Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned a challenge by a group of citizens (Citizens) to an ordinance passed by the Ground County Council (Council) approving amendments concerning a Planned Unit Development district. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Council and the developer. In the district court, Citizens claimed the Council had acted administratively in adopting the ordinance, and accordingly, the matter should be remanded to the county board of adjustments because Citizens weren't allowed to challenge an administrative decision in a district court until they had exhausted their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Council acted in its legislative capacity in adopting the ordinance because the ordinance created a new law of general applicability passed after the Council weighed policy considerations and because it had the formal nature of a legislative act; and (2) the ordinance should not be set aside because of illegality because, for each of Citizens' claims, the Council complied with applicable zoning ordinances. View "Suarez v. Grand County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a house from Defendant, who built the house. Plaintiffs later discovered mold in some of the windows and walls and sued Defendant. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their negligence claim but found in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim. The jury also found that Plaintiffs failed to perform all, or substantially all, of the things the contract required them to do and therefore the jury did not reach the question of whether Defendant breached the contract. The Supreme Court held (1) the economic loss rule prevented recovery of economic damages within the scope of the parties' contract but allowed for recovery of damages to other property or for bodily injury; (2) the trial court did not err when it permitted Dr. Eugene Cole to testify as an expert witness; (3) because Defendant prevailed in his claims under the contract, which provided the only basis for awarding attorney fees, he was entitled to recover attorney fees for the breach of contract suit; and (4) the trial court did not err when it denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Remanded. View "Reighard v. Yates" on Justia Law

This dispute centered around two roads owned by the Maceys, their company Family Link, and the remaining defendants (Defendants). Petitioner Nadine Gillmor previously brought suit against the Maceys seeking to interpret and enforce the terms of a settlement agreement purporting to give the Gillmors a limited private easement over one road and limited access over the other road. The court of appeals held that Gillmor had a limited private easement over the roads but that the easement would not pass on to her children from a prior marriage. Gillmor later brought two claims for access over the roads, asserting that the roads were subject to condemnation for a public access easement and that the roads had been continuously used as public thoroughfares for a period of ten years and were thus dedicated to public use as a "highway by use" under Utah Code 72-5-104. The district court dismissed the complaint based on res judicata and imposed sanctions on Gillmor's attorney for filing a claim without a basis in law. The Supreme Court (1) held that Gillmor's claims were not barred by res judiciata; and (2) vacated the imposition of sanctions. Remanded for adjudication of Gillmor's suit on the merits. View "Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of residential tenants (collectively, Tenants) alleged claims of negligence against Canyon Cover Properties, LLC and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (collectively, AMC). AMC argued that it was relieved from liability because Tenants signed a residential lease agreement (Agreement) that included a limited liability provision (Exculpatory Clause) waiving the right to bring an action for negligence against AMC. The district court concluded that the Agreement and Exculpatory Clause did not violate public policy and were therefore valid and enforceable, and accordingly, granted summary judgment for AMC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because AMC failed to respond meaningfully to Tenants' claim that the Exculpatory Clause was unenforceable because it violated public policy, AMC's brief was rejected and Tenants' claim was accepted that the Exculpatory Clause in the Agreement was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC" on Justia Law

This protracted litigation arose out of a real-property exaction imposed on B.A.M. Development, LLC, as a condition of a construction permit for a fifteen-acre residential housing development. Twice the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. After conducting a third trial, the district court concluded that the County's exaction did not violate the Dolan v. City of Tigard rough proportionality standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects, holding (1) the district court did not err by including in its rough-proportionality analysis costs borne by state government entities; (2) the district court did nor err by limiting the scope of its review to B.A.M.'s thirteen-foot road dedication; and (3) B.A.M.'s remaining arguments were meritless or inadequately briefed. View "B.A.M. v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law

The Point of the Mountain Aqueduct is a sixty-inch diameter pipeline that runs along the Draper Canal and transports culinary water to Salt Lake City and other cities in the Salt Lake Valley. Plaintiffs in this case were homeowners who asserted claims challenging Metropolitan Water District's construction of the aqueduct as exceeding the scope of its real property rights along the canal route. The district court granted summary judgment for the Water District. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in most respects, but reversed the district court's conclusion that (1) Reaches 16-17 were not limited by restrictive covenants; and (2) enclosing the Draper Canal within a buried pipeline was reasonable as a matter of law and so did not exceed the scope of the Water District's property rights in Reach 19. The Court then (1) held that warranty deeds imposed restrictive covenants that run with the land, limiting Reaches 16-17 to canal purposes only; and (2) remanded for a factual determination of whether the canal enclosure was reasonable and did not materially alter the burden to Appellants' land with respect to Reaches 16, 17, and 19. View "Stern v. Metro. Water Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the Privilege Tax Statute, which provides that an entity may be taxed on the privilege of beneficially using or possessing property in connection with a for-profit business when the owner of that property is exempt from taxation. But the tax may not be imposed unless the entity using or possessing the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) challenged the imposition of a privilege tax on its use of government property. The district court granted summary judgment against ATK, concluding that ATK had "exclusive possession" of federal government property because there was no evidence that anyone other than the government, the landowner, had any possession, use, management or control of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the Statute, "exclusive possession" means exclusive as to all parties, including the property owner, and thus, exclusive possession exists when an entity has the present right to occupy and control property akin to that of an owner or lessee; and (2) because the record indicated disputed material facts regarding ATK's authority to control the government property, summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. View "Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Aequitas Enterprises and Interstate Investment Group entered into a real estate contract for the sale of 388 properties, all located outside the state. Aequitas subsequently sued Interstate Investment for breach of contract. To protect its interest in the properties, Aequitas also filed a motion requesting an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment on all the properties. The district court granted Aequitas's motion for prejudgment writ of attachment and entered an order vesting title to all the properties in Aequitas. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and vacated its order, holding that the state's rules of civil procedure did not authorize a district court to enter an order directly affecting interests in real property located in other states. View "Aequitas Enters., LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced in 2005. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Wife brought a separate civil suit seeking various forms of equitable relief and monetary damages, which the district court granted. At issue in the civil suit was certain property on which the couple ran an equestrian business but which a Husband's corporation owned. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously found that an express oral agreement existed between Husband and Wife to purchase, hold, and develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing a constructive trust and declaring the property part of the marital estate; but (2) the district court erred in its determination that an enforceable agreement existed, as the purported agreement lacked sufficient specificity. Remanded. View "Goggin v. Goggin" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over a parcel of land situated between adjoining landowners, Defendant and Plaintiff. Plaintiff was the record owner of the property, but Defendant and its predecessors-in-interest occupied the properly for approximately fifty years. The district court quieted title to the property in favor of Defendants after finding that the parties' predecessors-in-interest mutually acquiesced to a boundary marked by an old barbed wire fence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is clear and convincing evidence; (2) acquiescence does not require any degree of subjective intent; and (3) Defendant's predecessors-in-interest acquiesced to the original barbed wire fence as the boundary between the properties. View "Essential Botanical v. Kay" on Justia Law