Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Orlando Millenia (Plaintiff), the lender on a multi-million dollar real estate transaction, filed this suit alleging that United Title Services of Utah, Inc. breached its fiduciary duty as an escrow agent in the property transaction. In addition, Plaintiff asserted claims for vicarious liability against Stewart Title Insurance Co. and First American Title Insurance Co. under Utah Code 31A-23a-407, a provision that Plaintiff viewed as imposing vicarious liability on Stewart and First American for United Title’s actions as escrow agent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that survived Defendants’ motions for summary judgment; and (2) Plaintiff successfully stated a claim for vicarious liability under section 407. View "Orlando Millenia, LC v. United Title Servs. of Utah, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the effect of a subordination agreement between fewer than all of the creditors who hold an interest in the same collateral. Appellant VCS, Inc. provided labor and materials to improve real property located in a planned unit development. The developer, Acord Meadows, secured funding for the project from America West Bank and Utah Funding Commercial. The loans were secured with trust deeds to the development properties, and the lenders entered into subordination agreements among themselves that altered the priority arrangement of their trust deeds. Because VCS was never paid for its work, it filed a mechanic’s lien covering several lots of the development, four of which were sold through a foreclosure sale after Acord defaulted on its loans from Utah Funding. VCS claimed it was entitled to payment of its mechanic’s lien because its lien had priority over Utah Funding’s liens. The district court ruled that VCS’s mechanic’s lien was extinguished by the foreclosure of Utah Funding’s liens. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the partial subordination approach to the issue in this case, holding that under the partial subordination approach, VCS’s mechanic’s lien was extinguished once Utah Funding’s lien was foreclosed upon. View "VCS Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

2 Ton Plumbing, LLC recorded a notice of mechanics’ lien against a lot in a development (Lot 30). Gregory and Kendra Thorgaard later purchased Lot 30 and executed a trust deed in favor of Washington Federal. Thereafter, 2 Ton recorded amended notices of mechanics’ lien against Lot 30 and filed a lien foreclosure claim against the Thorgaards and Washington Federal. Washington Federal, meanwhile, recorded its notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security purporting to release 2 Ton’s original notice of lien. The district court ultimately entered judgment against Lot 30, which included principal and fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) 2 Ton’s amended notices of lien were invalid because they included attorney fees and costs in the value of the mechanics’ lien, but 2 Ton’s original notice of lien remained valid; (2) the Thorgaards’ notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security complied with the statutory requirements, and therefore, the district court erred in refusing to release Lot 30 from the lien; but (3) because the Thorgaards stipulated to the accuracy of the original lien claim, 2 Ton was entitled to recover its costs and a reasonable attorney fees award. Remanded. View "2 Ton Plumbing, LLC v. Thorgaard" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an action against a Bank seeking to foreclose his judgment lien against property owned by the Bank. Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint because the judgment lien had expired while the foreclosure action was pending. The district court granted the Bank’s motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Appellant argued that the Court should overturn its precedent holding that a foreclosure action does not toll the expiration of a judgment or hold that the Bank should be estopped from asserting the expiration of the judgment because the Bank unfairly extended the foreclosure litigation past the judgment’s expiration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) filing a foreclosure action does not toll the expiration of a judgment; and (2) principles of equity do not support tolling the expiration of Appellant’s judgment. View "Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two siblings owned certain parcels of land in Park City as tenants in common with United Park City Mines (UPCM). Appellant and UPCM decided jointly to develop the parcels, and Wasatch County approved the parties’ development plan. UPCM was subsequently acquired by Mountain Resort Developments’ (MRD) parent company. MRD and Appellant could not agree how to jointly develop the property or on a purchase price for Appellant’s interest in the parcels. The parties ultimately entered a settlement agreement and exchanged interests in the parcels. After the exchange of deeds under the settlement agreement, MRD asserted that Appellant had not retained development rights under the development plan. Appellant sued for breach of contract, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for MRD on all of Appellant’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s breach of contract claim failed because Appellant and MRD did not agree to continue to develop their properties in compliance with the development plan, and therefore, there was no reasonable basis for Appellant to believe she would retain development rights as detailed in that plan; and (2) the remainder of Appellant’s claims failed because Appellant did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of those causes of action. View "Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., LLC " on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned a fifteen-acre parcel owned by Michael Carlson despite the fact that it needed just over one acre for its planned project. At issue in this case was whether Utah Code 72-5-113 authorized UDOT’s condemnation of the excess property and whether the taking failed for lack of a “public use” as required under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution or United States Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with UDOT’s construction of section 113 and granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT without expressly addressing the constitutionality of the taking. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s endorsement of UDOT’s statutory authority to condemn excess property for transportation purposes; but (2) reversed and remanded to allow the district court to determine the constitutionality of UDOT’s condemnation of Carlson’s excess property. View "Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

