Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares’ application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

Petitioner owns a vacant parcel adjoining respondent's parcel. Petitioner had failed to visit or inspect his property for a twenty-six year period and, during that time, respondent had occupied her parcel such that it encroached into petitioner's vacant parcel. Petitioner sought to quiet title as to the disputed stripe created by fence encroachment. Respondent claimed title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent. The court held that the occupation element in the court's boundary by acquiescence doctrine does not require a claimant to prove occupancy on both sides of a visible line. Instead, a claimant must show occupation up to a visible line on his or her property only. Because respondent occupied her property up to the fence for over twenty years, she satisfied the occupation element. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anderson v. Fautin" on Justia Law

Salt Lake City Corp. used its power of eminent domain to condemn land owned by Evans Development Group, LLC in order to exchange the property for another piece of property owned by Rocky Mountain Power. The City filed a complaint asserting several public uses and public purposes for the condemnation. Evans moved for summary judgment, arguing that the City lacked statutory authority to condemn its property because the condemnation was not for a public use as required by Utah Code 78B-6-501. The City filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of public use. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although a property exchange may not be completely prohibited by the relevant eminent domain statutes, it may not be accomplished in the manner attempted in this case. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Evans Dev. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Salt Lake City Corp. used its power of eminent domain to condemn land owned by Evans Development Group, LLC in order to exchange the property for another piece of property owned by Rocky Mountain Power. The City filed a complaint asserting several public uses and public purposes for the condemnation. Evans moved for summary judgment, arguing that the City lacked statutory authority to condemn its property because the condemnation was not for a public use as required by Utah Code 78B-6-501. The City filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of public use. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although a property exchange may not be completely prohibited by the relevant eminent domain statutes, it may not be accomplished in the manner attempted in this case. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Evans Dev. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was how and when a party acquires title to property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This case was based on a boundary dispute between Wayne Hughes and Patricia Hampton-Hughes (collectively, Hugheses) and their neighbor, Q-2, LLC and its predecessors-in-interest (collectively, Q-2). Q-2 brought an action to quiet title to the disputed property under the theory of boundary by acquiescence. The Hugheses counterclaimed, asserting that even if Q-2 had acquired the property through boundary by acquiescence, the Hugheses had reacquired the property by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the Hugheses’ counterclaim on summary judgment and subsequently quieted title to the property in Q-2. The court of appeals concluded (1) the trial court correctly concluded that Q-2 had obtained title to the property through boundary by acquiescence, but (2) the Hugheses introduced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on their claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party obtains title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence by operation of law at the time the elements of the doctrine are satisfied. View "Q-2 LLC v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The prior owner and received approval to construct condominium units on the land but had not recorded the plats for the first phase of development. Mind & Motion agreed to purchase the property, but the REPC required the Bank to record the plats by a certain date and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank enough time to record. Under the REPC, if Mind & Motion extended the deadline, the deadline to complete the transaction would be automatically extended. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but refused to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Mind & Motion, concluding that the recording provision was unambiguously a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition, and there was no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion v. Celtic Bank" on Justia Law

628 Park Avenue, LLC filed a complaint asserting claims for unlawful detainer, breach of a promissory note, breach of lease, and declaratory relief against James Ring and other defendants. A default judgment was entered against Ring. The judgment, however, was nonfinal because claims against other defendants remained pending when it was entered. Because 628 Park Avenue recorded the default judgment it claimed to have acquired a judgment lien. The district court concluded that 628 Park Avenue possessed a valid judgment lien against the property in the amount of the original default judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judgment sustaining a lien under Utah Code 78B-5-202(7) must be a final judgment; and (2) the recorded judgment in this case was insufficient because it merely identified the judgment debtor by name and did not provide sufficient information as required by section 78B-5-202(7)(a)(i). View "Irving Place Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave, LLC" on Justia Law

Donald Rawlings, the eldest of five siblings, claimed full ownership of farmland deeded to him by his father. Donald’s siblings sought to maintain a constructive trust over the farm property and its equal division among the children, claiming that their father never intended to vest sole ownership in Donald and to their permanent exclusion. In Rawlings I, the Supreme Court upheld a district court order imposing a constructive trust over the property in favor of the siblings under a theory of unjust enrichment. On remand, the district court permitted additional discovery to resolve the issue of what properties should be included within the constructive trust. When Donald did not adequately respond to the siblings’ discovery requests, the district court entered an order to compel. When Donald failed to comply with that order, the district court granted the siblings’ request to strike Donald’s pleadings and defenses and entered default judgment against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment against Donald; and (2) under the mandate rule, Donald may not challenge the imposition of the constructive trust. View "Rawlings v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

Angie Moffo lived rent free for eight years in a home owned by her brother-in-law, Doug Rich. After Rich filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the appointed bankruptcy trustee, Stephen Rupp, filed suit against Moffo for back rent under Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, asserting that Rich had defrauded his creditors by allowing Moffo to live in the house rent free after he became insolvent. The district court concluded that Moffo was the recipient of a fraudulent transfer and entered a $34,200 judgment against Moffo. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment entered against Moffo, holding that Rich did not transfer an asset to Moffo within the scope of the Act because the home was fully encumbered by a mortgage, and any rents were not the property of Rich. Remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Moffo. View "Rupp v. Moffo" on Justia Law