Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While Mother was incarcerated, Father cared for the couple’s children. Following an adjudication of neglect, the district court approved a service plan for Father that included reunification services but did not order that reunification services be provided to Mother. After Father was incarcerated, the juvenile court established a primary permanency goal of adoption and terminated Father’s reunification services. After a termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a juvenile court is required to order reasonable reunification services to an incarcerated parent unless it determines that those services would be detrimental to the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, if a child’s primary permanency goal does not contemplate reunification with an incarcerated parent, the juvenile court need not order reunification services. Remanded. View "L.G. v. State" on Justia Law

Father and Mother conceived a child together in Pennsylvania. Due to their age difference, the sexual relationship between Mother and Father was prohibited by Pennsylvania criminal law. Mother placed the child for adoption in Utah. After Father became aware of the adoptive parents’ adoption petition he filed a motion to intervene in the Utah adoption proceedings. The district court denied the motion to intervene, citing Utah Code 78B-6-111, which forbids a biological father from challenging an adoption when his child was conceived as a result of conduct that “would constitute any sexual offense” described in the Utah Criminal Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 78B-6-111 does not apply in this case because the statute does not apply to sexual conduct lacking any jurisdiction nexus in Utah. View "In re Adoption of J.M.S." on Justia Law

Child was conceived in Colorado. Mother later traveled to Utah where she gave birth to Child and placed it for Adoption. Mother never told Father of her plans to come to Utah and to proceed with the adoption in Utah. After learning of Child’s birth in Utah, Father filed a petition to establish paternity in a Utah district court. The district court granted summary judgment for Mother and the adoption agency (collectively, Respondents), concluding that Utah Code 78B-6-122 required Father to affirmatively establishing paternity before acquiring any right to notice of an adoption proceeding, and because Father failed to follow these steps under Colorado law to establish paternity, Father forfeited any rights he may have had to contest the adoption under Utah law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 78B-6-122 merely required Father to fulfill the requirements of Colorado law to protect his interests as a father, and because Father’s parental rights would have remained intact under Colorado law until he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, his parental rights were likewise preserved under Utah law. View "Nevares v. M.L.S." on Justia Law

These cases arose from the marriage dissolution of Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl. Kim appealed the Divorce action, alleging several claims of error, and also brought a separate action against certain defendants seeking a share of the assets of the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust, which she claimed were marital property. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and remanded for further proceedings because the Trust should have been joined as a party to the Divorce action. The Court further held (1) as to the Trust, Utah law applies, the Trust is revocable as a matter of law, and Kim is entitled to withdraw her share of the marital property she contributed to the Trust as a settlor; and (2) in the Divorce action, the district court judge was not biased against Kim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings or in declining to award Kim alimony, the judgment pertaining to the division of the marital property is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Charles sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children, and the court did not err in not ordering Charles to pay Kim’s attorney fees. View "Dahl v. Dahl" on Justia Law

After Kenneth Vanderwerff’s death, Janetta Gardiner, Vanderwerff’s romantic partner for the three years before his death, filed a petition for a “judicial declaration of common law marriage.” The district court granted the declaration of marriage, and Gardiner was appointed as personal representative of the estate. Four of Vanderwerff’s cousins (Cousins) moved to set aside the marriage determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and to intervene in the marriage action. The court granted intervention to the Cousins and set aside the declaration of marriage. Approximately two years after Gardiner’s petition was granted, the court dismissed the marriage case of its own accord for untimely service under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(i). The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the declaration of marriage, holding that the district court improperly set aside the declaration of marriage, granted intervention, and sua sponte dismissed the case for failure of service. View "Gardiner v. Vanderwerff" on Justia Law

In order to object to an adoption under the Utah Adoption Act, unwed biological fathers must not just assert and establish paternity but must also file a sworn affidavit attesting that they are able and willing to support their child. Unmarried mothers are not required to provide similar assurances about how they will care for and support a child. William Bolden, the putative father of J.S., tried to intervene in and object to the adoption of J.S. The district court barred Bolden from intervening because he failed to preserve his legal rights as a father by timely filing a paternity affidavit. Bolden appealed, arguing that the affidavit requirement is unconstitutional because, among other things, it discriminates against unmarried fathers. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Bolden’s motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings, holding that the affidavit requirement does not violate Bolden’s due process or equal protection rights, as (1) Bolden failed to establish an infringement of a fundamental right of substantive due process; and (2) the state’s interests in protecting children by facilitating the adoption process are substantially advanced by the statutory affidavit requirement. View "Bolden v. Doe" on Justia Law

The State filed a juvenile court petition seeking an adjudication that Appellant had abused and neglected his three children. Near the end of the sixty-day statutory deadline for a hearing on the State’s petition, all parties stipulated to waiver of the deadline and to an extension of the trial date to allow Appellant additional time for expert discovery and trial preparation. Despite the parties’ prior stipulation to waive the sixty-day statutory deadline for a hearing, the juvenile court denied Appellant’s formal request for additional time on the ground that the governing statute required a final adjudication hearing within sixty days of the filing of the petition. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order adjudicating Appellant’s children abused and neglected and prohibited any further contact between Appellant and his children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties had jointly stipulated for an extension of the sixty-day statutory deadline, Appellant’s request for additional time should not have been denied; and (2) instead, the juvenile court should have exercised its discretion to decide whether further discovery was justified under the circumstances of this case. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

Mark Johnson and Elizabeth Johnson married in 1974 and divorced a decade later. Mark retired in 1999. In 2008, Elizabeth filed a qualified domestic relations order attempting to secure her portion of Mark’s retirement benefit. To comply with the 1984 divorce decree the district court awarded Elizabeth ongoing payments from the date Elizabeth filed for the clarifying order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in determining that an action to enforce the ongoing right to collect a portion of pension retirement benefits is not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) did not err in determining that Mark’s argument concerning laches was inadequately briefed; and (3) erred when it affirmed the district court’s award granting Elizabeth her marital fraction of Mark’s actual retirement benefits. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Robert Baird sought a civil stalking injunction against his mother, Gloria Baird, because Gloria contacted him almost every day. The district court granted a three-year injunction, determining that Gloria’s nearly daily phone calls to Robert were causing Robert emotional distress. Gloria appealed, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Utah’s Stalking Statute because it entered the injunction based on its finding that Gloria’s conduct was causing Robert emotional distress without finding that her conduct would have caused emotional distress to a reasonable person in Robert’s circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the stalking injunction, holding (1) the Stalking Statute required the district court to determine whether Gloria’s conduct would cause a reasonable person in Robert’s circumstances emotional distress; and (2) the statutory definition of emotional distress means mental or psychological suffering, and there is no requirement that the emotional distress arise from outrageous and intolerable conduct by the respondent. View "Baird v. Baird" on Justia Law

Christopher Carlton, a Pennsylvania resident, was in a relationship with Shalanda Brown, who was pregnant with Carlton’s child. Unbeknownst to Carlton, Brown traveled to Utah, where she gave birth to a baby girl and relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. Because no putative father was registered with respect to the child, Adoption Center commenced and adoption proceedings for the child, which were later finalized. Brown, however, had informed Carlton that the child had died. After Brown subsequently told Carlton that the baby was still alive and had been given up for adoption, Carlton filed an amended petition to establish paternity challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act and the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who wish to contest adoptions in Utah. The district court dismissed Carlton’s petition based on a lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in (1) denying Carlton leave to amend his petition to cure standing defects to assert the constitutional claims, and thereby, in dismissing Carlton's constitutional claims; and (2) dismissing Carlton’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Remanded. View "Carlton v. Brown" on Justia Law