Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment granting Bradley Scott's motion to terminate alimony, holding that the court correctly terminated alimony under the couple's divorce decree, which provided that Jillian Scott's alimony would terminate "upon" her "cohabitation."After Jillian and Bradley divorced, Jillian began dating James Okland. When Jillian and Okland broke up, Bradley filed a petition to terminate his alimony payments on the grounds that Jillian had cohabited with Okland. The district court terminated alimony pursuant to Utah Code 30-3-5(10). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 30-3-5(10) requires the paying spouse to establish that the former spouse is cohabiting at the time the paying spouse moves to terminate alimony. On remand, Bradley moved to terminate alimony under the divorce decree. The district court granted Bradley's motion and denied Jillian's motion for an award of costs in the Scott I appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate the mandate rule in addressing Bradley's motion under the divorce decree; (2) the court correctly determined that Jillian cohabited with Oakland under the terms of the decree; and (3) Jillian was entitled to an award of her costs on appeal in Scott I. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

In this adoption proceeding involving a child, B.B., whose biological parents were members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (the Tribe), the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment transferring this case to the tribal court under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) of the Indian Child Welfare Act on the ground that B.B. was "domiciled within the reservation," holding that the Tribe did not have exclusive jurisdiction over this case.B.B. was born in Utah to Father and Mother, who were unmarried, and placed for adoption in a proceeding filed in the Third District Court. Father and the Tribe moved to transfer the case to the tribal court under section 1911(a), which provides that an "Indian tribe" has exclusive jurisdiction "over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe...." The district court granted the motion on the grounds that B.B. was domiciled within the reservation at the time this action was filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction because (1) Mother was domiciled in Utah at the time of B.B.'s birth, and (2) Mother's initiation of formal adoption proceedings did not constitute an abandonment that shifted B.B.'s domicile to that of Father, who was domiciled on the reservation. View "In re Adoption of B.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Father's motion to revoke his relinquishment of parental rights, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Father's relinquishment was voluntary, and any failure to notify Father of his statutory right to receive counseling did not invalidate the relinquishment.Father consented to the adoption of his biological daughter and signed a relinquishment of parental rights. Later, Father filed a motion to revoke his relinquishment, alleging that his relinquishment was involuntary. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father failed to identify an evidentiary basis for his allegation that his relinquishment was involuntary; (2) Father did not have a due process right to have his relinquishment invalidated by the adoptive parents' failure to notify him of his statutory right receive counseling; and (3) Father lacked standing to assert an equal protection challenge to the relinquishment requirements that apply to biological fathers. View "S.A.S. v. K.H.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the strict compliance requirement of section 110 of Utah's Adoption Act, which permits a district court to terminate parental rights if the parent does not "fully and strictly comply" with the statutory requirements, as applied to Mother, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's compelling interest in prompt adoption proceedings.Mother gave birth to Child in 2010. Sometime thereafter, Child went to live with Adoptive Parents. In 2015, Adoptive Parents filed an adoption petition and served notice of the proceeding on Mother. The notice informed Mother that she had thirty days to file a motion to intervene or she would forfeit her parental rights in Child and would be barred from participating in the adoption proceeding. Mother attempted to intervene, but the district court struck her filing due to a procedural deficiency in the document and barred her from participating in the adoption proceeding. Mother filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking relief from the order to strike, which district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mother's substantive due process rights were violated because section 110's strict compliance requirement is not narrowly tailored. View "In re K.T.B." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights action the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case to the juvenile court so that it may reexamine the termination petition in light of the clarified standard, holding that the court of appeals did not misinterpret the Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code 78A-6-506, -507.To resolve Mother's petition to terminate the parental rights of Father the juvenile court followed the statutory framework the legislature created by finding multiple grounds for termination and concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. The juvenile court then addressed a legislative mandate that termination occur only when it is "strictly necessary" to terminate parental rights. See Utah Code 78A-6-507(1). On appeal, Father argued that the juvenile court incorrectly interpreted the termination statute. The court of appeals clarified the analysis the juvenile court should have employed and remanded for reexamination under the clarified analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in disavowing the almost automatically language in its case law; (2) correctly held that the Act requires that termination be strictly necessary for the best interests of the child; and (3) properly remanded the cause to the juvenile court. View "In re B.T.