Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Douglas Lovell was convicted in 2015 for the murder of Joyce Yost, a crime he committed in 1985. Lovell had previously pled guilty to the murder in 1993 and was sentenced to death, but his plea was later withdrawn, leading to a new trial. During the new trial, Lovell did not contest his guilt but argued for a lesser sentence, presenting evidence of his remorse and rehabilitation.In the lower courts, Lovell's 1993 guilty plea was vacated by the Utah Supreme Court in 2011 due to procedural errors. The case was remanded for a new trial, where Lovell was again convicted and sentenced to death. Lovell appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted his testimony from the 1993 proceedings and that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the district court erred in admitting Lovell's 1993 testimony but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Lovell's guilt. However, the court agreed with Lovell that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase. The court found that counsel failed to adequately object to prejudicial testimony regarding Lovell's excommunication from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Church's doctrine on repentance and remorse. This testimony improperly suggested that the jury could rely on the Church's assessment of Lovell's remorse rather than making their own determination.The Utah Supreme Court held that this ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced Lovell's ability to have a fair sentencing hearing. As a result, the court vacated Lovell's death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Lovell" on Justia Law

In 2018, a juvenile court removed seven children from their biological parents' custody due to abuse and neglect. The children were returned in early 2019 but removed again a few months later after continued issues. The five oldest children were eventually placed with their grandparents in New Mexico, while the two youngest, Alice and Liam, were placed with a foster family in Utah. In October 2020, the juvenile court held a termination trial to determine the best permanent placement for Alice and Liam. The court decided it was in their best interest to terminate the biological parents' rights and allow the foster family to adopt them.The biological parents appealed the decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the termination order, concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The appellate court also held that termination must be "materially better" than any other option. Because it reversed on the merits, the court of appeals did not address other issues raised by the parents, such as ineffective counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several errors in the court of appeals' reasoning. First, it rejected the "materially better" standard, stating that the correct standard is whether termination is "strictly necessary" to promote the child's best interest. Second, the court of appeals exceeded its scope by reweighing evidence and considering evidence outside the record. Third, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issues in the biological parents' initial appeal. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam. View "Labrum v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The case involves a 2009 loan transaction between TNE Limited Partnership (TNE) and the Muir Second Family Limited Partnership (the Muir Partnership) at a time when the Muir Partnership was dissolved. The plaintiffs, including the Muir Partnership, Dorothy Jeanne Muir, and Wittingham, LLC, sought to void the transaction. After a seven-day bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the transaction void and denying their request for attorney fees.TNE appealed, arguing that the transaction was voidable, not void, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court, in Wittingham III, agreed with TNE that the transaction was voidable and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the transaction bound the dissolved Muir Partnership and whether TNE was entitled to legal or equitable remedies. The court also instructed the district court to reconsider the attorney fees issue if plaintiffs renewed it on remand.On remand, the district court concluded that Nick Muir, who executed the transaction on behalf of the Muir Partnership, lacked both actual and apparent authority to bind the Partnership. The court also found that the plaintiffs were injured by the transaction and could void it. However, the court again denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, interpreting the trust deed's fee provision as not applicable to the plaintiffs' action to invalidate the transaction. TNE's subsequent rule 60(b) motion, arguing that new authority from the Utah Supreme Court changed the controlling law on apparent authority, was denied.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that TNE failed to show any manifestation of the Muir Partnership’s consent to Nick’s authority, either direct or indirect. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing the Muir Partnership to void the transaction and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees under the trust deed. View "Wittingham v. TNE Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Brett Del Valle was sued by Alum Rock Riverside, LLC in California for breach of contract, resulting in a judgment against him for over $4 million. Alum Rock domesticated this judgment in Utah and recorded it with the Weber County Recorder’s Office. At the time of recording, the property in question was held by a revocable trust established by Brett and his wife, but the trust sold the property to the Mulligans before Alum Rock applied for a writ of execution to seize and sell the property.The Third District Court upheld the writ of execution despite the Mulligans' objections. They argued that Alum Rock failed to create a valid judgment lien because it did not record the judgment in the registry of judgments, that the writ was not available since the trust held the title when the judgment was domesticated, and that the court lacked jurisdiction as the property was in a different judicial district. The district court rejected these arguments, holding that recording the judgment with the county recorder was sufficient to create a lien, the writ was valid because Brett retained ownership indicia over the property, and the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that since July 1, 2002, a judgment lien is created by recording the judgment with the county recorder, not by filing it in the registry of judgments. The court also determined that Brett owned the property for purposes of the lien because he retained control over the trust. Finally, the court found no relevant limitation on the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ, even though the property was located in a different judicial district. View "Mulligan v. Alum Rock Riverside" on Justia Law

