Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2000, a fire destroyed a business location of Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc., spurring years of litigation with its insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America. After Stone Flood and its two shareholders, James and Patrice Stone, sued Safeco in 2007, the district court dismissed all claims against Safeco. The court concluded (1) Stone Flood's claims on the insurance policy were filed three days beyond the applicable statute of limitations and were therefore barred; (2) the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to bring individual claims under the policy; and (3) the Stones lacked standing to bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because their alleged injuries were merely derivative of the corporation's. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court's calculation of the tolling of the limitations period was incorrect and a correct calculation saved Stone Flood's claims under the insurance policy; and (2) the district court properly concluded the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to sue under the policy, and their claim of IIED failed for lack of a distinct, non-derivative injury. Remanded. View "Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lonnie Arave approached an eleven-year-old boy and offered to pay him if he would agree to let Arave perform oral sex on him. At trial, Arave moved to dismiss a charge of attempted sodomy on a child, asserting that his conduct amounted only to the offense of solicitation and could not sustain a conviction of attempt. The district court denied the motion, and Arave was convicted on the attempt charge. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals insofar as it upheld Arave's conviction for attempt, holding (1) solicitation of a potential victim falls within the ambit of the solicitation statute; and (2) the act of solicitation alone is not enough to constitute a substantial step, and thereby an attempt, to commit a crime. Remanded. View "State v. Arave" on Justia Law

Aequitas Enterprises and Interstate Investment Group entered into a real estate contract for the sale of 388 properties, all located outside the state. Aequitas subsequently sued Interstate Investment for breach of contract. To protect its interest in the properties, Aequitas also filed a motion requesting an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment on all the properties. The district court granted Aequitas's motion for prejudgment writ of attachment and entered an order vesting title to all the properties in Aequitas. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and vacated its order, holding that the state's rules of civil procedure did not authorize a district court to enter an order directly affecting interests in real property located in other states. View "Aequitas Enters., LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

During an investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Task Force on Internet Crimes against Children (ICAC), ICAC agents discovered that child pornography had been downloaded through an IP address belonging to David Maxwell. The agents went to Maxwell's home and asked if he would consent to a seizure and search of his computer. Maxwell refused and adverted to the possibility of destroying his computer. The agents then seized the computer and later secured a warrant to search it. The ensuing search uncovered video and still images of child pornography, and Maxwell was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The district court granted Maxwell's motion to suppress the files found on his computer, concluding that there was no exigent circumstance sustaining a warrantless seizure of Maxwell's computer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an exigent circumstance arose out of Maxwell's open acknowledgment that he was thinking of destroying his computer; (2) the exigency was not improperly created by the police, as there was not threat to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the decision to seize Maxwell's computer was a reasonable method of preventing the destruction of evidence. View "State v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

After giving birth to a stillborn male, Father and Mother filed suit against the United States in federal district court, alleging medical negligence and requesting damages for their pain and suffering, for the wrongful death of their child, and for expenses related to their child's death. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer whether Utah Code Ann. 78-11-6 allows a claim to be made for the wrongful death of an unborn child. At the time the claim was filed, Utah's wrongful death statute stated that "a parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Although there was no majority opinion, four members of the Court held that the statute allows an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child because the term "minor child," as used in the statute, includes an unborn child. View "Carranza v. United States" on Justia Law

Daniel Berman asked the district court for a declaratory judgment quantifying his Utah water rights and an injunction ordering a Wyoming water official to deliver this water to his property in Wyoming. The district court issued the declaratory judgment but expressly reserved ruling on any enforcement issues. Later, Berman filed a motion to enforce, asking the court to order Wyoming water officials, including those who were not parties in the declaratory action, to deliver the amount of water quantified in the declaratory judgment. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Berman's motion to enforce was procedurally barred because (1) a motion to enforce cannot be used to address matters beyond the scope of the underlying judgment it seeks to enforce, and (2) in this case, the declaratory judgment did not include any directive to Wyoming water officials. View "Berman v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Tina Harding was one of three passengers in a vehicle that was stopped by a law enforcement officer. The driver gave the officer her consent to search the vehicle. Without inquiring about who owned them, the officer proceeded to search two backpacks and bags found in the vehicle. The officer found drugs and paraphernalia in the backpacks, which belonged to Harding. Harding subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to methamphetamine possession and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. The court of appeals affirmed. Harding appealed, asserting that the officer had improperly assumed the driver had authority to consent to the search of her backpacks. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the evidence adduced in the district court supported the conclusion that the officer could not have reasonably believed that the driver had authority to consent to a search of Harding's backpacks; but (2) the district court did not make any particularized findings as to whether Harding's conduct in relation to the search suggested the driver had apparent authority to consent to a search of her backpacks or as to the general nature of the backpacks searched by the officer. Remanded for further factual findings. View "State v. Harding" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced in 2005. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Wife brought a separate civil suit seeking various forms of equitable relief and monetary damages, which the district court granted. At issue in the civil suit was certain property on which the couple ran an equestrian business but which a Husband's corporation owned. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously found that an express oral agreement existed between Husband and Wife to purchase, hold, and develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing a constructive trust and declaring the property part of the marital estate; but (2) the district court erred in its determination that an enforceable agreement existed, as the purported agreement lacked sufficient specificity. Remanded. View "Goggin v. Goggin" on Justia Law

Utah's exemption statute provides that a retirement plan "that is described in" I.R.C. 401(a) is exempt from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Upon filing for bankruptcy, Douglas Reinhart claimed that the funds in his Keogh retirement plan were exempt from bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that the Keogh plan was not technically tax qualified under I.R.C. 401(a) due to certain operational defects. Although the Keogh plan was operationally in default, the bankruptcy court found the plan was described in section 401(a), and thus, the funds in the plan were exempt under the exemption statute. The bankruptcy court entered an exemption order, and the trustee of Reinhart's bankruptcy estate appealed. The U.S. district court affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer the question of whether a retirement plan can be "described in" section 401(a) when it fails to fulfill that section's requirements for tax qualification. The Court held that a retirement plan is "described in" section 401(a) if it substantially complies with that section. View "Gladwell v. Reinhart" on Justia Law

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that a seventeen-year-old girl had engaged in criminal solicitation to commit murder after she asked a stranger to punch her in the stomach to terminate her pregnancy. The juvenile court (1) held that an assault of a woman by punching her in the stomach was a "procedure" intended to terminate her pregnancy and therefore qualified as an abortion under statute; and (2) dismissed the State's petition against the minor because a woman cannot be held criminally liable for seeking an abortion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the solicited assault of a woman to terminate her pregnancy was not a "procedure" as contemplated by statute and therefore did not constitute an abortion. Remanded. View "State v. J.M.S." on Justia Law