Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of attempted murder, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's Utah R. App. P. 23B motion, nor was Defendant prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to call an expert who would have testified about the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications.On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call the eyewitness testimony expert, who his prior counsel had previously identified and disclosed. Defendant also filed a Rule 23B motion asking the court to remand so that he could supplement the record with facts concerning the uncalled expert. The court of appeals denied the Rule 23B motion and affirmed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err by concluding that Defendant failed to present a sufficient basis for remand under Rule 23B; and (2) did not apply an incorrect version of the Washington v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard to its conclusion. View "State v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

In these three medical malpractice actions the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial of Defendants' motions to dismiss and remanded to uphold Plaintiffs' opportunity to develop and present evidence in support of the "fraudulent concealment" exception to the two-year limitations period, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal and that the sufficiency of the evidence was a matter for summary judgment or trial.In each case, Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and that the time bar was not tolled by either the foreign object or fraudulent concealment exceptions set forth in the statute in part because Plaintiffs did not allege fraudulent concealment with the particularity required by Utah R. Civ. P. 2(c). The motions to dismiss were denied in large part. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions denying the motions to dismiss on time-bar grounds and reversed the decision dismissing the negligent credentialing claim, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal; (2) the foreign object exception did not apply in this case; and (3) the Act did not retroactively bar Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claims. View "Bright v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

In this case, one of thousands filed by state and local governments against opioid manufacturers across the country, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the second district court granting a manufacturer defendant's motion to transfer the Davis County action to the third district court for discovery and pretrial proceedings, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs in these cases asserted that manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs misled the public about the safety of these drugs, leading to the opioid epidemic. Fifteen opioid cases were filed in Utah courts. When certain manufacturer defendants moved to consolidate all of the state's pending cases in third district, the court invited judges in other district courts to consider transferring their opioid cases to the third district. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. filed a motion in the second district asking that the court transfer the Davis County action to the third district for discovery and pretrial proceedings. The second district granted the transfer petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court has inherent authority to grant a motion to transfer for pretrial proceedings; and (2) the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in transferring this case to the third district. View "Davis County v. Purdue Pharma, LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that, under the circumstances, the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford Appellant the due process protections explained in Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (2017), before it could determine that Appellant was a sex offender and condition his parole on sex offender treatment.Appellant was serving a prison sentence for his convictions of attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because he was convicted of attempted child kidnapping Appellant was considered a sex offender under the sex offender registration statute. Further, Appellant admitted in his presentence report that he had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old. Appellant filed a petition for extraordinary relief alleging that the Parole Board had violated his due process rights by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. Summary judgment was granted for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board owed Appellant no additional process before it considered unconnected sex offenses in its decision to require Appellant to undergo sex offender treatment. View "Blanke v. Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Albertson's LLC's motion for partial summary judgment concluding that the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act (UOSHA) preempted Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim, holding that UOSHA does not reflect a clear legislative intent to preempt common law remedies.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Albertson's fired him because he reported a workplace injury. Plaintiff asserted three causes of action - wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that UOSHA preempted Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where UOSHA contains no exclusive remedy provision and where Utah Code 34A-6-110(1) instructs that UOSHA does not limit or repeal other legal obligations, it cannot be concluded that UOSHA's structure and purpose demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt common law causes of action. View "Graham v. Albertsons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's personal injury lawsuit, holding that Plaintiff produced evidence in support of the disputed elements of her claim.Plaintiff, who tripped and fell while walking across a park strip, asserted that she tripped over a metal rod protruding out of a hole in the ground. Plaintiff sued Defendants, including Herriman City, for negligence. In granting summary judgment for Defendants the district court ruled that Plaintiff had failed to produce enough evidence to create a disputed issue of fact as to when the unsafe condition arose, and therefore, Plaintiff could not show that Defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe condition and an opportunity to remedy the condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the durable, non transitory nature of the unsafe condition itself is evidence from which a fact-finder could infer longevity, which is sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to the length of time the condition existed; and (2) in conjunction with evidence relevant to the noticeability of the metal rod, Plaintiff produced evidence in support of the contested elements of her claim. View "Cochegrus v. Herriman City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during Defendant's criminal trial, holding that defense counsel's performance was not deficient.Defendant was convicted of forcible sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that because counsel did not object to the jury instruction for forcible sexual abuse Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that counsel's acquiescence to the jury instruction could not have been sound strategy and that Defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for the murder of his wife on grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that there was insufficient information to conclude that counsel's course of conduct was deficient or prejudicial.During trial, when Defendant tried to testify about a threat he claimed his wife had made a few days before he shot her, the trial court excluded the testimony on hearsay ground. On appeal, Defendant argued that his lawyer's failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay constituted ineffective assistance. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals did not know or consider the specifics of the threat, it was impossible to determine whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

In this action brought by Claimants seeking recovery for physical takings as well as severance damages for their property's decrease in market value after the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned portions of their land the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals upholding the jury's verdict awarding claimants $2.3 million in severance damages, holding that the jury's award of severance damages was appropriate.The UDOT projects involved the reconstruction of a freeway interchange near Claimants' property. UDOT's condemnation of a portion of the property owned by Claimants interfered with both the property's visibility and its convenient "right-out" exits that provided access to the freeway. The jury awarded $2.3 million in severance damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severance damages awarded were appropriate because Claimants put on adequate evidence that their damages were caused by UDOT's construction of an improvement in the form of the new interchange. View "Utah Department of Transportation v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in this action seeking to recover delinquent contributions to various trust funds for construction on a state construction project, holding that the right of action under a payment bond statute extends to any amount due an employee, meaning any amount that is traceable specifically to an employee.One of the subcontractors hired to work on the project failed to make contributions to various trust funds for its employees' work on the project, as required by trust agreements and a collective bargaining agreement. The trusts (Plaintiffs) sought to recover the delinquent contributions from the public payment bond associated with the project by suing Defendant, the surety for the payment bond. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. On appeal, the parties disputed whether Utah Code 63G-6-505(4) limits the right of action on a payment bond to amounts due to an employee or encompasses claims for any amounts due for an employee or on the employee's behalf. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right of action under the public payment bond statute contemplates recovery of any specific benefit that is due a person in the sense of being traceable to that person. View "McDonald v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland" on Justia Law