Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that required Husband to pay monthly alimony to Wife. Wife later moved in with her parents and developed a relationship with one of her parents' foster children, M.H. Husband then filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, seeking to terminate his alimony obligation on the basis of Wife's alleged cohabitation with M.H. The district court concluded that Wife had cohabitated with M.H. and terminated Wife's right to alimony. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) although a spouse's alimony duty terminates by statute upon a finding of cohabitation, cohabitation under the statute contemplates a relationship akin to a marriage and requires more than a finding of two individuals living under the same roof; and (2) Wife's relationship with M.H. did not rise to the level of marriage-like cohabitation, and Husband's alimony duty was accordingly not affected by it. View "Myers v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned real property belonging to Admiral Beverage Corporation, and Admiral was entitled to compensation from the State for the taking of its property. During the condemnation proceedings, Admiral sought to introduce evidence of the fair market value of its property, including evidence of its damages arising from the loss of view and visibility of its remaining property. The district court ruled that evidence of the fair market value of Admiral's property was not admissible under the holding in Ivers v. UDOT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the part of Ivers that allowed severance damages only for "recognized property rights" was too restrictive to accord the full protection of the Utah Constitution, was inconsistent with both Utah statutes and the Court's prior case law, and was therefore overruled; and (2) Admiral had the right to recover from UDOT for the decrease in the fair market value of its remaining property resulting from the condemnation. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp." on Justia Law

L.C. Canyon filed an application with Salt Lake County to rezone several acres of its property to allow the construction of a residence on the property. The County Planning Commission recommended its approval to the Salt Lake County Council. The Council then passed an ordinance amending the zoning map to grant L.C. Canyon's requested rezoning. Before the ordinance was to take effect, the Council rescinded the rezoning ordinance. L.C. Canyon filed a complaint against the County, asserting that the Council had no authority to rescind the rezoning ordinance and that the rescission effected a taking of L.C. Canyon's property. The district court entered summary judgment against L.C. Canyon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County had a rational basis for its zoning decision, (2) the Council had the authority to rescind its rezoning ordinance before it became effective, and (3) because L.C. Canyon had only a unilateral hope that the rezoning ordinance ultimately would take effect, it had no viable takings claim. View "L.C. Canyon Partners v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute in this appeal revolved around the issue of who was contractually obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to an employee of Employer. The Supreme Court found that Employer's Insurer was required to pay workers' compensation benefits for all of Employer's employees and remanded the case. The district court entered a final judgment. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's judgment, Insurer filed an "objection to judgment." Insurer then filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's order disposing of that motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to address the appeal as (1) Insurer did not file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's final judgment, and (2) Insurer failed to file a postjudgment motion that would toll the time for appeal or one that the Court had jurisdiction to review. View "Workers Comp. Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Terry Johnson was convicted of murdering his child's babysitter. The court of appeals affirmed. Johnson subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging, among other things, his counsel's effectiveness and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The district court denied the petition without reaching the merits of Johnson's claims, finding each claim was either previously adjudicated, frivolous, or barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Johnson's petition contained claims that had been previously adjudicated, that the district court had no jurisdiction to decide, and that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal, the district court correctly dismissed Johnson's petition. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant Money & More Inc. (M&M) allegedly maintained and operated a Ponzi scheme. Pursuant to a petition filed by the State, the district court issued a temporary restraining order freezing Defendants' assets and later entered a preliminary injunction. Several hundred individuals and dozens of corporations that made fraudulent investments formed Money & More Investors LLC (MMI) and assigned to it their rights, interests, and claims against Defendants, who included the individuals comprising M&M. After reaching a settlement agreement with Defendants, MMI filed a motion to intervene in the State's preservation action. The district court granted MMI both intervention as of right under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a) and, in the alternative, permissive intervention under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of intervention as of right, holding that MMI met all the elements of rule 24(a) where (1) MMI's motion to intervene was timely; (2) MMI had a direct interest relating to the property; (3) MMI sufficiently established that the original parties to the suit would inadequately represent MMI's interests; and (4) MMI would be bound by the judgment. View "State v. Bosh" on Justia Law

Three cases, including State v. Davis, State v. Jeffs, 2011 UT 56, and State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, were consolidated in this opinion. All three cases came to the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal and involved nearly identical facts and issues. Each Defendant was charged with crimes in Salt Lake County. Although each Defendant qualified for representation by a public defender, each Defendant retained a private attorney. Subsequently, each Defendant filed a motion requesting funding for expert witnesses and other defense resources, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the holding in State v. Burns, which states that the Utah Indigent Defense Act requires local governments to provide indigent defendants with funding for necessary defense resources even when the defendant is represented by private counsel, remains good law after amendments to the Act; and (2) because the Act requires a defendant to demonstrate a compelling reason to receive funding for defense resources only when a local government has contracted to provide such resources to all indigent defendants, and the County in this case had not so contracted, the district court erred in requiring Defendants to demonstrate a compelling reason for the requested funding. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Judge Judith Atherton presided over a criminal proceeding involving an indigent defendant in which Atherton ordered the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) to provide funding for the defendant's expert. LDA was not given notice of the hearing on the defendant's motion requesting funding for his expert witness and was not present at the hearing. LDA filed a petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition and vacated Atherton's order, holding that Atherton violated LDA's right to due process by ordering LDA to provide funding for the defendant's expert witness without giving it notice or an opportunity to be heard. Remanded. View "Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Third District Court (Atherton) " on Justia Law

Ivory Homes purchased various concrete products from a company that, when it delivered the products, provided an invoice that charged a single sales price without indicating separate delivery charges. Ivory Homes then discovered if it structured its transactions with the company differently and bargained for separate and independent delivery charges, the charges would not be taxable. Subsequently, Ivory Homes filed a refund request with the Utah Taxpayer Services Division for sales tax it paid for several years on expenses associated with the concrete products. The Division denied the refund. The Utah State Tax Commission also denied the refund request. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Commission's decision that it did not erroneously receive any tax and that Ivory Homes was not entitled to a tax refund where (1) under a substantial evidence standard of review, the Commission correctly made findings of fact that the parties did not intend delivery charges in their original transactions; and (2) alternatively, a plain language interpretation of the Refund Statute requires that the Tax Commission commit some error in its receipt of taxes before a taxpayer is entitled to a refund. View "Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah Tax Comm'n " on Justia Law

Summit Water was a mutual water company providing culinary grade water to residential and commercial shareholders. After the Utah State Tax Commission audited Summit Water's annual property tax affidavit and concluded that the value of the distribution facilities was substantially higher than Summit Water reported that year, Summit County assessed Summit Water for the back taxes owed for the previous four years. In all, Summit County assessed Summit Water $204,020 in additional taxes. The Summit County Board of Equalization determined that Summit Water failed to establish that the taxation of the property was incorrect or illegal, concluding (1) Summit Water was not eligible for the constitutional tax exemption afforded to entities that own a water distribution system providing water for irrigating lands because the water used by Summit Water's shareholders was for nonagricultural purposes, and (2) there was no double taxation of Summit Water's property. The Commission affirmed. The district court reversed in part, holding that the constitutional exemption at issue includes any artificial watering of land, including nonagricultural properties. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the constitutional exemption encompasses the nonagricultural watering of lands and that no double taxation occurred. View "Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law