Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a minor arising out of his attack on his wife in the presence of the parties’ four-year-old daughter. During voir dire, defense counsel used all five of his peremptory challenges on female members of the venire. The prosecution objected, and because Defendant failed to give nondiscriminatory explanations for two of the strikes, the trial court reinstated those two jurors. The court, however, did not restore the two peremptory challenges Defendant used to strike the jurors. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant had not shown he was actually prejudiced by his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance or by the trial court’s alleged errors. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that any prejudice arose from any arguable deficiency in his counsel’s performance or that there was a basis for a presumption of prejudice; and (2) Defendant failed to establish the elements of plain error in regard to the trial court’s decision to reinstate the two jurors and its failure to sua sponte restore the peremptory challenges used to strike them. View "State v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Nearly twenty years ago Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. After Appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Appellant unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Appellant’s post-conviction petition and allowed him to amend his petition. Ultimately, Appellant filed a fifth amended petition for relief under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), which the post-conviction court (PCC) denied. Appellant appealed the denial of his fifth amended petition, raising numerous claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA failed because he did not establish he had a constitutional right to funded post-conviction counsel, and the PCC did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant further PCRA funding; (2) the PCC did not err in rejecting several of Appellant’s post-conviction motions; and (3) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-phase, penalty-phase, or appellate proceedings. View "Menzies v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction because the court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah’s aggravated kidnapping statute. The court of appeals upheld Petitioner’s LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner’s sentence of LWOP, holding that the district court erred when it considered only those aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission instead of broadly considering the interests of justice required by the aggravated kidnapping statute. Remanded. View "State v. Lebeau" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five securities law violations and one count of maintaining a pattern of unlawful activity related to an investment scheme. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s five securities law convictions, concluding that Defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to a jury instruction stating that a “note is presumed to be a security” because that instruction impermissibly relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of the securities crimes with which Defendant was charged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s five securities law convictions, holding that the instruction at issue was an accurate statement of law and not a burden-shifting evidentiary presumption. View "State v. Kelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to patronizing a prostitute in Layton City after negotiating a plea in abeyance agreement. The agreement contained the condition that Defendant would commit “no violations of law.” Defendant was subsequently charged in Sunset City with sexual solicitation. The action was dismissed after Defendant entered into a diversion agreement with Sunset City. Thereafter, the Second District Court held a hearing to determine whether Defendant violated the plea in abeyance agreement condition requiring that he commit no further violations of law. The district court concluded that the “no violations of law” condition in the plea abeyance agreement required a conviction, and entering into the diversion agreement did not constitute a conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecution may show that the defendant failed to comply with the condition through evidence of misconduct other than a conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution need not provide proof of a conviction to establish that a defendant failed to comply with a plea in abeyance condition prohibiting further violations of law; and (2) the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant failed to comply with a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement. View "Layton City v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner entered a plea in abeyance to a charge of lewdness that ultimately culminated in a conviction. In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of a second act of lewdness. In 2011 and 2012, Petitioner was subject to further lewdness charges. Petitioner was charged with felonies in light of his prior convictions. At this point, Petitioner sought to challenge his 2010 conviction, alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal the 2010 decision under the standards set forth in Utah R. App. P. 4(f) and Manning v. State. The justice court denied Petitioner’s motion. On de novo appeal to the district court, the court determined that Petitioner had waived the right to assert the denial of his right to appeal under Manning by waiting too long to assert that claim. Petitioner sought extraordinary relief challenging the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Rule 4(f) governed Petitioner’s motion to reinstate his appeal from justice court to district court in a manner foreclosing the district court’s waiver analysis; (2) the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion; and (3) the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable. View "Ralphs v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The district court neither conducted a preliminary hearing nor obtained a waiver of Defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter his guilty plea because he was neither afforded the right to a preliminary hearing nor did he expressly waive his right to a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as set forth in State v. Smith, which the Court also issued today, a district court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing, obtain a waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, or issue a bindover order is a nonjurisdictional defect. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

Under the terms of a plea agreement Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a second-degree felony. Defendant and his wife appeared in court for their joint preliminary hearing, but a preliminary hearing never occurred. Eventually, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that because he was never bound over following either a preliminary hearing or an express waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, the district court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant, determining that the guilty plea was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is error for a district court to accept a guilty plea without holding a preliminary hearing or obtaining an express waiver from the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing, but (2) such an error does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2002, Appellant, a Mexican native and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to felony theft. Eight years later, deportation proceedings were initiated against Appellant, in part due to Appellant’s 2002 felony theft conviction. Appellant filed a petition asking the district court to vacate his 2002 plea under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) or, alternatively, through a writ of coram nobis. In his petition, Appellant claimed that his counsel was ineffective during the plea process by failing to disclose the possible immigration consequences related to his plea. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition and writ of coram nobis, concluding (1) Appellant’s petition was time barred by the PCRA, and (2) Appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel, as Appellant knew or should have known that there were potential immigration consequences related to his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to preserve his argument that his attorney affirmatively misrepresented the immigration consequences of his plea; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of coram nobis, as Appellant had a remedy available to him through the PCRA. View "Oseguera v. State" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers discovered child pornography on Defendant’s computer, they applied for and obtained a federal search warrant to search the computer. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to five counts of voyeurism. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lack probable cause and because his statements to the officers violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the warrant was sufficiently particular and supported by probable cause; and (2) Defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements to the law enforcement officers so the officers’ failure to read him his Miranda rights did not violate the Fifth Amendment. View "State v. Fuller" on Justia Law