Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Appellant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition under Part 3 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act seeking testing on previously untested items from the murder scene and arguing that the DNA testing would prove his factual innocence. The State subsequently filed a response asking the district court to dismiss Appellant’s petition. Before Appellant had an opportunity to oppose the State’s filing, the district court dismissed Appellant’s petition on the grounds that Appellant failed to establish a non-tactical reason for declining DNA testing at trial. Thereafter, the district court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to allow Defendant an opportunity to file a response to the State’s opposition to his petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Remanded. View "Gordon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial held in 1999, Appellant was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. The convictions were affirmed on appeal and upheld on multiple postconviction challenges in both state and federal court. Appellant here filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing, claiming that DNA testing will show his factual innocence. The district court denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that the DNA testing did not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would establish Appellant’s factual innocence under Utah Code 78B-9-301(2)(f). The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court’s analysis of the operative terms of the statute was only partially in accordance with the law. Remanded. View "Meinhard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial held in 1999, Appellant was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. The convictions were affirmed on appeal and upheld on multiple postconviction challenges in both state and federal court. Appellant here filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing, claiming that DNA testing will show his factual innocence. The district court denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that the DNA testing did not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would establish Appellant’s factual innocence under Utah Code 78B-9-301(2)(f). The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court’s analysis of the operative terms of the statute was only partially in accordance with the law. Remanded. View "Meinhard v. State" on Justia Law

M.J. was allegedly required to enter into an underage marriage at the direction of Warren Jeffs, then the head of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and trustee of the United Effort Plan Trust. M.J. filed suit against Jeffs and Bruce Wisan, in his capacity as special fiduciary of the Trust, asserting a variety of tort claims and claims for both vicarious and direct liability against the Trust. The Trust filed a series of motions for summary judgment, all of which were denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment in large part, upholding that district court’s decisions on all issues except its determination that the Trust is subject to liability on reverse veil-piercing grounds, holding that the Trust was entitled to summary judgment on that limited basis. View "M.J. v. Wisan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when forced to stop suddenly near a construction crew on a Utah road. Plaintiff submitted a notice of claim against the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). UDOT did not respond to the notice of claim within sixty days, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was deemed denied. One month later, UDOT sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that UDOT denied the claim. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against UDOT and several unnamed “John Does.” UDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) barred Plaintiff’s claim because he did not file within one year of the date on which it was deemed denied. The trial court granted UDOT’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s entire suit with prejudice, including his claim against the Doe Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the denial letter sent after the deemed denial had occurred did not restart the limitations period and was a legal superfluity, and therefore, Plaintiff did not timely file his suit under the GIA; (2) estoppel was not warranted in this case; and (3) the dismissal of the Doe Defendants was proper where they were described as employees of UDOT. View "Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Petitioners, as members of Utah Term Limits NOW!, sponsored an initiative application in which Petitioners sought to initiate legislation imposing term limits on persons appointed by the Governor to state boards and commissions. The Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative application. Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary writ asking the Supreme Court to compel the Lieutenant Governor to rescind and withdraw his rejection of Petitioners’ application. After filing their petition, Petitioners ceased efforts to place the proposed initiative on the ballot. Thereafter, the Lieutenant Governor filed a suggestion of mootness. In response, Petitioners asked the Court to resolve the issues based on the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for extraordinary writ as moot and held that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply in this case. View "Poulton v. Cox" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was how and when a party acquires title to property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This case was based on a boundary dispute between Wayne Hughes and Patricia Hampton-Hughes (collectively, Hugheses) and their neighbor, Q-2, LLC and its predecessors-in-interest (collectively, Q-2). Q-2 brought an action to quiet title to the disputed property under the theory of boundary by acquiescence. The Hugheses counterclaimed, asserting that even if Q-2 had acquired the property through boundary by acquiescence, the Hugheses had reacquired the property by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the Hugheses’ counterclaim on summary judgment and subsequently quieted title to the property in Q-2. The court of appeals concluded (1) the trial court correctly concluded that Q-2 had obtained title to the property through boundary by acquiescence, but (2) the Hugheses introduced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on their claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party obtains title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence by operation of law at the time the elements of the doctrine are satisfied. View "Q-2 LLC v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C. and Renalto Saltz (collectively, Saltz) performed an abdominoplasty and a breast augmentation on Conilyn Judge. Judge was subsequently interviewed by Fox News and posed for post-operative photographs showing the results of her surgery. Fox News aired redacted nude photographs of Judge both before and after the operation. Judge filed suit against Saltz, alleging five causes of action, including publication of private facts, false light, and intrusion upon seclusion. The trial court grated summary judgment for Saltz on all claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court adopted the requirement in section 652D(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that plaintiffs must show that “the matter publicized…is not of legitimate concern to the public” and affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of the grant of summary judgment on the claims for publication of private facts and intrusion on seclusion, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment Judge’s claims for publication of private facts and intrusion on seclusion. View "Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C." on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Monsour Al Shammari, a citizen of Saudia Arabia, was arrested and charged with rape. The Royal Consulate of Saudia Arabia provided the cash funds to post bail. Al Shammari subsequently attempted to cross the border into Mexico but was detained by the United States Customs and Border Patrol. Thereafter, Al Shammari failed to appear for a scheduled hearing, and the district court ordered the cash bail forfeited. Al Shammari moved to set aside the order of forfeiture, contending that the forfeiture was procedurally deficient because the Consulate was not given notice. The district court ordered the bail forfeited, concluding that the Consulate was not a “surety” for purposes of Chapters 20 and 20b of Title 77 of the Utah Code. The Supreme Court denied the Consulate’s petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that the Consulate was not a surety that was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to notice. View "Royal Consulate v. Hon. Pullen" on Justia Law