Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of residents sought to challenge a Tooele County zoning ordinance that changed the designation of a parcel of land in Erda from agricultural to planned-community zoning, enabling its development. The residents, acting as referendum sponsors, attempted to gather enough signatures to place the ordinance on the ballot for possible repeal, aiming to preserve the land’s agricultural status. Their efforts were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related executive orders, which they argued hindered their ability to collect signatures. Despite requesting permission to use electronic signatures, their request was denied, and they ultimately failed to meet the required signature threshold as determined by the County Clerk.The sponsors then filed suit in the Third District Court, Tooele County, against both the County and the Governor, challenging the signature threshold and the denial of electronic signatures. During the litigation, the area containing the property was incorporated as the City of Erda, transferring land-use authority from the County to the new city. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, finding the Clerk had correctly applied the signature threshold, and granted judgment on the pleadings to the Governor, rejecting the constitutional claims. The sponsors appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and determined that it was moot. The court held that, because the property is now within the City of Erda and subject to its zoning authority, a referendum repealing the Tooele County ordinance would have no legal effect on the property’s current zoning. The court found that it could not provide meaningful relief to the sponsors, as Erda has enacted its own zoning ordinances for the property. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Haney v. Tooele County" on Justia Law

Two companies each owned a one-half undivided interest in the subsurface estate (specifically, sand, gravel, and clay) of a small parcel of land, while one of them also owned the entire surface estate. The surface owner developed the parcel by excavating soil and using it as fill on the same parcel to achieve the desired grade and density for construction. The subsurface co-owner sued, alleging that the surface owner had removed and transferred soil off-site without compensation, and also claimed entitlement to compensation for the on-site use of the soil, arguing that such use interfered with its rights.The Fourth District Court reviewed the case after discovery. The surface owner moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence that no soil was removed from the parcel and that all excavated soil was used on-site. The subsurface co-owner conceded it had no evidence that soil was exported off-site but argued that a jury could infer such removal due to the surface owner’s exclusive control of relevant information. The district court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding off-site removal and held that, under Utah law and persuasive Washington precedent, a surface owner is entitled to use soil for on-site development without compensating the subsurface owner, unless the soil is exported. The court granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that the subsurface co-owner failed to provide evidence supporting its claim of off-site removal, and that the surface owner’s on-site use of soil did not constitute actionable interference with the subsurface rights. The Court clarified that, absent an agreement to the contrary, a surface owner may use subsurface materials for on-site development without owing compensation to a subsurface co-owner, provided there is no interference with the latter’s right to remove those materials. The summary judgment in favor of the surface owner was affirmed. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

After experiencing shortness of breath and chest pain, Jorge Armenta lost consciousness and his wife called 911. Emergency medical technicians from Unified Fire Authority (UFA) responded, evaluated Armenta, and told him that everything appeared normal, suggesting he had an anxiety attack and did not need to go to the emergency room. A week later, Armenta was hospitalized for a massive heart attack, which resulted in significant and potentially life-shortening heart damage. Armenta filed a negligence suit against UFA, alleging that their failure to properly diagnose and treat him caused his injuries.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, reviewed UFA’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) shielded UFA from liability. The district court applied a three-part test, found that UFA’s actions were a governmental function, that immunity was generally waived for such activities, but that an exception for “providing emergency medical assistance” restored immunity. The court dismissed Armenta’s claims against UFA and entered judgment under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the district court’s statutory interpretation and dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “providing emergency medical assistance” exception under the UGIA. The Court determined that, when read in context with related statutory provisions, the exception applies only to medical assistance provided in response to certain types of emergencies, such as disasters or catastrophic events, not to routine emergency medical responses like the one at issue. Therefore, the UGIA does not immunize UFA from Armenta’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ARMENTA v. UNIFIED FIRE AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property, which they had borrowed to develop parcels in Utah. After several loan modifications and assignments, the lenders—Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P.—foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, where they were the only bidders. The sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt, and the lenders continued to pursue the deficiency. Later, Talisker discovered information suggesting that the lenders, in coordination with a court-appointed receiver, may have taken actions to depress the sale price, including deterring potential bidders and bundling properties in a way that made them less attractive.Talisker filed suit in the Third District Court, Summit County, seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, alleging that the lenders’ conduct during the foreclosure process violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and constituted fraud or grossly inequitable conduct. The lenders moved to dismiss, arguing that Talisker had broadly waived any rights or defenses related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but concluded that the waivers were enforceable and covered the rights Talisker sought to assert, including those under Rule 69B(d). The court found no unlawful irregularity in the sales and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s broad and explicit waivers in the loan documents encompassed all rights and defenses related to the foreclosure sales, including the right to challenge the method of sale or seek equitable relief based on alleged unfairness or irregularities. The court concluded that, regardless of the alleged conduct, Talisker had contractually relinquished any basis for relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

