Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Point of the Mountain Aqueduct is a sixty-inch diameter pipeline that runs along the Draper Canal and transports culinary water to Salt Lake City and other cities in the Salt Lake Valley. Plaintiffs in this case were homeowners who asserted claims challenging Metropolitan Water District's construction of the aqueduct as exceeding the scope of its real property rights along the canal route. The district court granted summary judgment for the Water District. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in most respects, but reversed the district court's conclusion that (1) Reaches 16-17 were not limited by restrictive covenants; and (2) enclosing the Draper Canal within a buried pipeline was reasonable as a matter of law and so did not exceed the scope of the Water District's property rights in Reach 19. The Court then (1) held that warranty deeds imposed restrictive covenants that run with the land, limiting Reaches 16-17 to canal purposes only; and (2) remanded for a factual determination of whether the canal enclosure was reasonable and did not materially alter the burden to Appellants' land with respect to Reaches 16, 17, and 19. View "Stern v. Metro. Water Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the Privilege Tax Statute, which provides that an entity may be taxed on the privilege of beneficially using or possessing property in connection with a for-profit business when the owner of that property is exempt from taxation. But the tax may not be imposed unless the entity using or possessing the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) challenged the imposition of a privilege tax on its use of government property. The district court granted summary judgment against ATK, concluding that ATK had "exclusive possession" of federal government property because there was no evidence that anyone other than the government, the landowner, had any possession, use, management or control of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the Statute, "exclusive possession" means exclusive as to all parties, including the property owner, and thus, exclusive possession exists when an entity has the present right to occupy and control property akin to that of an owner or lessee; and (2) because the record indicated disputed material facts regarding ATK's authority to control the government property, summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. View "Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were Lehi City voters who sought to place on the municipal ballot initiatives regulating salaries and residency requirements for certain city employees. The City refused to accept the initiatives. Three of the initiatives' sponsors subsequently filed a petition for writ of extraordinary relief, contending that the initiatives were proper exercises of initiative power under Utah Const. art. VI. At issue before the Supreme Court was the scope of the people's initiative power under article VI. The Court upheld the initiatives after repudiating the framework set forth in Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, holding (1) a ballot initiative should be deemed an appropriate legislative, and thus referable, act where it proposes a law of general applicability; (2) the subject matter of the initiatives in this case was legislative in nature; and (3) the initiatives did not conflict with state law because Utah Code 10-3-818, invoked by the City, did not apply to voter initiatives. View "Carter v. Lehi City" on Justia Law

Marilyn Hamblin, the owner of a water right as an alleged tenant in common, filed a permanent change application with the state engineer, seeking to change her water right's place of use and point of diversion. The engineer rejected Hamblin's application because Hamblin had established no beneficial use under the water right since at least 1980. The district court granted the engineer's motion for summary judgment, basing its decision primarily on the determination that Hamblin's water right had been forfeited by operation of law through nonuse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the state engineer lacked the authority to adjudicate water rights, and therefore, could not consider non-adjudicated forfeiture when reviewing a change application; and (2) instead, the engineer was limited to considering factors presented in Utah Code Ann. 73-3-8(1) when deciding whether to approve or deny a change application, but could stay change application proceedings while pursuing an adjudication of forfeiture. View "Jensen v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned real property belonging to Admiral Beverage Corporation, and Admiral was entitled to compensation from the State for the taking of its property. During the condemnation proceedings, Admiral sought to introduce evidence of the fair market value of its property, including evidence of its damages arising from the loss of view and visibility of its remaining property. The district court ruled that evidence of the fair market value of Admiral's property was not admissible under the holding in Ivers v. UDOT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the part of Ivers that allowed severance damages only for "recognized property rights" was too restrictive to accord the full protection of the Utah Constitution, was inconsistent with both Utah statutes and the Court's prior case law, and was therefore overruled; and (2) Admiral had the right to recover from UDOT for the decrease in the fair market value of its remaining property resulting from the condemnation. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp." on Justia Law

