Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying the Utah State Tax Commission's motion to dismiss Gail and Margaret Christensens' petition seeking judicial review of an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) requiring Gail to pay income tax and interest on income he earned while working in the Republic of Angola, holding that the Christensens did not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review.Gail did not file Utah tax returns for the three years he was working in Angola. The Auditing Division of the Commission ordered Gail to pay his taxes, along with interest and penalties. Gail challenged that decision, and an ALJ ordered him to pay taxes and interest but not a penalty. Gail did not request a formal hearing before the Commission but, instead, sought review of the order, along with his wife, in the district court. The Commission moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, by failing to request a formal hearing, the Christensens did not exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. View "Christensen v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for burglary and sexual abuse, holding that any error found or assumed in this case was not prejudicial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's comments about he differences between his initial statement at the scene of the crime and his trial testimony violated his constitutional right to remain silent and that the trial court's admission of two prior acts - a peeping incident and a trespassing incident - was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that a constitutional violation occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination about omissions in Defendant's statement at the scene, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not prejudice Defendant; (2) any assumed error in the admission of the trespassing incident was harmless; and (3) Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the admission of the peeping incident. View "State v. Argueta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a Utah prison inmate must register as a sex or kidnap offender the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford the inmate the due process protections required by Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (Utah 2017).Kevin Blanke was serving a prison sentence for attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because of his conviction for attempted child kidnapping Blanke was considered a sex offender under Utah's sex offender registration statute. At the time he was sentenced for kidnapping, Blanke further admitted to having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old, conduct that would place him, if he were convicted, on the sex offender registry. The Parole Board declined to set a parole date for Blanke because he refused to participate in the prison sex offender treatment program. Blanke filed a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d), arguing that the Parole Board had violated due process by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the procedural protections in Neese did not apply. View "Blanke v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the post-conviction court denying Petitioner's pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code 78B-9-101 to -503, holding that Petitioner failed to identify a material dispute sufficient to rebut the State's showing that he was not prejudiced by his guilty plea or the State's showing that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient.Petitioner pled guilty to first-degree murder. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he did not understand that the absence of imperfect self-defense was an element of murder and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of a language barrier with trial counsel. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claim that his plea was unknowing and involuntary failed because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced as a result; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether trial counsel's failure to obtain an interpreter constituted deficient performance. View "Arriaga v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's request to view the alleged sexual abuse victim's privileged mental health therapy records, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that an exception to the mental health therapist-patient privilege exists under Utah R. Evid. 506.Defendant was accused of sexually abused his girlfriend's three-year-old child (Child). Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to produce Child's mental health therapy records under Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant failed to make the particularly showings regarding relevance or that the records were reasonably certain to contain exculpatory information. The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that Defendant failed to meet the "reasonable certainty" requirement under case law. The Supreme Court affirmed without considering the merits of Defendant's challenge to the "reasonable certainty" test, holding that Defendant failed to establish that Child had a "condition" under Rule 506(d)(1)(A). Because, however, Defendant raised significant concerns about the reasonable certainty test, the Supreme Court referred Rule 506 to the rules committee for review. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights action the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case to the juvenile court so that it may reexamine the termination petition in light of the clarified standard, holding that the court of appeals did not misinterpret the Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code 78A-6-506, -507.To resolve Mother's petition to terminate the parental rights of Father the juvenile court followed the statutory framework the legislature created by finding multiple grounds for termination and concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. The juvenile court then addressed a legislative mandate that termination occur only when it is "strictly necessary" to terminate parental rights. See Utah Code 78A-6-507(1). On appeal, Father argued that the juvenile court incorrectly interpreted the termination statute. The court of appeals clarified the analysis the juvenile court should have employed and remanded for reexamination under the clarified analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in disavowing the almost automatically language in its case law; (2) correctly held that the Act requires that termination be strictly necessary for the best interests of the child; and (3) properly remanded the cause to the juvenile court. View "In re B.T.B." on Justia Law

In this eminent domain action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court endorsing a "general rule that a party may not rely on post-valuation facts and circumstances to prove severance damages," holding that there is no categorical rule foreclosing the relevance of evidence of a subsequent transaction involving the property in question.In 2009, a portion of Plaintiff's property was taken by the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). During the subsequent litigation, the parties disputed the amount of damages for the condemned property and on the amount of severance damages as to Plaintiff's remaining property. Plaintiff eventually sold the remaining property, which was developed into two car dealerships. On a pretrial motion in limine the district court excluded this development, concluding that that the property had to be valued as of the date of the taking and based on what a willing buyer and seller would have known at that time. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no categorical rule deeming post-valuation-date evidence irrelevant to the determination of fair market value under Utah Code 78B-6-511 and -512. View "Utah Department of Transportation v. Boggess-Draper Co." on Justia Law

In this case brought by an alleged victim of child-sex abuse years after the alleged abuse occurred, the Supreme Court held that the Utah Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving a time-barred claim in a manner depriving a defendant of a vested statute of limitations defense.Plaintiff, who alleged that Defendant sexually abused her in 1981, conceded that each of her claims had expired under the original statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, argued that (1) her claims were revived when the legislature, in 2016, enacted Utah Code 78B-2-308(7), and (2) her claims against Defendant were timely filed under this statue. The federal court certified this case to the Supreme Court asking the Court to clarify whether the legislature had the authority to expressly revive time-barred claims through a statute. The Supreme Court held (1) the legislature lacks the power to retroactively vitiate a ripened statute of limitations defense under the Utah Constitution; and (2) therefore, section 78B-2-308(7) is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. View "Mitchell v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely, holding that the district court's order of dismissal did not constitute a separate judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(1), and therefore, the judgment was not complete and entered until 150 days after the clerk recorded the order of dismissal.This appeal stemmed from a legal malpractice claim. The district court dismissed the complaint. On April 10, the district court signed the proposed order of dismissal with prejudice. On May 9, Plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion requesting various forms of relief. Defendant argued that the motion was untimely because it was filed more than twenty-eight days after the April 10 order. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion and vacated the April 10 order, concluding that the order was not a separate judgment under Rule 58A(a) and therefore did not start the time to file post-judgment motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the April 10 order was not a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(a); and (2) because the April 10 order did not constitute an "entry of judgment" that started the time to file post-judgment motions, Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau" on Justia Law

In this case where Defendant was charged with two separate instances of violating a protective order the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to quash his bindover to stand trial, holding that the magistrate properly bound over Defendant to face both counts to the extent they were based on a previously issued ex parte order.In moving to quash the bindover Defendant argued that he had not been properly served with the protective order he was accused of violating and that the ex parte order had expired. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the protective order was served pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 5, it was not properly served; (2) the district court correctly determined that the ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the alleged violations; and (3) therefore, to the extent that the charges against Defendant were based on alleged violations of the ex parte order, the bindover is affirmed. View "State v. Bridgewaters" on Justia Law