A group of residents and business owners in Salt Lake City filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city's failure to eliminate encampments of unsheltered people on public land interfered with their use and enjoyment of their properties. The residents claimed that the city, as a landowner, had a duty to maintain its properties free of nuisance. The city argued that the residents were attempting to use the court to force the city to exercise its enforcement powers in a specific way, and that under the public duty doctrine, the city had no duty to the residents regarding its failure to use those powers.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County dismissed the residents' complaint with prejudice, ruling that the public duty doctrine precluded their claims. The court found that the residents failed to allege that the city breached a duty owed specifically to them, rather than a duty owed to the public at large. The court concluded that the city owed no duty to the residents individually apart from its general duty to enforce laws and protect the public.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the public duty doctrine, which protects government actors from civil liability for failing to perform duties owed to the public, precluded the residents' claims of public and private nuisance. The court found that no special relationship existed between the residents and the city that would exempt the residents' claims from the public duty doctrine's preclusion. The court emphasized that the public duty doctrine applies to omissions by government actors performing public duties and that the residents did not demonstrate any unique duty owed to them by the city. View "Barrani v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Julie and Gerald Ross (Grandparents) filed a petition in district court to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K., and to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological parents, Steven and Denielle Kracht (Parents). The district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that they had abandoned and neglected their children, that the father had abused the children, and that both parents were unfit. The adoption petition by the Grandparents was still pending.Parents appealed the termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals before the adoption action concluded. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for original appellate review. The central issue was whether the termination order issued by the district court was immediately appealable before the adoption action concluded.The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code subsection 78B-6-112(3) creates a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allowing termination orders issued by district courts to be immediately appealable. The court concluded that the statutory language of subsection 78B-6-112(3) indicates that a district court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of adoption is entered, thus making such termination orders appealable upon entry. This decision overruled the Court of Appeals' previous decision in In re Adoption of K.R.S., which had held that no exception to the final judgment rule allowed parties to appeal a district-court-issued termination order before it was final. The Utah Supreme Court retained the case for further argument on the merits of the Parents' challenges to the termination order. View "Ross v. Kracht" on Justia Law

A.K. (Mother) is the mother of four minor children, B.C., K.J.C., D.W.C., and B.C. In 2013, while living in Alaska, the children’s biological father, C.C. (Father), was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor and subsequently incarcerated. That same year, Mother and the children moved to Utah. In 2015, Father was convicted, and in 2016, Mother divorced Father and married L.K. (Stepfather), who then began living with and raising the children alongside Mother.In 2020, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in district court for Stepfather to adopt the children, which included a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father intervened and opposed the termination and adoption. After an evidentiary hearing, the Second District Court in Weber County terminated Father’s parental rights.Father immediately appealed the termination order. While his appeal was pending, the Utah Court of Appeals decided In re Adoption of K.R.S., holding that a termination order issued by a district court is not immediately appealable when an underlying adoption petition remains unresolved, as it does not constitute a final judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and, for reasons articulated in Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, retained jurisdiction to hear further arguments on Father’s challenges to the termination order. The court issued an order requesting the parties to brief the merits of Father’s challenges to the termination order. View "In re Adoption of B.C." on Justia Law

