Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marilyn Hamblin, the owner of a water right, filed a permanent change application with the state engineer seeking to change her water right's place of use and point of diversion. The state engineer denied the application, declaring that Hamblin had forfeited her water right. Hamblin filed a petition for judicial review. The district court granted the state engineer's motion for summary judgment and denied Hamblin's cross-motion for summary judgment, basing its decision primarily on the determination that Hamblin's water right had been forfeited by operation of law by her nonuse. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the state engineer lacked statutory authority to consider non-adjudicated forfeiture when making a decision to approve or reject a permanent change application. View "Jensen v. Jones" on Justia Law

Chance Robinson was charged with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance based on the presence of methamphetamine in his bloodstream. The charge was grounded on provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act that make it unlawful for any person to "knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled substance in [his or her] body." Robinson pleaded guilty to the charges. On appeal Robinson argued that Utah's measurable amount provision violates the Utah and United States Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding (1) the provision does not violate the due process or the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution; (2) the provision does not violate the constitutional principles set forth in Robinson v. California because it punishes the act of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance while in utah and requires the State to prove that such use was knowing and intentional; and (3) the provision does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Several Utah counties appealed a tax court's valuation of T-Mobile's taxable Utah property, arguing the valuation did not give proper deference to the Commission's prior assessments, erroneously excluded the value of goodwill, and was based on inadmissible evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court correctly conducted a trial de novo under the standard of review; (2) the tax court properly excluded T-Mobile's accounting goodwill from its taxable Utah property because the Utah Constitution prohibits taxing goodwill as property; and (3) under the Utah rules of evidence, the tax court did not abuse its discretion when it determined T-Mobile's expert witness was a qualified expert and that his testimony was reliable. View "T-Mobile v. Tax Comm'n and Counties, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Sandy City and Plaintiffs Mark Haik and several others all hold deeds to the same water right. Sandy City recorded a sales agreement for the right in 1977, but did not record the deed until 2004. The Plaintiffs purchased the same water right in 2003, and recorded that deed immediately. The district court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the recorded contract was not sufficient notice to Plaintiffs. The agreement was an executory contract that gave no indication whether the deed to the right was actually delivered. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the district court erred in giving the right to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court found that in some circumstances ârecord noticeâ of an equitable interest in water rights could subvert a claim by another good faith purchaser of the same right, but those circumstances were not present in this case. The Court held that since Plaintiffs were the first to file their deed, they held the water right.

Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Lenkart was charged with rape, forcible sodomy and two counts of sexual abuse. A jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Following his sentencing hearing, Defendant moved to arrest judgment and filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant raised several errors at trial, including the denial of his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Courtâs review of the record found that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to investigate and present important exculpatory evidence. The Court reversed Defendantâs conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Oak Lane Homeowners Association (the Association) sought review of the appellate courtâs judgment in favor of Defendants Dennis and Renae Griffin. The previous owners of the Griffinsâ property âhad an understandingâ that the lane in question could only be used with permission. The Griffins had used the lane for ingress and egress for fifteen years. Their neighbors sought to form the Association in order to maintain the lane. When the Association asked the Griffins to join, the Griffins refused, and asserted their intent to continue to use the lane. The Association sought quitclaim deeds from all original owners of the platted lots. After receiving them, the Association placed huge boulders in the edges to prevent the Griffins from accessing their property from the lane. The Association argued that the Defendants did not have a private easement over a private lane. The appellate court found that a private easement was created in favor of the Griffiths because their deed in the subdivisionâs recorded plat showed their property abuts the private lane. On appeal, the Association argued that recognizing the Griffinsâ âeasement by platâ is inconsistent with the state law. The Supreme Court disagreed: â[w]e have repeatedly held that when a property abuts a public roadway, a private easement over that roadway arises in favor of the abutting landowner.â Seeing no reason to distinguish a private lane from a public road, the Court upheld the appellate courtâs grant of summary judgment to the Griffins.

Victims-Appellants T.C. and N.C. are the minor victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by their adopted older brother Zachariah Clark. As part of the restitution ordered during sentencing, the trial court required the defendant to pay the costs of the victimsâ therapy. But as defendant was also sentenced to prison, he had no means to pay those costs. Because defendant was adopted through the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), Appellants requested that DCFS be ordered to pay their treatment costs pursuant to state law. That request was ultimately denied. On appeal, Appellants raise several grounds for challenging the district courtâs refusal to order DCFS to pay for their treatment. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of these contentions because it found that the Appellants had no statutory right to appeal the decision.

Appellees Mark and Marilyn Hesse purchased an undeveloped subdivision of land owned by Canberra Development Company (CDC) in February 2004. Appellees constructed their home on the lot. After moving into their new home, Appellees noticed several structural problems including the presence of large cracks in the floor. Appellees later learned that these problems were caused by unstable soil beneath the foundation of their home. Subsequently, Appellees discovered that CDC had failed to inform them of soil analysis assessment reports which had been ordered seven years prior to the selling of their lot. These test reports indicated the presence of expansive and collapsible soils most notably in the Appelleesâ back yard. Appellees filed suit against CDC seeking compensatory and punitive damages for fraudulent nondisclosure and misrepresentation. After a jury trial, Appellees were awarded over $3 million in economic damages including pain and suffering. No punitive damages were awarded. After the trial, CDC filed several post-verdict motions including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The District Court ultimately denied these motions. The Supreme Court held that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude CDC was liable to Appellees for fraudulent nondisclosure and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court found later, however, that the district court had erred in denying CDCâs motion for a new trial to assess damages. As a result, the Supreme Court reduced Appelleesâ economic damages award.

Petitioner-Defendant Brenda White was charged with the attempted murder of her ex-husband after she chased him and hit him with her car at his workplace. Petitioner filed a pretrial motion asking the judge to instruct the jury on the extreme emotional distress defense, arguing that on the date of the incident, extreme sets overwhelmed her ability to act rationally and caused her to lose all self-control. The trial court denied her motion, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. On review of the case, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court applied the wrong standard when it evaluated the availability of the extreme emotional distress defense, it reversed the court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court to reevaluate evidence in support of the defense.