Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that when a Utah prison inmate must register as a sex or kidnap offender the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford the inmate the due process protections required by Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (Utah 2017).Kevin Blanke was serving a prison sentence for attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because of his conviction for attempted child kidnapping Blanke was considered a sex offender under Utah's sex offender registration statute. At the time he was sentenced for kidnapping, Blanke further admitted to having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old, conduct that would place him, if he were convicted, on the sex offender registry. The Parole Board declined to set a parole date for Blanke because he refused to participate in the prison sex offender treatment program. Blanke filed a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d), arguing that the Parole Board had violated due process by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the procedural protections in Neese did not apply. View "Blanke v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the post-conviction court denying Petitioner's pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code 78B-9-101 to -503, holding that Petitioner failed to identify a material dispute sufficient to rebut the State's showing that he was not prejudiced by his guilty plea or the State's showing that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient.Petitioner pled guilty to first-degree murder. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he did not understand that the absence of imperfect self-defense was an element of murder and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of a language barrier with trial counsel. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claim that his plea was unknowing and involuntary failed because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced as a result; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether trial counsel's failure to obtain an interpreter constituted deficient performance. View "Arriaga v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's request to view the alleged sexual abuse victim's privileged mental health therapy records, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that an exception to the mental health therapist-patient privilege exists under Utah R. Evid. 506.Defendant was accused of sexually abused his girlfriend's three-year-old child (Child). Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to produce Child's mental health therapy records under Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant failed to make the particularly showings regarding relevance or that the records were reasonably certain to contain exculpatory information. The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that Defendant failed to meet the "reasonable certainty" requirement under case law. The Supreme Court affirmed without considering the merits of Defendant's challenge to the "reasonable certainty" test, holding that Defendant failed to establish that Child had a "condition" under Rule 506(d)(1)(A). Because, however, Defendant raised significant concerns about the reasonable certainty test, the Supreme Court referred Rule 506 to the rules committee for review. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights action the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case to the juvenile court so that it may reexamine the termination petition in light of the clarified standard, holding that the court of appeals did not misinterpret the Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code 78A-6-506, -507.To resolve Mother's petition to terminate the parental rights of Father the juvenile court followed the statutory framework the legislature created by finding multiple grounds for termination and concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. The juvenile court then addressed a legislative mandate that termination occur only when it is "strictly necessary" to terminate parental rights. See Utah Code 78A-6-507(1). On appeal, Father argued that the juvenile court incorrectly interpreted the termination statute. The court of appeals clarified the analysis the juvenile court should have employed and remanded for reexamination under the clarified analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in disavowing the almost automatically language in its case law; (2) correctly held that the Act requires that termination be strictly necessary for the best interests of the child; and (3) properly remanded the cause to the juvenile court. View "In re B.T.B." on Justia Law

In this eminent domain action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court endorsing a "general rule that a party may not rely on post-valuation facts and circumstances to prove severance damages," holding that there is no categorical rule foreclosing the relevance of evidence of a subsequent transaction involving the property in question.In 2009, a portion of Plaintiff's property was taken by the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). During the subsequent litigation, the parties disputed the amount of damages for the condemned property and on the amount of severance damages as to Plaintiff's remaining property. Plaintiff eventually sold the remaining property, which was developed into two car dealerships. On a pretrial motion in limine the district court excluded this development, concluding that that the property had to be valued as of the date of the taking and based on what a willing buyer and seller would have known at that time. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no categorical rule deeming post-valuation-date evidence irrelevant to the determination of fair market value under Utah Code 78B-6-511 and -512. View "Utah Department of Transportation v. Boggess-Draper Co." on Justia Law

In this case brought by an alleged victim of child-sex abuse years after the alleged abuse occurred, the Supreme Court held that the Utah Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving a time-barred claim in a manner depriving a defendant of a vested statute of limitations defense.Plaintiff, who alleged that Defendant sexually abused her in 1981, conceded that each of her claims had expired under the original statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, argued that (1) her claims were revived when the legislature, in 2016, enacted Utah Code 78B-2-308(7), and (2) her claims against Defendant were timely filed under this statue. The federal court certified this case to the Supreme Court asking the Court to clarify whether the legislature had the authority to expressly revive time-barred claims through a statute. The Supreme Court held (1) the legislature lacks the power to retroactively vitiate a ripened statute of limitations defense under the Utah Constitution; and (2) therefore, section 78B-2-308(7) is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. View "Mitchell v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely, holding that the district court's order of dismissal did not constitute a separate judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(1), and therefore, the judgment was not complete and entered until 150 days after the clerk recorded the order of dismissal.This appeal stemmed from a legal malpractice claim. The district court dismissed the complaint. On April 10, the district court signed the proposed order of dismissal with prejudice. On May 9, Plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion requesting various forms of relief. Defendant argued that the motion was untimely because it was filed more than twenty-eight days after the April 10 order. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion and vacated the April 10 order, concluding that the order was not a separate judgment under Rule 58A(a) and therefore did not start the time to file post-judgment motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the April 10 order was not a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(a); and (2) because the April 10 order did not constitute an "entry of judgment" that started the time to file post-judgment motions, Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau" on Justia Law

In this case where Defendant was charged with two separate instances of violating a protective order the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to quash his bindover to stand trial, holding that the magistrate properly bound over Defendant to face both counts to the extent they were based on a previously issued ex parte order.In moving to quash the bindover Defendant argued that he had not been properly served with the protective order he was accused of violating and that the ex parte order had expired. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the protective order was served pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 5, it was not properly served; (2) the district court correctly determined that the ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the alleged violations; and (3) therefore, to the extent that the charges against Defendant were based on alleged violations of the ex parte order, the bindover is affirmed. View "State v. Bridgewaters" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for extraordinary relief brought by ACLU of Utah, Disability Law Center, and Utah Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys (collectively, Petitioners) seeking relief on behalf of all individuals in criminal custody in the state who are at risk of contracting COVID-19, holding that Petitioners lacked standing.Rather than claiming that have traditional standing or associational standing, Petitioners argued that they had public interest standing. While two members of the Court have previously expressed serious doubt about the continued validity of public interest standing, the Supreme Court held that it need not engage in an extended discussion of the doctrine. Instead, the Court held that Petitioners did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the issues they sought to litigate were unlikely to be raised if they were denied standing. View "ACLU of Utah v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the professional rescuer rule that this Court adopted in Fordham v. Oldroyd, 171 P.3d 411 (Utah 2007), extends no further than Fordham's detailed formulation and that a person does owe a duty of care to a professional rescuer for injury that was sustained by the gross negligence or intentional tort that caused the rescuer's presence.Plaintiff, a firefighter, was severely injured while responding to a mulch fire that occurred on Defendant's property. At the time of the fire, Defendant was in knowing violation of several ordinances, including the fire code, and of industry standards regarding the safe storage of mulch. Plaintiff sued Defendant for gross negligence, intentional harm, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Plaintiff under the professional rescuer rule. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court partially reversed the summary judgment order, holding (1) a person owes professional rescuers a duty of care when that person's gross negligence or intentional tort triggers the rescuers' presence; and (2) the case is remanded to the district court to rule whether Defendant's actions were grossly negligent, creating a duty to Plaintiff. View "Ipsen v. Diamond Tree Experts, Inc" on Justia Law