Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault and sentenced to life without parole on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that the prosecution's decision to charge him with aggravated murder and the district court's denial of his motion to amend the charge to murder violated his constitutional rights; (2) the aggravated murder statute is constitutional; and (3) the admission of victim impact testimony at Defendant's sentencing hearing did not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments, and therefore, defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Mateos-Martinez" on Justia Law

In 1993, Jed Gressman was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a term of five years to life. In 1996, Gressman moved to dismiss the charges against him based on newly-discovered evidence. The district court vacated Gressman's conviction based on the newly-discovered evidence. In 2009, Gressman filed suit under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) seeking to obtain his factual innocence and obtain financial assistance. Gressman died during pendency of the suit, so counsel moved to substitute Gressman's widow. The district court substituted Gressman's widow, granted Gressman's widow's motion for summary judgment, and awarded Gressman's widow PCRA assistance payments, including prejudgment interest. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed for further proceedings, holding (1) Gressman's PCRA claims survived his death, and thus, the district court properly substituted Gressman's widow as the plaintiff in this suit; (2) the district court erred when it found that the vacatur of Gressman's conviction conclusively established his factual innocence as defined by the PCRA; and (3) the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Gressman v. State" on Justia Law

Susie Stohm, the one-time CFO of ClearOne Communications, was charged with eight federal criminal counts relating to an investigation into certain accounting practices at ClearOne. Strohm was eventually acquitted of all but one count. Strohm and her counsel (Counsel) filed this action against ClearOne, alleging that ClearOne was required to indemnify Strohm for her criminal defense costs. The district court (1) ordered ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for her defense costs subject to certain restrictions, and (2) found that a contract between the parties entitled Counsel to charge ClearOne eighteen percent interests on the amounts that were billed to ClearOne but not timely paid and to collect the costs it expended in enforcing ClearOne's contractual obligation to indemnify Strohm. A unanimous court affirmed the district court affirmed the district court's indemnification decisions in large part, its rulings relating to contract termination rights, its reasonableness determination for fees in the criminal case, and its decision to enforce the eighteen percent interest rate. A majority of the court, however, reversed the district court's decision to allow Counsel to recoup its fees in the collection matter. Remanded.View "Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for stabbing the victim. At trial, the district court instructed the jury on self-defense. However, the court refused to instruct the jury on defense of a third person because it determined that Defendant's theory that he stabbed the victim in defense of a third person was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a jury could not reasonably have concluded that the third person was in imminent danger at the time of the assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis in the evidence to support Defendant's theory that he acted in defense of the third person when he stabbed the victim.View "State v. Berriel" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone and was sentenced to a term of incarceration for five years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search was unlawful because, among other reasons, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in his vehicle when they stopped him for a traffic infraction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, as the officers, who had possessed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity, improperly extended the original purpose of the stop, which was to investigate a minor traffic infraction, and instead undertook a prolonged investigation into Defendant's possible drug activity. Remanded. View "State v. Gurule" on Justia Law

Defendant was working as an aide at a middle school when she was convicted of rape, forcible sodomy, and forcible sexual abuse for incidents involving a fifteen-year-old student student and his friend. The trial judge arrested the judgment and granted a new trial on all counts based on evidentiary errors and several irregularities that occurred during trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting a new trial and reinstated Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the evidentiary ruling excluding evidence of the victim's sexual predisposition was proper; and (2) the other claimed errors and irregularities did not require reversal because they did not prejudice Defendant.View "State v. Billingsley" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to shooting a female victim during a custodial interrogation by detectives. Defendant moved to suppress the confession on the grounds that it was coerced. The district court granted the motion based on the detectives' invocation of Defendant's children as a method to get a confession. After clarifying that a confession is involuntary if the will of the accused has been overcome, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant's free will was not overcome, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the references in the interrogations to Defendant's children were coercive police tactics that rendered Defendant's confession involuntary. Remanded. View "State v. Arriaga-Luna" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated assault. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, stating that he was confused when he entered his plea. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant was adequately informed of the nature of the charge and was not confused. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant received constitutionally adequate notice of the nature of the charge of his limited appeal rights; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. View "State v. Candland" on Justia Law

The City police department fired a police officer (Plaintiff) for reporting for duty while under the influence of alcohol. The board of appeals and court of appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the City's alcohol policy, as the portable breath test administered to Plaintiff accurately measured Plaintiff's breath alcohol and blood alcohol content; and (2) Utah Code 34-38-7 does not prohibit the City from deviating from its specified procedure of testing urine to establish blood alcohol content, as the statute does not apply to the City. View "Becker v. Sunset City" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of vaginal rape and forcible anal sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court's exclusion prior instances of sexual conduct between Defendant and the victim under Utah R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(A) was error. Specifically, Defendant unsuccessfully sought to offer evidence that he and the victim had previously engaged in consensual oral and anal sex through his own testimony and the testimony of witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of Defendant's proffered sexual history evidence under Rule 412(b)(2)(A) was error that undermined the jury's verdict. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law