Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, holding that Defendant's trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient in not requesting a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), about the potential unreliability of eyewitness identification.During trial, Defendant's counsel presented a theory of mistaken identification in his opening and closing arguments and cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses about weaknesses in their testimony. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel's failure to request a Long instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Long does not apply to "real-time identifications," such as the identification in this case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' holding that Long did not apply but nevertheless affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred when it ruled that Long applies only to "memory-based" identifications; and (2) a reasonable, competent lawyer could have chosen not to request a Long instruction in this case. View "State v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the University of Utah for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence, holding that Plaintiff did not identify a basis for a legal cause of action against the University.After the University dismissed Plaintiff from its neuroscience Ph.D. program, and the decision was affirmed at every level of administrative review, Plaintiff brought his action against the University. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, the University was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) Plaintiff's claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claim. View "Rossi v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of accomplice to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under a theory of accomplice liability, holding that the trial court gave an erroneous mens rea instruction to which trial counsel should have objected and this failure to object prejudiced Defendant.At issue was a jury instruction detailing the mens rea required to convict under an accomplice-liability theory. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instruction was erroneous and that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to it. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the instructions adequately instructed the jury on accomplice liability for aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue was erroneous and that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to it; and (2) trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Defendant. View "State v. Eyre" on Justia Law

In this case alleging that Larry Boynton's wife, Barbara, was exposed to asbestos dust from several job sites that Larry worked at during the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the job site operators, holding that premises operators owe a duty of care to a worker's cohabitants with respect to take-home exposure to asbestos.During his marriage to Barbara, Larry worked at numerous job sites where he was exposed to asbestos. In 2016, Barbara was diagnosed with Malignant mesothelioma and died from it that year. Larry sued the job site operators for indirectly exposing Barbara to asbestos dust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the operators, concluding that they had no duty to prevent "take-home exposure" to asbestos dust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) premises owners are liable to their employees' co-habitants for take-home asbestos exposure; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the premises operators retained control over its contractor. View "Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC v. Phillips 66 Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against a physician who performed an independent medical examination (IME) on Plaintiff, holding that even if the physician's IME report constituted an affirmative act with foreseeable harms, he was not liable for Plaintiff's injuries resulting from a delay in workers' compensation proceedings.Plaintiff was injured during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and the claim was coordinated by Broadspire Services, Inc. Broadspire arranged for Dr. Mark Anderson to perform an IME of Defendant's injuries. Anderson concluded that the accident caused Plaintiff to suffer a transient cervical strain and that Plaintiff's remaining symptoms were secondary to pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Broadspire denied Plaintiff various forms of workers' compensation benefits. Three years later, the Utah Labor Condition determined that the accident created additional injuries and ordered that Plaintiff's employer pay historical medical expenses. Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against Anderson and vicarious liability against Broadspire. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that policy considerations favor no duty owed by an expert whose professional opinion causes a delay in legal proceedings. View "Kirk v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the termination of Mother's parental rights was not against the clear weight of the evidence, holding that the court of appeals did not err.The juvenile court found that there were statutory grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights to her child and determined that it was in the child's best interest to do so. The court determined that it was "strictly necessary" to terminate Mother's parental rights. On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court failed to give adequate consideration to reasonable alternatives to termination, as required for the "strictly necessary" inquiry. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied the standard of review set forth in State ex rel. B.R., 171 P.3d 435 (Utah 2007), to the juvenile court's best interest determination, and Mother identified no other basis for reversal. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that a factfinder may consider extrinsic evidence of the sexual purpose of a person charged with producing a visual depiction of murder.Defendant was convicted of thirty-three counts of child sex crimes, including aggravated sexual abuse of a child and forcible sodomy of a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial counsel was ineffective based on his failure to object to the prosecutor's request that the jury consider Defendant's subjective intentions in deciding whether Exhibits 21 and 22 - two photographs obtained from Defendant's laptop - qualified as child pornography under Utah law. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant had asserted a successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Exhibit 22 but not Exhibit 21 and reversed Defendant's conviction based on Exhibit 22. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not identify a basis for challenging the State's invitation for the jury to consider Defendant's subjective intention in creating an image that qualified as child pornography as a depiction of child nudity for the purpose of sexual arousal under Utah Code 76-5b-103(10)(f). View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his felony discharge of a firearm convictions under the doctrine of merger, holding that Utah Code 76-5-203(5)(a) expressly forecloses merger for all offenses described in subsection (1) of the murder statute but does not explicitly extend to the crime of attempted murder.Defendant was convicted of both felony discharge of a firearm and attempted murder. Defendant filed a motion to vacate the felony discharge counts under the doctrine of merger, asserting that the two sets of charges arose out of the "same acts" and were thus subject to merger under Utah Code 76-1-402(1). The district court denied the motion, concluding that it could address concerns regarding evidentiary overlap as a matter of sentencing. The court did so by imposing sentences that were to run concurrently. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that "the prohibition against a predicate offense merging with murder also prevents that offense from merging with attempted merger." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature has not explicitly stated its intent to foreclose the general rules of merger as applied to the crime of attempted murder. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court setting aside a default certificate under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c), holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default certificate.This complaint was filed by family members alleging mismanagement of the decedents' trusts and unjust enrichment and seeking an accounting of trust funds and a declaratory judgment establishing their rights under the trusts. After the answer deadline, Plaintiffs filed a proposed order entering Defendants' default and then filed a motion for default judgment. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and granted Defendants' request to set aside the default certificate, arguing that they had shown "good cause" to set aside the default certification under Rule 55(c). The court granted Defendants' request to set aside the default certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion finding there was good cause to set aside the default certificate. View "Gillman v. Gillman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the equitable estoppel doctrine offers a discrete basis for tolling a statute of limitations in Utah.Owners executed a trust deed note with Alpine East Investors, LLC for certain property and promised to pay the note in full within two years. The promise was not fulfilled. After the foreclosure limitations period had expired, Owners sought to enjoin Alpine East from foreclosing its trust deed on the property and a determination that Alpine East had no valid interest in the property. Alpine East invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel seeking to toll the limitations period. Owners argued that equitable estoppel is not a stand-alone basis for defeating a statute of limitations defense. The district court granted summary judgment for Owners, declaring that the limitations period for enforcing the trust deed had expired before Alpine East recorded a notice of default or filed an action to foreclose. Thereafter, the court granted Alpine East's Rule 59 motion to revise the ruling, concluding that findings of fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) equitable estoppel is a discrete basis for tolling a statute of limitations; but (2) a mere promise to pay, without more, is insufficient to invoke equitable estoppel. View "Fitzgerald v. Spearhead Investments, LLC" on Justia Law