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Office of Public Guardian's (OPG) petition for extraordinary relief after the juvenile court appointed OPG as guardian ad litem for Mother in a parental rights proceeding, holding that the juvenile court went beyond the bounds of its discretion by appointing OPG in this matter.Before appointing OPG as Mother's guardian ad litem, the juvenile court noted that, under its reading of the Utah Code, OPG could petition or agree to represent Mother in termination proceedings. The juvenile court then ordered OPG to "represent" mother in the proceedings. OPG petitioned for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) OPG can seek extraordinary relief because it lacked a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to address its appointment; (2) the juvenile court has inherent authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for an adult; but (3) the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by appointing the OPG as guardian ad litem in this case. View "In re G.J.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's action seeking to establish his paternity of a child born to Mother, who was married to Husband, holding that section 78B-15-602 of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA), Utah Code 78B-15-101 to -902, grants standing to Plaintiff and that subsection 607(1) does not revoke that standing when the child has a presumed father.During Mother's relationship with Plaintiff they conceived a child. Mother and Husband remained married. Plaintiff filed a petition in the district court to challenge Husband's presumed paternity and assert his own parentage. Mother filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that subsection 78B-15-607(1) of the UUPA denied Plaintiff standing. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 78B-15-602 grants standing to alleged fathers seeking to adjudicate their paternity, and nothing in subsection 607(1) revokes that standing. View "Castro v. Lemus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal challenging the district court's determination that he did not have standing to establish paternity of his biological daughter under the Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA), holding that Plaintiff did not preserve his arguments that the UUPA is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.During her marriage with Husband Mother engaged in a relationship with Plaintiff during which a child was conceived and born. After Mother and Husband began divorce proceedings Plaintiff intervened in the proceedings, alleging that he was the biological father of the child. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to assert his parentage claim and further concluded that Plaintiff had abandoned his paternity claim entirely. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, holding Plaintiff waived any claim to challenge Husband's presumed paternity because he did not challenge the district court's finding that he abandoned his paternity claim. View "Hinkle v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition to adjudicate his paternity of a child he conceived with Mother while she was married to Father, holding that the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA) granted standing to Plaintiff to adjudicate his paternity of the child.In her motion to dismiss Mother argued that Plaintiff lacked standing under the UUPA to bring his petition because the child was born within a marriage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that to deny Plaintiff standing would violate his procedural due process right under the federal constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on alternative grounds, holding that the UUPA grants standing to Plaintiff, and this standing is not altered when the child was conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father. View "Olguin v. Anderton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment permitting Husband to rescind his voluntary denial of paternity of a child on the basis of mutual and unilateral mistake of fact and later granting Husband's petition declaring him to be the child's legal father, which ultimately resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff's paternity petition, holding that the district court erred in allowing rescission of the denial.During her marriage to Husband, Mother had a sexual relationship with Plaintiff and became pregnant. Before the child's birth, Plaintiff filed a paternity petition in the district court. After the child's birth, genetic testing established that the child was Plaintiff's biological daughter. Husband signed a voluntary denial of paternity renouncing his paternity of the child. Mother moved to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, arguing that he lacked standing under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to challenge Husband's presumed paternity. Simultaneously, Husband petitioned the district court to declare him to be the child's legal father. The district court allowed rescission of the denial and granted Husband's petition for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the mistake was not a mistake of fact but, rather, a mistake regarding the legal consequences of signing the declaration and denial, Husband should not have been permitted to rescind the denial. View "Mackley v. Openshaw" on Justia Law