Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this action brought by Claimants seeking recovery for physical takings as well as severance damages for their property's decrease in market value after the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned portions of their land the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals upholding the jury's verdict awarding claimants $2.3 million in severance damages, holding that the jury's award of severance damages was appropriate.The UDOT projects involved the reconstruction of a freeway interchange near Claimants' property. UDOT's condemnation of a portion of the property owned by Claimants interfered with both the property's visibility and its convenient "right-out" exits that provided access to the freeway. The jury awarded $2.3 million in severance damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severance damages awarded were appropriate because Claimants put on adequate evidence that their damages were caused by UDOT's construction of an improvement in the form of the new interchange. View "Utah Department of Transportation v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in this action seeking to recover delinquent contributions to various trust funds for construction on a state construction project, holding that the right of action under a payment bond statute extends to any amount due an employee, meaning any amount that is traceable specifically to an employee.One of the subcontractors hired to work on the project failed to make contributions to various trust funds for its employees' work on the project, as required by trust agreements and a collective bargaining agreement. The trusts (Plaintiffs) sought to recover the delinquent contributions from the public payment bond associated with the project by suing Defendant, the surety for the payment bond. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. On appeal, the parties disputed whether Utah Code 63G-6-505(4) limits the right of action on a payment bond to amounts due to an employee or encompasses claims for any amounts due for an employee or on the employee's behalf. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right of action under the public payment bond statute contemplates recovery of any specific benefit that is due a person in the sense of being traceable to that person. View "McDonald v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction as an accomplice to the crime of aggravated murder, holding that it was reasonably probable that the jury would not have convicted Defendant absent three jury instruction errors.The jury instruction discussing the elements for accomplice liability on aggravated murder contained three errors. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that, in the absence of these errors, there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Defendant in the absence of the three errors in the jury instruction that provided the basis for Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Grunwald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's claim brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), holding that, contrary to the conclusions of the district court, Appellant's petition was not barred because his initial petition did not count as a "previous request for post-conviction relief" under Utah Code 78B-9-106(1)(d).In 2013, Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. In 2017, Appellant submitted a petition in the Second District Court of Utah seeking to challenge his conviction. Appellant subsequently withdrew his petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). Later, Appellant filed a new petition in the Second District Court. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was procedurally barred because it asserted claims that were, or could have been, raised or addressed in a previous request for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no "previous request for post-conviction relief" where the action was initiated but voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1)(A). View "Hand v. State" on Justia Law

In three consolidated cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district judges denying in large part Defendants' motions to dismiss these medical malpractice lawsuits on time-bar grounds and reversed the judgment of one of the three judges granting the motion to dismiss as to a negligent credentialing claim, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal.Plaintiffs, three former patients of Dr. Sherman Sorensen, sued Sorensen, his business entity, and either St. Mark's Hospital or IHC Health Services, Inc., alleging that Sorensen performed unnecessary heart surgery on them. Defendants moved to dismiss each case on the ground that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Defendants also contended that the time bar was not tolled by the statute's "fraudulent concealment" or "foreign object" exceptions. The three district judges denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding(1) the statutory tolling provisions in Utah Code 78B-3-404(2) apply to both the two-year limitations period and the four-year repose period in section 78B-3-404(1); and (2) responses to affirmative defenses are not subject to the pleading requirements of rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Bright v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants, a hospital and a midwife, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce expert evidence that created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the causation element of her medical malpractice claim.Thirteen years after her baby sustained brain damage during delivery, Plaintiff, as parent and natural guardian of her minor child, sued Defendants, alleging that the hospital's labor-and-delivery nurses and the midwife inadequately monitored Plaintiff's labor, which resulted in the child's hypoxic brain injury. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Defendants dismissing Plaintiff's claims for premajority medical expenses and then later dismissed Plaintiff's remaining negligence claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly found that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that would establish the necessary causal link between the alleged breaches in standard of care and the supposed injury to the child. View "Ruiz v. Killebrew" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery on the ground that the legal framework established in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), is no longer viable and reinstated the jury verdict on the alternative basis that any arguable error in admitting eyewitness identification evidence in this case was harmless.Defendant was convicted based on eyewitness identification testimony and other evidence admitted at trial. The court of appeals reversed the conviction under the reliability factors set forth in Ramirez and on the ground that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals, however, also raised concerns about the viability of the standard set forth in Ramirez, indicating that the Ramirez framework must be revisited. The Supreme Court endorsed the need for revising and updating the factors set forth in Ramirez based on new developments in scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. The Court then held (1) admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony is to be measured in the first instance by the rules of evidence; and (2) in this case, any error in admitting such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Lujan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Office of Public Guardian's (OPG) petition for extraordinary relief after the juvenile court appointed OPG as guardian ad litem for Mother in a parental rights proceeding, holding that the juvenile court went beyond the bounds of its discretion by appointing OPG in this matter.Before appointing OPG as Mother's guardian ad litem, the juvenile court noted that, under its reading of the Utah Code, OPG could petition or agree to represent Mother in termination proceedings. The juvenile court then ordered OPG to "represent" mother in the proceedings. OPG petitioned for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) OPG can seek extraordinary relief because it lacked a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to address its appointment; (2) the juvenile court has inherent authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for an adult; but (3) the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by appointing the OPG as guardian ad litem in this case. View "In re G.J.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, in which Appellant raised two new arguments, from the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea under Utah Code 77-13-6, the Plea Withdrawal Statute, holding that the Plea Withdrawal Statute prohibited this Court from considering Appellant's unpreserved arguments.Appellant pled guilty to felony driving under the influence. Before sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed and raised two new arguments under the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to the preservation rule. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for original appellate review. The Supreme Court held (1) the Plea Withdrawal Statute prevents this Court from considering Appellant's unpreserved arguments; and (2) defendants may not rely on preservation exceptions when appealing the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. View "State v. Flora" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it acted jurisdiction to hear Defendant's unpreserved claim on appeal, holding that Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code 77-13-6, bars review of unpreserved claims raised as part of an appeal from the denial of a timely plea-withdrawal motion.Defendant pled guilty to attempted murder. Before he was sentenced Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed this denial and raised a new challenge under the plain error exception to the preservation rule. The court of appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's unpreserved claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars appellate review of unpreserved claims raised as part of an appeal of a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. View "State v. Badikyan" on Justia Law