Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal of a criminal case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah concluded that the police officers' warrantless entry and search of Alexander Hung Tran’s home were reasonable and justified under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court also declined to recognize broader protection under the Utah Constitution in the emergency aid context. The case arose when Tran appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police officers obtained during a warrantless entry and search of his home. The officers had entered Tran's home due to their belief that two individuals inside were in need of immediate aid, which was supported by a range of factors. The court held that the totality of the circumstances known to the police officers at the time they entered Tran’s home supported an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the two individuals were in need of immediate aid, thus falling within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. View "State v. Tran" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah considered the appeal of Marianne Tyson who sought to access her sealed adoption records from 1978, in order to learn more about her birth parents' medical histories and any potential health risks. The district court had denied Tyson's petition, interpreting "good cause" as requiring more than a generalized desire to obtain health or genetic information unrelated to a specific medical condition of the petitioner. The district court also held that Tyson's reasons for wanting access to adoption records did not outweigh her birth mother's interest in privacy.The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed with the district court's interpretation of "good cause" and its application of the balancing test. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature did not define "good cause" in the statute and did not impose additional requirements to establish "good cause". The Court held that the district court erred in interpreting the statute to require something more than a general desire to know one's medical history. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not properly balance the interests under the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as it focused solely on the birth mother’s privacy interests and did not consider Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records.The case was remanded back to the district court to reassess Tyson's petition under the correct standard. The district court must evaluate Tyson's petition under a correct interpretation of "good cause" and conduct a proper balancing test, giving weight to both the birth mother’s privacy interests and Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records. View "In re Adoption of M.A." on Justia Law

In the medical malpractice case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from Lillian Birt, her daughter Jenafer Meeks sued the treating doctors, Wei Peng and Christina G. Richards, both individually and on behalf of Ms. Birt's heirs and estate. The children of Ms. Birt had decided to discontinue her life support based on the misinformation they received from the doctors about her condition. The doctors inaccurately portrayed her condition as terminal, leading the children to believe that the treatment was only prolonging her life unnaturally. However, Ms. Birt's condition was not terminal, and there was a high probability of her recovery if the treatment had continued.In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the doctors appealed on two issues. Firstly, they argued that the trial court's jury instruction 23 was incorrect as it did not explicitly state that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care. Secondly, they contended that the lower court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the survival claim due to lack of evidence that Ms. Birt experienced pain and suffering in the hours between the doctors' negligence and her death.The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care, as the instruction implicitly required the jury to determine the standard of care as part of proving a breach of it. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the doctors that Ms. Meeks failed to provide evidence of Ms. Birt's experience of pain, suffering, or inconvenience during the period between the doctors' negligence and her death. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court. View "Peng v. Meeks" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Robert Evan Woodham was convicted for failing to yield to stationary emergency vehicles in violation of Utah Code subsection 41-6a-904(2). The conviction was upheld by the district court, after which Woodham appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing that the district court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, which is a requirement for appellate review under Utah Code § 78A-7-118(11). Woodham then petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah, arguing the district court implicitly ruled on his constitutional argument.The Supreme Court of Utah clarified that an implicit ruling by the district court on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is sufficient to permit appellate review under Utah Code subsection 78A-7-118(11), overruling a contrary holding by the Utah Court of Appeals in Murray City v. Timmerman. However, the Court agreed with the appellate court's decision in Woodham's case, stating that he did not preserve a constitutional challenge to the emergency vehicle statute, and therefore, the district court did not implicitly rule on its constitutionality. Consequently, the dismissal of Woodham's appeal due to lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Park City v. Woodham" on Justia Law

In this case, a doctor, Dr. Gabriel Fine, sued the University of Utah School of Medicine, alleging that the University deprived him of his clinical privileges without following the procedures required by its bylaws. The University moved for summary judgment, pointing to a provision in its bylaws where Dr. Fine had agreed not to sue "for any matter relating to appointment, reappointment, clinical privileges, or the individual’s qualifications for the same." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, agreeing that Dr. Fine had released his claims against the University.Dr. Fine appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the release to apply to his case. He asserted that the release only applied to actions taken during a formal review process and his claims arose from actions taken during an informal process.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah disagreed with Dr. Fine's argument. The court interpreted the release using its traditional tools of contract interpretation and found no textual justification for limiting the release's application only to actions taken during the formal review process. The court held that Dr. Fine’s claims against the University fell within the scope of the release and therefore affirmed the district court's decision. View "Fine v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the petitioner, Elbert John Paule, was charged with murder, obstruction of justice, reckless endangerment, and assault following a fatal shooting incident involving a friend. The jury acquitted Paule on all charges except obstruction of justice. Paule challenged his conviction, arguing that the obstruction of justice conviction was legally inconsistent with the jury’s determination that he was not guilty of the other crimes. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the lower court's ruling.The Supreme Court held that to be convicted of obstruction of justice, a defendant need only perform an obstructive act with the requisite intent. Proof of a separate crime is not necessary. The court concluded that because a violation of Utah’s obstruction of justice statute requires only that a defendant act with the requisite intent—it does not require proof of a separate criminal offense—the jury’s verdict was not legally impossible. Furthermore, the court found that Paule's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to seek a more detailed unanimity instruction. View "State v. Paule" on Justia Law

