Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this lawsuit over a work-related ailment, holding that remand was required.Plaintiff contracted lead poisoning while working for Defendant. A narrow exception in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) allows employees like Plaintiff to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act, and Plaintiff sued Defendant under this exception. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Plaintiff's claim because he did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) although both parties assumed that the WCA covered Plaintiff's condition, Utah law has frequently recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act; and (2) therefore, remand was required to determine if Plaintiff's lead poisoning was an occupational disease. View "Kay v. Bullets" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this personal injury action, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendants were not negligent.A nine-year-old beginner skier collided with Plaintiff on the "First Time" ski run in Park City. Plaintiff sued the child and her parents, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence and negligent supervision. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while a person has a duty to exercise reasonable care while skiing, a nine-year-old beginner skier on a beginner ski run is held to the standard of care commensurate with children of the same age, experience, and intelligence under similar circumstances; and (2) Plaintiff did not carry her burden of showing that Defendants were negligent under the circumstances of this case. View "Donovan v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and concluding that the negligence of KNS International, LLC was a superseding cause of Plaintiff's injury, holding that summary judgment was appropriate.Stuart Wood, a truck driver, was picking up packages from a KNS warehouse when a heavy vinyl curtain fell from the loading bay door above Wood's head and hit him, causing serious injuries. The curtain had been jarred loose after an accident that had occurred one week early when a UPS truck had backed into the loading bay and struck the building. Wood and his wife filed suit against KNS and UPS. The district court granted summary judgment for UPS. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that UPS owed Wood no duty by the time he was injured. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because KNS's actions were a superseding cause of Wood's injury. View "Wood v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that, as a matter of law, a boat manufacturer or supplier owes a duty to adequately warn passengers of dangers associated with the failure to wear a stop switch lanyard.Craig Feasel was severely injured when he and the driver of a boat, Monty Martinez, were ejected into the water. Martinez was not wearing the stop switch lanyard at the time of the ejection. Feasel argued that Defendants - the boat manufacturer and the engine manufacturer - were liable for his injuries because they failed adequately to warn the driver of the danger associated with failure to wear the lanyard and failed in their duty to warn boat passengers of the danger. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the standard for determining the adequacy of a warning is that the warning must be of an intensity and at a level of specificity justified by the magnitude of the risk; and (2) this Court adopts a standard of reasonableness to determine whether warnings regarding the dangers of not wearing a lanyard must be issued directly to the passenger or an intermediary may be relied upon to convey the warnings. View "Feasel v. Tracker Marine LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the University of Utah for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence, holding that Plaintiff did not identify a basis for a legal cause of action against the University.After the University dismissed Plaintiff from its neuroscience Ph.D. program, and the decision was affirmed at every level of administrative review, Plaintiff brought his action against the University. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, the University was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) Plaintiff's claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claim. View "Rossi v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

In this case alleging that Larry Boynton's wife, Barbara, was exposed to asbestos dust from several job sites that Larry worked at during the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the job site operators, holding that premises operators owe a duty of care to a worker's cohabitants with respect to take-home exposure to asbestos.During his marriage to Barbara, Larry worked at numerous job sites where he was exposed to asbestos. In 2016, Barbara was diagnosed with Malignant mesothelioma and died from it that year. Larry sued the job site operators for indirectly exposing Barbara to asbestos dust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the operators, concluding that they had no duty to prevent "take-home exposure" to asbestos dust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) premises owners are liable to their employees' co-habitants for take-home asbestos exposure; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the premises operators retained control over its contractor. View "Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC v. Phillips 66 Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against a physician who performed an independent medical examination (IME) on Plaintiff, holding that even if the physician's IME report constituted an affirmative act with foreseeable harms, he was not liable for Plaintiff's injuries resulting from a delay in workers' compensation proceedings.Plaintiff was injured during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and the claim was coordinated by Broadspire Services, Inc. Broadspire arranged for Dr. Mark Anderson to perform an IME of Defendant's injuries. Anderson concluded that the accident caused Plaintiff to suffer a transient cervical strain and that Plaintiff's remaining symptoms were secondary to pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Broadspire denied Plaintiff various forms of workers' compensation benefits. Three years later, the Utah Labor Condition determined that the accident created additional injuries and ordered that Plaintiff's employer pay historical medical expenses. Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against Anderson and vicarious liability against Broadspire. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that policy considerations favor no duty owed by an expert whose professional opinion causes a delay in legal proceedings. View "Kirk v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court granting Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and vacating the jury's general damages verdict in favor of Plaintiff on her negligence claim, holding that the district court erred.Plaintiff's vehicle was hit by a truck by a driver that worked for Geneva Rock. Plaintiff sued the driver and Geneva Rock, alleging that the driver's negligence caused the crash and that Geneva Rock had negligently employed the driver. Geneva Rock conceded that its driver was at fault for the collision. After Plaintiff rested her case-in-chief during a trial on the issue of damages, the court ruled that the jury could not award special damages to Plaintiff for lack of sufficient evidence. The jury returned a general damages verdict of $30,000. The district court vacated the jury's verdict, concluding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of Utah Code 31A-22-309. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Plaintiff was entitled to ask the jury to award special damages; and (2) the district court improperly excluded evidence of Geneva Rock's negligent hiring practices. View "Sheppard v. Geneva Rock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Nebo School District on Plaintiff's negligent employment claim, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's negligent employment claim.A school bus operated by a driver employed by Nebo School District caused a crash with Plaintiff. In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Nebo was liable for its driver's negligence under principles of respondent superior and that Nebo was independently negligent because it continued to employ the driver even though he had been involved in several accidents. Nebo moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the negligent employment claim was redundant with the negligence claim and that Plaintiff was not entitled to pursue a claim directly against it after it conceded vicarious liability. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found that Nebo's motion for judgment on the pleadings was timely; and (2) Plaintiff was entitled to proceed on alternate claims. View "Ramon v. Nebo School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's request for a civil stalking injunction against Defendant, holding that the district court erred.Plaintiff ran a residential treatment program for young woman. Defendant, her neighbor, objected to the program's presence in his neighborhood and flipped off and swore at Plaintiff and the program attendees and placed provocative signs in his yard. Plaintiff sought a civil talking injunction, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the district court misinterpreted the stalking statute; (2) the district court failed to assess the impact of Defendant's conduct on a reasonable person in Plaintiff's circumstances; (3) the district court applied an incorrect analysis in deciding that the First Amendment protected Defendant's conduct; and (4) because the reversal of the first three issues may affect the basis for the district court's attorney-fees decision, that decision is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a new determination. View "Ragsdale v. Fishler" on Justia Law