The trustee of the United Effort Plan Trust filed a complaint against the City of Hildale and the Twin City Water Authority (TCWA) (together, Appellants) to compel the subdivision of certain parcels of Trust property located within the City’s boundaries. Because Appellants failed to appear or answer the complaint, the district court entered default judgment against them. Thereafter, Appellants filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment. While the motion was pending, Appellants filed a direct appeal from the default judgment. The district court denied Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion, and Appellants did not appeal the denial. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Appellants’ direct appeal from the default judgment, holding that the direct appeal was the incorrect vehicle for relief because it relied exclusively on Rule 60(b) arguments made to the district court in the postjudgment motion and disposed of in the unappealed order. View "Wisan v. City of Hildale" on Justia Law

This action concerned the sale of certain property to Plaintiffs. The property was sold by Robert Rood, who, together with his company Level One Capital Partners, LLC, originated loans funded by Southern Management Corporation Retirement Trust (SMCRT). In 2006, Level One originated a loan to Thomas Gramuglia, which was secured by a trust deed for property Gramuglia owned in Park City. Gramuglia later sold the property to Plaintiffs. At the time of the purchase, Plaintiffs did not know the beneficial interest under the trust deed had been assigned to SMCRT. After SMCRT gave notice of its intent to foreclose on the property, Plaintiffs sued SMCRT. The district court determined (1) the trust deed encumbering the Plaintiffs’ property in Park City was invalid, (2) SMCRT had slandered Plaintiffs’ title, (3) SMCRT was liable for damages, and (4) Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney fees, and a portion of those fees should be trebled. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the majority of its award of damages; but (2) reversed the court’s grant of treble attorney fees, holding that the court erred when it concluded that Utah Code 57-1-38(3) permits the trebling of attorney fees. View "Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners in a development, filed a derivative suit against Defendants, the directors of the non-profit homeowners association that provided road maintenance and other services to the development, alleging that the directors favored their own properties in their allocation of road construction and maintenance funds. Instead of defending the suit on the merits, Plaintiffs appointed an independent committee to evaluate whether maintenance of the derivative suit was in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation pursuant to Utah Code 16-6a-612(4). Based on the committee's report, the district court dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the members of the committee, all of whom owned property allegedly receiving preferential treatment, were "independent" under section 612(4). Remanded to allow the district court to assess whether the directors were independent, applying the definition of independence clarified by the Court in this opinion.View "Hi-Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer" on Justia Law

The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy (District) held an appurtenant easement that crossed Petitioner's residential property for the purpose of maintaining the Salt Lake Aqueduct. In 2009, Petitioner began making improvements to his backyard. In 2010, the District filed a complaint against Petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights under the easement as well as injunctive relief requiring Petitioner to remove the existing improvements and enjoining him from making any additional improvements. The district court eventually entered default judgment against Petitioner on grounds that he failed to answer the complaint. Petitioner moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The district court denied Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion, holding (1) the court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the default judgment without determining whether Petitioner knew that he had been served and was required to file an answer; and (2) Petitioner alleged a meritorious defense. Remanded.View "Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Sorf" on Justia Law