Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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Randi Mariani crashed her motor scooter and sustained a serious injury during a driving skills test, which she was taking to obtain a motorcycle endorsement to her driver license. Following the crash, the Utah Department of Public Safety-Driver License Division (DLD) denied Mariani’s application for the endorsement. Mariani sued the DLD for negligently causing her injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the DLD based on governmental immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed.The district court concluded that the DLD was immune from Mariani’s suit under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), reasoning that Mariani’s injury arose out of the administration of her motorcycle skills test, which was part of the licensing process. The court of appeals agreed, stating that Mariani’s injury was at least incident to the licensing approval process.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court focused on the specific language of the GIA’s licensing exception, which provides immunity for injuries that arise out of or in connection with the denial of a license. The Court concluded that the relevant conduct was the denial of the motorcycle endorsement, not the licensing process itself. The Court further determined that there was no causal relationship between the denial of the license and Mariani’s injury, as the injury occurred before the denial. Therefore, the licensing exception did not apply, and the DLD was not immune from Mariani’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mariani v. Driver License Division" on Justia Law

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In this case, Tiffany Bingham challenged the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s four-year statute of repose after her medical malpractice claim against Dr. George C. Gourley and Dr. McKay L. Platt was dismissed. Bingham underwent surgeries in 2010, experienced complications, and discovered in 2017 that the surgeries had caused damage, leading to the removal of her kidney. She filed her lawsuit in 2020, more than four years after the alleged malpractice, prompting the dismissal of her claim under the statute of repose.The Fourth District Court in Provo dismissed Bingham’s complaint, concluding that the statute of repose was constitutional. The court found that the statute did not violate the Open Courts Clause, the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that the statute was a non-arbitrary means of addressing the social and economic issues related to rising medical malpractice insurance costs and was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goal of stabilizing insurance premiums.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Bingham failed to demonstrate that the statute of repose violated the Open Courts Clause, as the legislature’s findings of a health care crisis were fairly debatable and the statute was a reasonable means to address that crisis. The court also found that the statute did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, as it was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goals and actually and substantially furthered those goals. Finally, the court concluded that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as it was rationally related to a legitimate public purpose and did not impair a fundamental right. View "Bingham v. Gourley" on Justia Law

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A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a defendant, alleging that the defendant's negligence caused a car accident resulting in significant injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant ran a red light and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. The defendant denied the allegations, arguing that the light was green and that the plaintiff was at fault for the accident.The trial court, a state district court, heard the case and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. The defendant appealed the decision to the state court of appeals, arguing that the trial court made several errors, including improper jury instructions and the exclusion of certain evidence that could have supported the defendant's case.The state court of appeals reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the jury instructions were appropriate and that the exclusion of evidence did not prejudice the defendant's case. The defendant then appealed to the state's highest court, the State Supreme Court, seeking further review.The State Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or in its evidentiary rulings. The court emphasized that the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that the trial court's actions were within the bounds of its discretion. The Supreme Court's decision effectively ended the defendant's appeals, leaving the jury's award to the plaintiff intact. View "State v. Chadwick" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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Justin Nelson filed a lawsuit against his former mother-in-law, Traci Phillips, former sister-in-law, Ashley Phillips, and other friends and family of his deceased wife, Tiffani Nelson. Justin alleged that Traci, Ashley, and the other defendants conspired to defame him by suggesting he was responsible for Tiffani’s death. None of the defendants reside in Utah, and each moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. They provided sworn statements denying the allegations, while Justin relied solely on his complaint’s allegations without submitting counter-evidence.The Fifth District Court in Washington County, Utah, denied the motions to dismiss. The court concluded that Justin had sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, would demonstrate a conspiracy to defame him, thus establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants. For Traci and Ashley, the court found that their personal contacts with Utah were sufficient to assert specific personal jurisdiction.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petitions for interlocutory review filed by Traci and Ashley as improvidently granted, as the lower court had not ruled on the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction for them. The court reversed the lower court’s denial of the motions to dismiss for the other defendants, finding that Justin failed to meet his burden of providing evidence to support his allegations once the defendants had submitted sworn statements contradicting his claims. The court emphasized that without evidence to support the allegations, the district court could not assert jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nelson v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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Ninety-four former patients of Dr. David Broadbent, an obstetrician and gynecologist, sued him, alleging that he sexually assaulted them under the guise of providing medical treatment. The claims against Broadbent included sexual battery, sexual assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs described various incidents where Broadbent allegedly performed inappropriate and non-medical acts during their medical appointments, causing them significant emotional and psychological harm.The defendants, including Broadbent and the healthcare facilities where he worked, moved to dismiss the case in the Fourth District Court in Provo, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were essentially medical malpractice claims. They contended that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The district court agreed with the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs' injuries arose from health care provided by Broadbent and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing that their claims were not subject to the Malpractice Act because their injuries did not arise from health care but from sexual assaults that had no medical purpose. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the Malpractice Act did not apply to their claims. The court reasoned that the alleged acts of sexual assault were not within the scope of legitimate medical treatment and had no medical purpose, even though they occurred during medical appointments. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were not based on health care rendered by Broadbent, and the Malpractice Act's prelitigation requirements did not apply. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Does v. Broadbent" on Justia Law