Terry Tischmak was married to a resident student attending Salt Lake Community College in Utah during the 2013 and 2014 tax years. Although he lived and worked in Wyoming, he and his wife filed their federal taxes jointly. Utah's Domicile Statute deems individuals domiciled in Utah for tax purposes if they or their spouse are resident students at a state institution. Consequently, the Utah State Tax Commission determined that Tischmak owed state income taxes for those years.The Utah State Tax Commission audited Tischmak and issued a Notice of Deficiency for the 2013 and 2014 tax years. Tischmak appealed, arguing that he should not be subject to Utah's income tax because he resided in Wyoming. After a formal hearing, the Commission upheld its decision, citing the Domicile Statute, which considers a person domiciled in Utah if their spouse is a resident student. The Commission did not address Tischmak's constitutional arguments, noting it lacked the authority to do so.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Tax Commission's decision. The court found that the Domicile Statute did not violate the federal right to travel, the Utah Constitution’s Due Process Clause, or the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision. The court also determined that the statute did not violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and that Tischmak was subject to Utah's income tax for the years in question. View "Tischmak v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Shon Brian Blake shot a man twice in the arm during an argument, causing injuries that required medical treatment. The Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC) paid the victim's medical expenses. Blake pled guilty to several charges, and the State sought a restitution order to reimburse UOVC for the medical expenses. The district court ordered Blake to repay part of the expenses, but the court of appeals reversed this order, citing insufficient evidence. The case returned to the district court, which held a second restitution hearing and issued a new restitution order.The district court initially entered a restitution order based on limited evidence, which the court of appeals found insufficient, leading to a reversal. The appellate court did not provide explicit instructions for further proceedings. Upon return to the district court, Blake objected to a second hearing, arguing that the reversal should preclude further action. The district court disagreed, held a second hearing, and issued a new restitution order. Blake appealed again, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court to address whether the district court could hold a second hearing and whether the new order was supported by sufficient evidence.The Utah Supreme Court held that the district court was not prohibited from holding a second restitution hearing. The court concluded that the reversal of the first order did not preclude further proceedings, as the appellate court did not expressly prohibit them. The court also determined that the new restitution order was supported by sufficient evidence, including detailed medical records and testimony from a UOVC representative. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's second restitution order. View "State v. Blake" on Justia Law

Valderra Land Holdings, LLC owns real property encumbered by a performance trust deed held for the benefit of Jenco, LC and others. After Valderra defaulted on its obligations, Jenco sought judicial foreclosure. Valderra counterclaimed, asserting a right to cure its default and requested the court to determine the amount owed. The district court set the payoff amount and directed Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property upon Valderra’s tender of funds.Valderra tendered the payoff amount, but Jenco did not instruct the trustee to release the trust deed. Instead, Jenco appealed the judgment and moved for a stay of the obligation to reconvey the property under rule 62(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the stay over Valderra’s objection, which argued that the order was injunctive and should be governed by rule 62(c), not 62(b).The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the case and agreed with Valderra that the district court erred in granting the stay under rule 62(b). The court held that rule 62(b) applies only to stays of orders or judgments to pay money, not injunctive orders, which are governed by rule 62(c). The court found that the order requiring Jenco to instruct the trustee to reconvey the property was injunctive in nature. Consequently, the district court should have considered the motion under rule 62(c), which requires the court to determine whether the conditions for the security of the rights of the adverse party are just.The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the district court’s decision to grant the stay under rule 62(b) and vacated the order rejecting Valderra’s rule 62(i) objection. The court also denied Valderra’s request for appellate attorney fees, as Valderra was not awarded fees in the lower court. View "Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings" on Justia Law