Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit related to her husband’s exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff served numerous defendants within within 120 days of filing in accordance with the service-of-process provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) but did not serve defendant Kerr Corporation until five years later. Kerr filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it had not been timely served. The district court denied the motion. At issue in this appeal was Rule 4(b)’s provision that “where one defendant in a case is served, other defendants may be served at any time prior to trial.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff complied with Rule 4(b)’s service of process requirements because she served Kerr prior to trial and while previously served defendants remained parties to the action. View "St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp." on Justia Law

Appellees alleged claims for tortious interference with economic relations against Appellant. The tortious interference theories each rested on two separate allegations: first, that Appellant had interfered with Appellees’ economic relations through an improper means; and second, that Appellant had interfered with Appellees’ economic relations in pursuit of an improper purpose. The district court partially granted Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) there was no evidence that Appellant had interfered with Appellees’ economic relations through an improper means; but (2) Appellant was not entitled to summary judgment on Appellees’ tortious interference claims insofar as they were based on the allegation that Appellant had acted with an improper purpose. The Supreme Court reversed, hereby rejecting the improper-purpose rule, holding that, contrary to Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, a claim for tortious interference may only succeed where the defendant has employed an improper means. View "Eldridge v. Johndrow" on Justia Law

Defendants provided services for individuals with mental and physical disabilities. Some of homes run by Defendants and occupied by disabled individuals were in residential neighborhoods. A.R., a minor child, was sexually abused by one of Defendants’ employees at one of those homes. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, alleging negligence in the hiring, training, and supervision of Defendants’ employees. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in holding that Defendants owed a duty to A.R. to exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training, and supervision of their employees; (2) did not err in determining that Plaintiffs had no obligation to designate an expert witness to establish a standard of care; and (3) erred in concluding that Defendants were not entitled to apportion liability to their employee under the comparative fault provisions of Utah Code 78B-5-818, as the fault to be apportioned under the statute is not limited to negligence but extends to intentional torts. View "Graves v. North Eastern Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a night of heavy drinking at a party hosted by Travis Izatt, Neely Creager picked up Izatt’s loaded handgun and accidentally shot herself in the head. The shot killed her. Creager’s estate filed this negligence action against Izatt, alleging general negligence, negligent entrustment, and premises liability. The district court granted summary judgment for Izatt, reasoning that he owed no duty to Creager. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that gun owners have a duty in tort to exercise reasonable care in supplying their guns to intoxicated individuals, but the gun owners will not necessarily be liable for damages when those individuals injure themselves because the intoxicated individual’s negligence will likely exceed that of the gun owner as a matter of comparative negligence. View "Herland v. Izatt" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Campbell sold investments in Beverly Hills Development Corporation (BHDC) while he was a registered agent of Horner, Townsend & Kent, Inc. (HTK), a broker-dealer licensed to sell securities in the state. After resigning from HTK, Campbell began soliciting investments from and selling BHDC notes to Plaintiffs. When they discovered that they had been scammed, Plaintiffs filed suit against Campbell and HTK. During discovery, Campbell pleaded no contest to selling unregistered securities and was ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted summary judgment for HTK on Plaintiffs’ claims of securities violations, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent training and supervision, and regarding a release signed by one investor; and (2) denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in which they alleged negligence, control-person liability, and material aid. The Supreme Court remanded in part, holding that the district court erred when it denied all of Plaintiffs’ requests for attorney fees. The Court otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Burdick v. Townsend" on Justia Law

David Ragsdale pleaded guilty to aggravated murder for shooting and killing his wife. Ragsdale committed the murder while under the influence of medications prescribed to him by Nurse Practitioner Trina West. The Ragsdales’ children, through their conservator, filed a negligence action against Nurse West and against Dr. Hugo Rodier, the consulting physician for Nurse West. In a previous case, the Court reversed the dismissal of the children’s tort suit against Nurse West. In this case, the Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the children’s claim against Dr. Rodier. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Dr. Rodier had a duty to consult directly with Nurse West as to any individual prescription of controlled substances she wrote for David Ragsdale. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Ragdale, holding that nothing in the cited provisions of the Utah Nurse Practice Act imposed on Dr. Rodier a duty to consult on each of the individual prescription of a controlled substance. View "Jeffs v. Rodier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a student at Utah Valley State College (UVSC), was injured while practicing with the state-owned college’s ballroom dance team. Plaintiff sued UVSC, alleging negligence. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that, in accordance with the public duty doctrine, UVSC owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine applied to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the district court, although for different reasons from those expressed by the court of appeals, holding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not based on a public duty, and therefore, the public duty doctrine did not bar Plaintiff’s negligence claim. View "Cope v. Utah Valley State College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of a boat that he docked in the marina at Jordanelle Reservoir. One day in 2008, Plaintiff walked out onto the floating dock and was injured when his boat “heaved” and struck him, shattering his shoulder. Plaintiff sued the State, which owns the marina, docks, boat slips, and reservoir, alleging that his injuries were due to the negligent adjustment of the dock. The State moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of governmental immunity. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff’s injuries fell within the “natural condition” exception to the waiver of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Jordanelle Reservoir was designed and created by human activity, and because it would not exist but for that activity, the reservoir is not a natural condition on the land under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Remanded. View "Glaittli v. State" on Justia Law

Under Utah’s Governmental Immunity Act, plaintiffs who have a claim against a governmental “employee” for acts committed during the performance of the employee’s duties must file a notice of claim within one year after the claim arises or the claim is barred. In the instant case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Brigham Young University (BYU) and its traffic cadet for negligently causing a motorcycle accident Plaintiff was involved in while leaving a BYU parking lot. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the BYU Defendants were “employees” of Provo City as defined in the Act at the time of the collision, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim as required by the Act. The court of appeals remanded for further proceedings, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the BYU Defendants were “employees” under the Act and that the district court’s dismissal was premature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the statutory definition of “employee” and in reversing the trial court’s dismissal. View "Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ." on Justia Law

Kelly Colvin was killed in an automobile accident while returning to Utah from a work project in Maryland. The accident occurred when Colvin was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his coworker, Joseph Giguere. Colvin’s widow and son sued Giguere, claiming that Colvin’s death was proximately caused by Giguere’s negligent driving. Giguere moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred this suit because the accident occurred in the course of his and Colvin’s employment. The district court agreed and granted Giguere’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the accident occurred while Colvin and Giguere were carrying out a special errand for their employer, this action was barred under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision. View "Colvin v. Giguere" on Justia Law