L.C. Canyon filed an application with Salt Lake County to rezone several acres of its property to allow the construction of a residence on the property. The County Planning Commission recommended its approval to the Salt Lake County Council. The Council then passed an ordinance amending the zoning map to grant L.C. Canyon's requested rezoning. Before the ordinance was to take effect, the Council rescinded the rezoning ordinance. L.C. Canyon filed a complaint against the County, asserting that the Council had no authority to rescind the rezoning ordinance and that the rescission effected a taking of L.C. Canyon's property. The district court entered summary judgment against L.C. Canyon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County had a rational basis for its zoning decision, (2) the Council had the authority to rescind its rezoning ordinance before it became effective, and (3) because L.C. Canyon had only a unilateral hope that the rezoning ordinance ultimately would take effect, it had no viable takings claim. View "L.C. Canyon Partners v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law

Ivory Homes purchased various concrete products from a company that, when it delivered the products, provided an invoice that charged a single sales price without indicating separate delivery charges. Ivory Homes then discovered if it structured its transactions with the company differently and bargained for separate and independent delivery charges, the charges would not be taxable. Subsequently, Ivory Homes filed a refund request with the Utah Taxpayer Services Division for sales tax it paid for several years on expenses associated with the concrete products. The Division denied the refund. The Utah State Tax Commission also denied the refund request. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Commission's decision that it did not erroneously receive any tax and that Ivory Homes was not entitled to a tax refund where (1) under a substantial evidence standard of review, the Commission correctly made findings of fact that the parties did not intend delivery charges in their original transactions; and (2) alternatively, a plain language interpretation of the Refund Statute requires that the Tax Commission commit some error in its receipt of taxes before a taxpayer is entitled to a refund. View "Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah Tax Comm'n " on Justia Law

Summit Water was a mutual water company providing culinary grade water to residential and commercial shareholders. After the Utah State Tax Commission audited Summit Water's annual property tax affidavit and concluded that the value of the distribution facilities was substantially higher than Summit Water reported that year, Summit County assessed Summit Water for the back taxes owed for the previous four years. In all, Summit County assessed Summit Water $204,020 in additional taxes. The Summit County Board of Equalization determined that Summit Water failed to establish that the taxation of the property was incorrect or illegal, concluding (1) Summit Water was not eligible for the constitutional tax exemption afforded to entities that own a water distribution system providing water for irrigating lands because the water used by Summit Water's shareholders was for nonagricultural purposes, and (2) there was no double taxation of Summit Water's property. The Commission affirmed. The district court reversed in part, holding that the constitutional exemption at issue includes any artificial watering of land, including nonagricultural properties. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the constitutional exemption encompasses the nonagricultural watering of lands and that no double taxation occurred. View "Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) contracted with Meadow Valley Contractors (MVC) for a highway construction project. MVC subcontracted the paving work to Southwest Asphalt Paving. After UDOT refused to allow Southwest to use ribbon paving and assessed MVC a thickness-laying penalty, MVC filed a compliant against UDOT, alleging that (1) it incurred costs not contemplated by the contract as a result of UDOT's prohibition on ribbon paving, and (2) the thickness penalty assessed by UDOT was unwarranted. UDOT denied MVC claims. Southwest then filed a complaint in district court in MVC's name against UDOT alleging breach of contract. The trial court (1) concluded that UDOT breached its contract with MVC by refusing to allow ribbon paving on the construction project, and (2) denied MVC's claim that UDOT had erroneously imposed a paving-thickness penalty. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) UDOT did did not breach its contract with MVC when it forbade MVC and Southwest from using ribbon paving, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that UDOT's interpretation of the contract regarding paving thickness was more reasonable than MVC's interpretation. View "Meadow Valley v. UDOT" on Justia Law

Marilyn Hamblin, the owner of a water right, filed a permanent change application with the state engineer seeking to change her water right's place of use and point of diversion. The state engineer denied the application, declaring that Hamblin had forfeited her water right. Hamblin filed a petition for judicial review. The district court granted the state engineer's motion for summary judgment and denied Hamblin's cross-motion for summary judgment, basing its decision primarily on the determination that Hamblin's water right had been forfeited by operation of law by her nonuse. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the state engineer lacked statutory authority to consider non-adjudicated forfeiture when making a decision to approve or reject a permanent change application. View "Jensen v. Jones" on Justia Law