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Utah Legislature's repeal and replacement of a citizen initiative known as "Proposition 4," which aimed to reform the state's redistricting process to prevent partisan gerrymandering. Proposition 4, passed by Utah voters in 2018, established an Independent Redistricting Commission and set forth neutral redistricting standards, including a prohibition on partisan gerrymandering. However, before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with a new law that did not include the same anti-gerrymandering provisions and weakened the role of the Independent Commission.In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the plaintiffs argued that the Legislature's actions violated the Utah Constitution by nullifying the reforms enacted by the people through Proposition 4. The district court dismissed this claim, holding that the Legislature has the authority to amend or repeal any statute, including those enacted by citizen initiative, without limitation. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on two constitutional provisions: the Initiative Provision in article VI, section 1, which grants the people the power to initiate legislation, and the Alter or Reform Clause in article I, section 2, which states that the people have the right to alter or reform their government. The court concluded that these provisions, when read together, limit the Legislature's power to amend or repeal a citizen initiative that reforms the government. The court held that the people’s right to reform the government through an initiative is constitutionally protected from legislative actions that would impair the reform enacted by the people.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of Count V, which challenged the Legislature's repeal and replacement of Proposition 4, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that legislative changes to a government-reform initiative must not impair the reform and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest if they do. View "League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Brent Gordon's claim that Herriman City's policy violates his right to inspect records under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). Gordon did not appeal Herriman’s denial of a records request but instead sued for an injunction that would require Herriman to allow him to inspect any public record free of charge. The district court dismissed Gordon’s case, concluding that he needed to submit a formal records request and exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit.The district court agreed with Herriman City and dismissed Gordon’s claim. The court ruled that Gordon was not entitled to judicial review because he either did not make a formal GRAMA request or, if he did, he did not fully exhaust the administrative remedies associated with that request. Gordon appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue his claim. The court explained that the injunction provision in Utah Code section 63G-2-802(1), which Gordon relied on, merely provides a remedy and does not create a right of action. The court concluded that without an express or implied statutory right to seek judicial review of Herriman’s alleged policy, Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue this action. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his GRAMA claim and correctly dismissed it. View "Gordon v. Nostrom" on Justia Law

A group of Utah voters, led by Ian Daniel Phillips, sought to initiate state legislation that would impose an age limit on Utah candidates for federal office. The Lieutenant Governor of Utah rejected the group's initiative application, concluding that the proposed law was "patently unconstitutional" under U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, a Supreme Court case that forbids states from enacting laws imposing qualifications on candidates for federal congressional office. The group then sued the Lieutenant Governor, seeking a declaration that the initiative is not patently unconstitutional and could become law if enacted.The district court dismissed the group's complaint, ruling that the proposed initiative is "squarely foreclosed by" Thornton, a decision that the court had no authority to overrule. The group appealed, maintaining that Thornton should be overruled because its prohibition on state-created qualifications for federal officeholders violates the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, they acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah lacks authority to overturn Thornton and asked the court to affirm the district court’s decision, thereby paving the way for them to petition the United States Supreme Court for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the group had appellate standing, despite their concession that they cannot prevail at this stage of the appeal. The court also agreed with the district court that the proposed law is patently unconstitutional under Thornton. Therefore, the group did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "Phillips v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Town of Hideout, Utah, took advantage of a brief window in state law that allowed municipalities to annex unincorporated areas without a petition or county consent. Hideout annexed an area in Summit County, and after receiving a certificate of annexation from the Lieutenant Governor, Summit County challenged the annexation and the related municipal ordinance in district court. The district court ruled in favor of Summit County, finding that it had standing to challenge the annexation and declaring the annexation ordinance invalid.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decisions. The court found that the relevant statutory scheme, the annexation code, did not provide Summit County with a legally protectible interest that would allow it to obtain the relief it sought. The court also found that the statutory provisions outside the annexation code that Summit County relied on did not provide it with a legally protectible interest in the controversy. The court further held that the doctrine of public interest standing, on which the district court alternatively relied, was inapplicable in this case.Because the court concluded that Summit County lacked standing to pursue its claims, it also reversed the district court’s award of summary judgment in Summit County’s favor without addressing the merits of Summit County’s claims. The case was remanded to the district court for dismissal. View "Hideout v. Summit County" on Justia Law