated murder conviction was life in prison without parole. Remanded for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to clarify what impact is misapprehension of the law had on its sentencing decision. View "State v. Met" on Justia Law

Based on information received by a confidential informant (CI), police officers pulled over a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Drugs were discovered during a search of the vehicle. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to compel the State to reveal the CI’s identity. The State claimed a privilege under Utah R. Evid. 505 and opposed the motion to compel. The district court elected to conduct an in camera interview to determine whether the CI possessed knowledge relevant to Defendant’s guilt or innocence, but the CI refused to appear. The district court concluded that Rule 505 did not require it to dismiss the charges against Defendant. Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when it ruled that Rule 505 did not require dismissal of the charges against Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law