Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A highway patrol trooper noticed a car driven by Vance Morris did not have a visible license plate. Once he pulled Morris over, the trooper realized the car had a valid temporary registration tag displayed in its rear window. The trooper approached and spoke to Morris, ultimately gathering evidence leading to Morris's conviction for, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that once the trooper realized his mistake, he lost the reasonable suspicion that justified the traffic stop, and any contact or further detention of Morris was unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an officer acting in good faith is reasonably mistaken about the grounds for a traffic stop, he may initiate contact with the driver to explain his mistake but may not detain the driver any further, and, if during this encounter, new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arises, the officer may act accordingly; and (2) because the trooper's stop was based on an objectively reasonable mistake of fact, he was allowed to approach Morris, and the odor of alcohol detected during this encounter allowed the trooper to constitutionally detain Morris further. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

This case concerned the application of payments made in connection with a real estate transaction between Kang Park and Marsha Park and Gary Stanford. The district court granted summary judgment to the Parks, determining, as a matter of law, that none of the payments Stanford submitted to the Parks could be credited toward a personal guaranty Stanford had made on the note payable to the Parks. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that no evidence indicated the Parks had actual knowledge that Stanford intended for the past payments to apply to his guaranty and no agreement or contractual provision expressly required the Parks to make such an application. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied the wrong test in its holding, and rather, a rule in which payments are credited toward a personal guaranty when the recipient of the payments has a reasonable basis to know the payments were submitted in satisfaction of the guaranty governed the application of payments toward a personal guaranty; and (2) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment under the rule and the record required further development. Remanded. View "Park v. Stanford" on Justia Law

After a Robin Doyle and Doug Doyle obtained a litigated custody decree, Robin petitioned the trial court for a modification of the custody of her son, maintaining that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances when Robin moved from Colorado back to the same neighborhood as her son. The court granted her petition, transferring custody from the child's father, Doug, to Robin. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded for recalculation of child support. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) formal bifurcation of the changed circumstances and best interests proceedings was not required by Utah law and the trial court appropriately received evidence regarding changed circumstances and best interest; (2) the trial court correctly found a change in circumstances even when there was no change in the custodial parent's circumstances; and (3) the trial court had ample authority to modify the child support order in the absence of a specific request in Robin's petition for modification of custody. View "Doyle v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Barbara and Steven Selvig, as sellers, and Blockbuster Enterprises, as buyer, entered into a real estate purchase contract for the purchase of a bed and breakfast. The contract specified that the deed to the property would be recorded when Blockbuster paid the full purchase price. Before paying the full purchase price, however, Blockbuster recorded the deed. The sellers sued in district court on several theories of liability. The district court granted Blockbuster's motion to dismiss, dismissing (1) the seller's claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the sellers had elected their remedy pursuant to an election of remedies provision in the contract by keeping the earnest money deposit; and (2) the seller's unjust enrichment claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in dismissing the seller's contractual claims because the election of remedies provision does not apply to a breach of contract claim out of a wrongful recording of the deed; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed the seller's claim for unjust enrichment because the sale of the property was covered by a written contract. View "Selvig v. Blockbuster Enterprises, L.C." on Justia Law

Baby E.Z., the child of John Wyatt and the birth mother, who were never married, was born in Virginia. After the birth, the birth mother consented to an adoption, after which Wyatt initiated custody and visitation proceedings in a Virginia court. The prospective parents then filed a petition for adoption in Utah district court. Wyatt filed a motion in the Utah court contesting the adoption and requesting permission to intervene. The Utah court denied Wyatt's motion, holding that he had waived his rights to the child, that he could not intervene, and that his consent to the adoption was not required. Subsequently, the Virginia court issued an order granting Wyatt custody of the baby. On appeal, Wyatt argued that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) deprived the Utah district court of jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and required enforcement of the Virginia court order awarding him custody of the baby. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Wyatt's motion, holding (1) the PKPA applied to the adoption proceedings, but that Wyatt waived any claim under the PKPA by failing to raise the statute below; and (2) Wyatt failed to timely assert his parental rights under Utah law. View "In Re Baby E.Z." on Justia Law

Defendant Douglas Lovell was convicted of aggravated murder. Following the entry of his guilty plea, Lovell moved to withdraw it. The district court initially held the motion was untimely, but the Supreme Court reversed that holding and remanded the case. In the district court, Lovell argued he had good cause to withdraw his plea because (1) the trial court failed to strictly comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), which sets out the requirements for a lawful guilty plea, and (2) there was good cause for him to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court (1) held that the trial court complied with rule 11(e) and even if it did not, the error did not amount to good cause to allow Lovell to withdraw his plea because Lovell did not show that but for the error he would not have pled guilty; and (2) rejected Lovell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e) constituted good cause to allow Lovell to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Lovell" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) contracted with Meadow Valley Contractors (MVC) for a highway construction project. MVC subcontracted the paving work to Southwest Asphalt Paving. After UDOT refused to allow Southwest to use ribbon paving and assessed MVC a thickness-laying penalty, MVC filed a compliant against UDOT, alleging that (1) it incurred costs not contemplated by the contract as a result of UDOT's prohibition on ribbon paving, and (2) the thickness penalty assessed by UDOT was unwarranted. UDOT denied MVC claims. Southwest then filed a complaint in district court in MVC's name against UDOT alleging breach of contract. The trial court (1) concluded that UDOT breached its contract with MVC by refusing to allow ribbon paving on the construction project, and (2) denied MVC's claim that UDOT had erroneously imposed a paving-thickness penalty. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) UDOT did did not breach its contract with MVC when it forbade MVC and Southwest from using ribbon paving, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that UDOT's interpretation of the contract regarding paving thickness was more reasonable than MVC's interpretation. View "Meadow Valley v. UDOT" on Justia Law

Appellants Marion Energy (Marion) and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the Trust) leased and owned oil and gas deposits that lay underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership (KFJ). To build a road to access their deposits, Marion and the Trust sought to condemn a portion of KFJ's land. To do so, they relied on a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of roads to facilitate the working of "mineral deposits." At issue was whether the phrase "mineral deposits" as used in the statute was intended by the legislature to encompass oil and gas deposits. The district court granted KFJ's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute did not provide authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute is ambiguous as to whether "mineral deposits" includes oil and gas, and (2) because the Court strictly construes an ambiguous statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain against the condemning party, Marion and the Trust were not authorized by the statute to condemn KFJ's land. View "Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship" on Justia Law

Carter and Glenada Iverson were killed in a head-on collision with an underinsured motorist while driving a vehicle covered by their policy with State Farm. The personal representative of the Iversons' estate requested that State Farm provide underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in an amount equal to the liability policy limits of $100,000. State Farm offered $20,000, the limit under the Iversons' policy for the UIM claims. Iverson sued State Farm in district court. The Supreme Court granted certification to answer whether an insurer may provide lower limits for underinsured motorist coverage than for liability coverage under Utah law. The Court concluded that (1) such coverage may comply with Utah law if the insurer follows the consumer notification requirements contained in the Utah Code; (2) because notification requirements differ depending on when the insured's policy was issued, a court must first determine whether a new policy existed on or after January 1, 2001; and (3) a new policy exists on or after this date when the insurer and the insured enter into a new contractual relationship or if changes are made to the terms of an existing insurance contract that materially alter the levels of risk contained in the contract. View "Iverson v. State Farm" on Justia Law

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co." on Justia Law