Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the death of Beverly Davies in 2015, her granddaughter filed a petition in the Utah district court to probate Davies’s will just before the three-year anniversary of Davies’s death. The petition sought to have the will declared valid and to appoint the granddaughter as personal representative. However, after nearly three years of inactivity, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Almost a year after this dismissal, the granddaughter refiled her petition, this time invoking Utah’s Savings Statute, which generally allows a new action to be commenced within one year of a non-merits dismissal if the original action was timely.Davies’s other grandchildren objected to the refiling and moved for partial summary judgment in the Fourth District Court, arguing that the new petition was untimely under Utah Code section 75-3-107, which requires probate proceedings to be commenced within three years of the decedent’s death. They contended that the Savings Statute did not apply to this probate timing statute. The district court disagreed, holding that the Savings Statute protected the granddaughter’s otherwise untimely petition and denied the motion for partial summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the interlocutory order. The court held that the Savings Statute does not apply to the three-year time limitation in section 75-3-107 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. The court reasoned that the plain language of the Probate Code prohibits commencing probate proceedings more than three years after death, and this prohibition conflicts with the general grace period provided by the Savings Statute. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the granddaughter’s second petition was prohibited. View "In re Estate of Davies" on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

The case involves the trustees of the Stanley and Sandra Goldberg Trusts, C. Leon Nelson and Marilynn Tetrick, who hired legal counsel to assist them in their duties. The same attorneys later defended them in a lawsuit brought by several beneficiaries of the trusts. The jury found that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties, and the district court entered a judgment against them, most of which was payable to the trusts. The court then removed the trustees and appointed successor trustees. The former trustees, still represented by the same attorneys, asked the court to reduce the amount of the judgment against them. The successor trustees moved to disqualify the former trustees’ attorneys, arguing that a conflict had surfaced under rule 1.9(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court agreed and disqualified the attorneys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship does not automatically arise merely because an attorney represents a trustee. In this case, the attorneys represented the former trustees only, not the trusts, which were not named in the suit. Thus, because the attorneys never represented the trusts in the litigation, rule 1.9(a) does not prevent the attorneys from continuing to represent the former trustees. View "In re Estate of Goldberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court setting aside a default certificate under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c), holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default certificate.This complaint was filed by family members alleging mismanagement of the decedents' trusts and unjust enrichment and seeking an accounting of trust funds and a declaratory judgment establishing their rights under the trusts. After the answer deadline, Plaintiffs filed a proposed order entering Defendants' default and then filed a motion for default judgment. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and granted Defendants' request to set aside the default certificate, arguing that they had shown "good cause" to set aside the default certification under Rule 55(c). The court granted Defendants' request to set aside the default certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion finding there was good cause to set aside the default certificate. View "Gillman v. Gillman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this trust and estate dispute, holding that, under certain circumstances, a party may assert a claim for intentional interference with inheritance.A dozen years after the decedent's death, his children sued David Rudd - the attorney who represented the decedent in various matters - and Ballard Spahr, LLP - the law firm where Rudd was a partner - claiming that Defendants improperly influenced the decedent to amend his will and trust in a way that shifted a portion of the children's expected inheritance to other beneficiaries, engaged in improper and/or misleading conduct, and mishandled estate assets after the decedent's death. On appeal were the district court's grant of (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss the children's claim for intentional interference with inheritance, (2) summary judgment on several tort claims the children wanted to assert on behalf of the decedent's estate, and (3) a motion in limine preventing the children from impeaching Rudd with certain statements. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in dismissing the intentional interference with inheritance claim; (2) did not err by not assigning the estate's claims to the children; and (3) erred in granting the motion in limine. View "In re Estate of D.A. Osguthorpe, D.V.M." on Justia Law

In this family dispute concerning an inheritance from the mother of two sets of sisters the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that May Harris and Jody Mattena committed a variety of torts in relation to the inheritance and finding them liable for compensatory and punitive damages, holding that the trial court did not err in its rulings during the course of the proceeding.Specifically, the Court held (1) the Liability Reform Act's provision for apportionment of damages, Utah Code 78B-5-818(4)(a), is mandatory only upon a request by a party, and therefore, in absence of a request for apportionment, a trial court acts within its discretion in falling back on the default of joint and several liability; and (2) the provision in Utah Code 78B-8-201(2) providing that evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made does not mandate bifurcation of a punitive damages trial in a case in which no party sought to introduce evidence of wealth or financial condition, and the introduction of such evidence is not required as a prerequisite to the availability of a punitive damages award. View "Biesele v. Mattena" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of Patricia and Robert Porenta’s marital home to Patricia in this case involving a fraudulent transfer of the home to Robert’s mother (Mother).During the divorce proceedings of Patricia and Robert, Robert transferred his interest in the couple’s marital home to Mother with the intent to avoid Patricia’s claim to the home. Robert subsequently died, and the divorce case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Patricia filed this action against Mother alleging that the transfer was fraudulent under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. The district court granted the marital home to Patricia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act requires an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship when a claim under the Act is filed, and the debtor-creditor relationship was in this case was not extinguished when Robert died because an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship existed between Patricia and Robert’s estate; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting Patricia the entire marital home rather than money damages, but the matter is remanded for a determination of the current status of title. View "Porenta v. Porenta" on Justia Law

The district court correctly construed the petitioner’s petition as an attempt to modify a final estate order, making his petition untimely.Twenty-two years after the estate of Gordon Warren Womack (the Decedent) was settled, his son, Gordon Douglas Womack (Mr. Womack), filed a petition to reopen the estate. Specifically, Mr. Womack sought to interpret a provision in the Decedent’s will that left a life estate in oil, gas, and mineral properties to his children, with the remainder to his grandchildren. Mr. Womack argued that the provision had not been construed in past orders of the district court regarding the Decedent’s estate and, accordingly, was not barred by the statute of limitations. The district court denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the petition was an untimely petition to interpret a will that had already been construed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition, as an attempt to reconstrue the Decedent’s will and modify the district court’s order, was severely untimely. View "In re Estate of Womack" on Justia Law

In 2014, Don McBroom, grandson of Rufus Call Willey, founder of R.C. Willey, filed a petition with the Second District Court to review his motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking to set aside two Second District Court orders relating to McBroom’s interests in the business. The orders were entered in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The district court denied McBroom’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying McBroom’s Rule 60(b) motion because (1) McBroom did not appropriately file for relief under paragraph (6), and, instead, his claims fall under paragraphs (3) and (4); (2) McBroom’s claims under paragraph (b)(3) are untimely; and (3) McBroom’s claims under paragraph (b)(4) fail on their merits. View "In re Estate of Rufus C. Willey" on Justia Law

Rufus Call Willey, the founder of R.C. Willey & Son, died in 1954. The day before he died, he signed a last will and testament. In 2011, two of the decedent’s grandchildren, Helen Immelt and Don McBroom, filed a complaint against their grandmother; their uncle, his brother, and his attorney; and a bank. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had deprived Plaintiffs of their rightful inheritance under the terms of the decedent’s will. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all of Immelt’s claims and most of Broom’s claims were barred by the terms of a 1973 agreement; and (2) McBroom’s breach of fiduciary duty claims were circular and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "McBroom v. Child" on Justia Law