Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Before the child of Mother and Father was born, a process server personally delivered a prebirth notice (“the Notice”) to Father informing him that Mother intended to place Child up for adoption. The Notice advised Father that he may lose all rights relating to Child if he did not take certain steps within thirty days. Forty-two days after he received the Notice, Father filed a paternity action and affidavit with the district court. Adoptive Parents subsequently petitioned to adopt Child. Mother then gave birth to Child, and Mother and Father executed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity naming Father as Child’s father. The next day, Mother relinquished her parental rights and surrendered Child to Adoptive Parents. Father filed a motion to intervene in Child’s adoption proceeding. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Father did not meet the requirements of the Prebirth Notice Statute by pursuing his rights within the Statute’s thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Notice did not contain all of the information the Statute requires, Father’s failure to comply within the thirty-day time frame did not deprive him of his ability to contest Child’s adoption. View "In re Baby Q." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In the course of one day, Defendant entered her initial appearance in district court, was appointed counsel, waived her right to a preliminary hearing, pled guilty, waived the minimum two-day waiting period for sentencing, and received judgment and sentence. Defendant filed a notice of appeal without filing a motion to withdraw her plea, challenging her plea as unknowingly and involuntary. Although the plea withdrawal statute cuts of a defendant’s right to a direct appeal once sentencing is announced, Defendant argued that the plea withdrawal statute merely allows a defendant to pursue either a direct appeal or postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with caselaw, the plea withdrawal statute bars direct appeals once sentencing takes place, thus requiring defendants to pursue post-conviction relief; and (2) because Defendant had not pursued a Post-Conviction Remedies Act proceeding, her claims were not ripe for review. View "State v. Gailey" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Power is required by governing regulations to provide “indicative pricing” to a producer seeking to pursue a power purchase agreement. In 2012, Ellis-Hall Consultants, which is involved in the development of wind power projects and sought to sell power to PacifiCorp through its Rocky Mountain Power division, received an indicative pricing proposal. Rocky Mountain Power later rescinded that proposal and refused to proceed with negotiations on a power purchase agreement under its earlier indicative pricing because the Utah Public Service Commission had since adopted new pricing methodology. The Commission concluded that Ellis-Hall was not entitled to continue to rely on the methodology used in Rocky Mountain Power’s indicative pricing proposal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ellis-Hall was entitled to proceed in reliance on the methodology set forth in the indicative pricing proposal it received from Rocky Mountain Power. View "Ellis-Hall v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The jury imposed a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a rule 23B hearing addressing Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court stayed the remainder of Defendant’s appeal pending the outcome of those proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain DNA and mtDNA evidence; (2) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (3) even if the remainder of Defendant’s claims established errors, any such errors would not have resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Attorney Donald Gilbert represented the Utah Down Syndrome Association and several of its founders in litigation between the Association and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. Gilbert filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging (1) a 2008 district court judgment ordering Gilbert to disgorge $30,000 taken from Foundation bank accounts to pay his attorney fees, (2) an injunction that originally barred Gilbert’s clients from paying him with Foundation funds, (3) an order denying Gilbert’s motion to vacate the 2008 judgment, and (4) an order denying Gilbert’s motion for relief from the 2008 judgment. The Supreme Court denied Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) Gilbert unreasonably delayed seeking extraordinary relief from the injunction, the disgorgement order, and the denial of his motion to vacate; and (2) Gilbert failed to pursue the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. View "Gilbert v. Third Dist. Court Judges" on Justia Law

In this, the second appeal arising out of a lawsuit against Westgate Resorts alleging violations of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Westgate challenged an arbitration panel’s award of attorney fees to Shawn Adel and Consumer Protection Group, LLC (collectively, CPG). In the first appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the panel’s award of damages against Westgate. Here, Westgate argued, inter alia, that the arbitration panel had no authority to award attorney fees for the court proceedings that confirmed the panel’s decision on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel’s award of fees for court proceedings confirming the panel’s own decisions is void because the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act does not authorize attorney fees for such proceedings; (2) the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act allows the panel’s award of attorney fees expended during arbitration; and (3) CPG is entitled to attorney fees for this appeal. View "Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law

Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares’ application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

Trans-Western filed an amended complaint in federal district court asserting claims against U.S. Gypsum for breach of an oil and gas lease and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The district court found that U.S. Gypsum had wrongfully rescinded the lease and that the rescission constituted a breach of contract and a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The court awarded nominal damages of one dollar to Trans-Western. The parties appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court the question of how to measure expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease. The Supreme Court answered (1) expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease are measured in much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract; (2) damages may include general and consequential damages; and (3) trial courts may allow the use of post-breach evidence to help establish and measure expectation damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in small claims court for physical injuries arising from an alleged automobile collision between the parties. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to appeal the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's jury demand and discovery requests. The court concluded that the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in small claims cases in a trial de novo in district court, and that defendant properly asserted that right. The court did not reach the merits of defendant's discovery arguments because they were not properly preserved. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Chilel v. Simler" on Justia Law

Petitioner owns a vacant parcel adjoining respondent's parcel. Petitioner had failed to visit or inspect his property for a twenty-six year period and, during that time, respondent had occupied her parcel such that it encroached into petitioner's vacant parcel. Petitioner sought to quiet title as to the disputed stripe created by fence encroachment. Respondent claimed title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent. The court held that the occupation element in the court's boundary by acquiescence doctrine does not require a claimant to prove occupancy on both sides of a visible line. Instead, a claimant must show occupation up to a visible line on his or her property only. Because respondent occupied her property up to the fence for over twenty years, she satisfied the occupation element. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anderson v. Fautin" on Justia Law