Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case where Defendant was charged with two separate instances of violating a protective order the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to quash his bindover to stand trial, holding that the magistrate properly bound over Defendant to face both counts to the extent they were based on a previously issued ex parte order.In moving to quash the bindover Defendant argued that he had not been properly served with the protective order he was accused of violating and that the ex parte order had expired. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the protective order was served pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 5, it was not properly served; (2) the district court correctly determined that the ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the alleged violations; and (3) therefore, to the extent that the charges against Defendant were based on alleged violations of the ex parte order, the bindover is affirmed. View "State v. Bridgewaters" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error in the jury instruction for rape and that the State had no duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to conduct a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone before trial.The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that (1) the district court had not erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of rape, and (2) the State did not commit a Brady violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction on the elements of rape, and, going forward, this Court endorses the use of Model Utah Jury Instruction 1605 for rape; and (2) the State did not violate Brady when it did not complete a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone. View "State v. Newton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Utah Code 78A-7-118(4), (8) providing a hearing de novo in the district court on justice court convictions but foreclosing further appeal unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, holding that the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny.Petitioner was convicted of three misdemeanors in justice court. Thereafter, Petitioner invoked his statutory right to appeal his convictions by seeking a trial de novo in the district court. In the district court, Petitioner was acquitted of one misdemeanor and reconnected of the other two. By statute, Petitioner had exhausted his right to an appeal following the district court's decision, but Petitioner nonetheless filed an appeal in the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Petitioner sought certiorari review, arguing that 78A-7-118(8) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the briefing in this case has highlighted some potential policy concerns with the process for filing an appeal from a justice court decision none of these concerns rises to the level of a constitutional problem. View "Taylorsville City v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of attempted murder, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's Utah R. App. P. 23B motion, nor was Defendant prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to call an expert who would have testified about the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications.On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call the eyewitness testimony expert, who his prior counsel had previously identified and disclosed. Defendant also filed a Rule 23B motion asking the court to remand so that he could supplement the record with facts concerning the uncalled expert. The court of appeals denied the Rule 23B motion and affirmed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err by concluding that Defendant failed to present a sufficient basis for remand under Rule 23B; and (2) did not apply an incorrect version of the Washington v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard to its conclusion. View "State v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that, under the circumstances, the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford Appellant the due process protections explained in Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (2017), before it could determine that Appellant was a sex offender and condition his parole on sex offender treatment.Appellant was serving a prison sentence for his convictions of attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because he was convicted of attempted child kidnapping Appellant was considered a sex offender under the sex offender registration statute. Further, Appellant admitted in his presentence report that he had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old. Appellant filed a petition for extraordinary relief alleging that the Parole Board had violated his due process rights by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. Summary judgment was granted for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board owed Appellant no additional process before it considered unconnected sex offenses in its decision to require Appellant to undergo sex offender treatment. View "Blanke v. Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for the murder of his wife on grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that there was insufficient information to conclude that counsel's course of conduct was deficient or prejudicial.During trial, when Defendant tried to testify about a threat he claimed his wife had made a few days before he shot her, the trial court excluded the testimony on hearsay ground. On appeal, Defendant argued that his lawyer's failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay constituted ineffective assistance. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals did not know or consider the specifics of the threat, it was impossible to determine whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during Defendant's criminal trial, holding that defense counsel's performance was not deficient.Defendant was convicted of forcible sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that because counsel did not object to the jury instruction for forcible sexual abuse Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that counsel's acquiescence to the jury instruction could not have been sound strategy and that Defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction as an accomplice to the crime of aggravated murder, holding that it was reasonably probable that the jury would not have convicted Defendant absent three jury instruction errors.The jury instruction discussing the elements for accomplice liability on aggravated murder contained three errors. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that, in the absence of these errors, there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Defendant in the absence of the three errors in the jury instruction that provided the basis for Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Grunwald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's claim brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), holding that, contrary to the conclusions of the district court, Appellant's petition was not barred because his initial petition did not count as a "previous request for post-conviction relief" under Utah Code 78B-9-106(1)(d).In 2013, Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. In 2017, Appellant submitted a petition in the Second District Court of Utah seeking to challenge his conviction. Appellant subsequently withdrew his petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). Later, Appellant filed a new petition in the Second District Court. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was procedurally barred because it asserted claims that were, or could have been, raised or addressed in a previous request for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no "previous request for post-conviction relief" where the action was initiated but voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1)(A). View "Hand v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery on the ground that the legal framework established in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), is no longer viable and reinstated the jury verdict on the alternative basis that any arguable error in admitting eyewitness identification evidence in this case was harmless.Defendant was convicted based on eyewitness identification testimony and other evidence admitted at trial. The court of appeals reversed the conviction under the reliability factors set forth in Ramirez and on the ground that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals, however, also raised concerns about the viability of the standard set forth in Ramirez, indicating that the Ramirez framework must be revisited. The Supreme Court endorsed the need for revising and updating the factors set forth in Ramirez based on new developments in scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. The Court then held (1) admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony is to be measured in the first instance by the rules of evidence; and (2) in this case, any error in admitting such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Lujan" on Justia Law