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Three customers, D.W., L.T., and J.G., filed a lawsuit against FPA Sandy Mall Associates (SMA) and Hong Guang Lin, an unlicensed massage therapist, after Lin allegedly sexually assaulted them during their massage appointments at a shopping center owned by SMA. The plaintiffs claimed premises liability and negligence, arguing that SMA, as the landlord, had a duty to ensure the safety of its invitees and to verify Lin's licensure status.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County denied SMA's motion to dismiss the claims, concluding that SMA owed a duty to the plaintiffs as invitees to keep the premises safe and to exercise reasonable care. The court also applied the five-factor analytical framework from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, 275 P.3d 228 (Jeffs factors), to assess whether SMA had a duty to verify Lin's licensure status and found that the factors favored recognizing such a duty.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court clarified that the Jeffs framework is only applicable when a party seeks to establish a previously unrecognized duty. Since the plaintiffs invoked established duties under Utah law, the district court's application of the Jeffs factors was unnecessary. The Supreme Court struck the district court's analysis based on the Jeffs factors, including its observations on foreseeability, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its instructions. The court did not address whether SMA owed a duty to verify Lin's licensure status, as this was not the duty recognized by the district court. View "D.W. v. FPA Sandy Mall Associates" on Justia Law

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Weston Bennion was injured when his apartment deck collapsed and subsequently sued his landlord, Dale Stolrow, for negligence. The parties settled, with Bennion agreeing to release Stolrow and his insurer from all claims in exchange for $150,000. The settlement was subject to related subrogation claims and healthcare liens, and Bennion promised to indemnify Stolrow from liability for any such claims and liens. Before making the payment, Stolrow informed Bennion that he intended to distribute the payment in two checks: one payable to Bennion and the other payable to a collection agency that had a healthcare lien on the settlement funds. Bennion objected and filed a motion to enforce the parties’ agreement, arguing that its terms did not allow Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds to a third party.The district court disagreed with Bennion and suggested that Stolrow issue two checks: one jointly to Bennion and the third party for the amount of the lien, and another to Bennion for the remainder of the funds. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Bennion then petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the parties’ agreement permitted Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds jointly to Bennion and the third-party collection agency. The court agreed with Bennion, stating that the plain language of the release provides for payment to Bennion in exchange for his release of claims against Stolrow and his assumption of responsibility for third-party liens. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower courts. View "Bennion v. Stolrow" on Justia Law

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Nicholas and Julie Kuhar filed a product liability claim against Thompson Manufacturing, a Utah company, seeking compensation for injuries Nicholas sustained when his safety harness failed while he was cleaning rain gutters in New Jersey. This was not the first lawsuit the Kuhars had brought regarding this incident. They had previously sued Thompson and other defendants in New Jersey federal court, alleging that the harness was defective. That suit was unsuccessful, with Thompson being dismissed from the case due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Kuhars then refiled their claims against Thompson in Utah.In the New Jersey case, the Kuhars' expert witness was excluded, and the remaining defendants were granted summary judgment. Thompson then moved in the Utah case to preclude the Kuhars from litigating the issue of whether the harness was defective. The district court agreed with Thompson and dismissed the Kuhars' claims. However, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the issue litigated and decided in New Jersey was not identical to the issue Thompson sought to preclude in Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It concluded that the elements of issue preclusion were satisfied. The court clarified that to determine the issue-preclusive effect of the New Jersey federal court’s judgment in this case, the substantive law of New Jersey applies. Under that law, the court concluded that the issue Thompson sought to preclude the Kuhars from litigating—whether the harness was defective—was actually litigated and decided on the merits in the New Jersey court’s summary judgment order. Therefore, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Kuhar v. Thompson Manufacturing" on Justia Law

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In the medical malpractice case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from Lillian Birt, her daughter Jenafer Meeks sued the treating doctors, Wei Peng and Christina G. Richards, both individually and on behalf of Ms. Birt's heirs and estate. The children of Ms. Birt had decided to discontinue her life support based on the misinformation they received from the doctors about her condition. The doctors inaccurately portrayed her condition as terminal, leading the children to believe that the treatment was only prolonging her life unnaturally. However, Ms. Birt's condition was not terminal, and there was a high probability of her recovery if the treatment had continued.In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the doctors appealed on two issues. Firstly, they argued that the trial court's jury instruction 23 was incorrect as it did not explicitly state that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care. Secondly, they contended that the lower court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the survival claim due to lack of evidence that Ms. Birt experienced pain and suffering in the hours between the doctors' negligence and her death.The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care, as the instruction implicitly required the jury to determine the standard of care as part of proving a breach of it. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the doctors that Ms. Meeks failed to provide evidence of Ms. Birt's experience of pain, suffering, or inconvenience during the period between the doctors' negligence and her death. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court. View "Peng v. Meeks" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Robyn Young's motion to dismiss this action brought by Granite School District regarding settlement proceeds Young had received for industrial injuries, holding that the Labor Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the factual questions at the heart of this reimbursement dispute.Young, a special education teacher, sought workers' compensation for injuries she received at the hands of her students. An administrative law judge awarded Young benefits, finding that Young was permanently and totally disabled and that Young did not have to reimburse Granite with funds she received from a legal settlement she had obtained against medical debt collectors for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Granite then initiated suit for reimbursement from Young under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The district court granted Young's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it dismissed Granite's complaint because the Workers' Compensation Act assigned the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute. View "Granite School District v. Young" on Justia Law