In this case, Cathy McKitrick, an investigative journalist, sought access to certain records under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). The Ogden City Records Review Board ordered the city to release redacted versions of the records. Kerry Gibson, the subject of the records, petitioned the district court to prevent their release. McKitrick intervened in the proceedings and moved to dismiss Gibson's petition for lack of standing. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that Gibson lacked standing. Before the district court dismissed the case, McKitrick moved for an award of attorney fees and litigation costs, which was denied by the district court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court’s interpretation of the fee provision but did not hold that McKitrick was entitled to a fee award. Because the district court did not consider substantive aspects of the fee provision, the Supreme Court remanded the case for it to do so. View "McKitrick v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the appellant, Troy Michael Kell, appealed the district court's dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. Kell, while serving a life sentence for murder, had stabbed another inmate to death in 1994. He was convicted of aggravated murder, a capital offense, and sentenced to death. Following his conviction, Kell filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was dismissed by the district court.Years later, during federal habeas corpus proceedings, Kell's attorneys discovered evidence that three jurors from his trial had communicated with the judge during sentencing deliberations without Kell or either party’s counsel present. One of these jurors remembered the judge stating that it was Kell’s burden to convince the jury that his life should be spared. This new evidence formed the basis of Kell’s second petition for post-conviction relief which he filed in 2018, over five years after the evidence was discovered.The district court dismissed Kell's petition, applying the time and procedural limitations under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Kell argued on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing his petition based on these limitations. He claimed that his delay in filing was due to ineffective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel and that applying the PCRA’s time and procedural bars violated his rights under the Suspension Clause, Due Process Clause, and Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Kell had not shown that any shortcoming of his initial post-conviction counsel excuses the five and a half year delay in bringing this claim after discovering the alleged improper communication between the trial judge and jurors. The court also held that Kell had not demonstrated that the application of the PCRA’s time and procedural bars to his claim violated his constitutional rights. He was unable to show that the application of these bars prevented him from challenging his detention or left him unable to vindicate his substantive rights. View "Kell v. Benzon" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the defendant, Alfonso Valdez, was arrested and charged with kidnapping and assaulting his ex-girlfriend. During the arrest, officers seized Valdez’s cell phone. The police later obtained a search warrant for the phone, but were unable to access the contents as they could not decipher Valdez's passcode. When asked to provide his passcode, Valdez refused. At trial, the State elicited testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode and argued that this refusal undermined one of his defenses. Valdez was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Valdez that he had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide his passcode, and that the State violated this right by using his refusal against him at trial.The State petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for certiorari, arguing that providing a passcode is not a testimonial communication, that the “foregone conclusion” exception applies in this case, and that the prosecutor's comments were permissible as a fair response to an issue that Valdez initiated.The Supreme Court disagreed with the State on all counts. The court held that verbally providing a cell phone passcode is a testimonial communication under the Fifth Amendment and that the "foregone conclusion" exception, which arises in cases where an “act of production” implicitly communicates information, does not apply. The court also rejected the State's "fair response" argument, concluding that the State had elicited the testimony about Valdez's refusal to provide his passcode before Valdez had raised any issue involving the contents of his phone. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Floyd Corry Robinson, argued that his sentence was unconstitutional because his counsel was ineffective and because the State suppressed evidence. Robinson brought his motion under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows for correction of a sentence under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah found that Robinson's claims did not fall under any of the categories listed in Rule 22(e) that would allow for a sentence correction. The court ruled that the district court correctly denied Robinson's motion, as his claims were not cognizable under Rule 22(e). The Supreme Court also rejected Robinson's argument that his filing should have been treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, not a Rule 22(e) motion. The court reasoned that Robinson's filing clearly invoked Rule 22(e) and did not suggest an intent to seek a different form of relief. The court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Robinson's motion. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law