Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with sodomy on a child and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The criminal information was filed on May 25, 2012. After retaining private counsel, Defendant filed a motion for funding for necessary defense resources, asserting that he was indigent and that the version of the Indigent Defense Act (IDA) in effect at the time of his alleged offenses controlled the disposition of his motion for funding. Salt Lake County opposed the motion, arguing that the amendments to the IDA that became effective on May 8, 2012, which foreclose an indigent defendant in a criminal action from retaining private counsel while requesting public defense resources from the government, applied to this case. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the 2012 amendments were procedural, and therefore, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed but on a different ground, holding that the conduct being regulated by the IDA is the exercise of a mature right to indigent defense resources, and the law in effect at the time that Defendant exercised that right was the amended version of the IDA. View "State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 1985, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later filed two claims under Utah’s Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). The first petition was denied, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The second petition was also denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the second petition in October 2012. While Appellant’s appeal of the second petition was pending, he filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the district court’s denial of the second petition, alleging newly discovered evidence. The district court denied the motion as untimely. In March 2012, Appellant filed a third PCRA petition. The clerk of court did not ultimately assign the third petition a new case number but filed it under the case number already assigned to the second petition. The district court dismissed the third petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s rule 60(b) motion on grounds that it was untimely; but (2) reversed the court’s dismissal of the third petition, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the third petition regardless of the case number assigned to it. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, two counts of unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, possession of an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, and failure to signal. Defendant appealed his convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish Defendant’s possession of the contraband; and (2) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible conduct during trial. View "State v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a plea agreement and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to remand for appointment of counsel. Shortly thereafter, Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on an “irreparable breakdown in the attorney client relationship.” The Supreme Court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw. The district court appointed two new attorneys to represent Defendant on appeal. Defendant then filed another pro se motion to remove his new counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion and directed that any further motions seeking to disqualify counsel be supported by adequately documented allegations. Defendant filed three more pro se motions to remove counsel. The motions were deemed denied. Defendant’s new counsel then filed this motion to withdraw, making allegations similar to the motion to withdraw filed by Defendant’s first appellate attorney. The Supreme Court granted the motion and held that, by repeatedly engaging in extreme dilatory, disruptive, and threatening conduct, Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel for the remainder of the appellate proceedings. View "State v. Allgier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop, a third degree felony under Utah Code 41-6a-210. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the mental state required for the conviction. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The court of appeals did not, however, provide guidance on remand regarding a correct jury instruction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction because the instruction given to the jury did not specify the essential mens rea elements of the failure-to-respond charge; and (2) held that the court of appeals did not err in asking the trial court to determine, in the first instance, the proper mens rea instruction. The Court then exercised its discretion to provide such guidance. View "State v. Bird" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the applicability of the “attenuation” exception to the exclusionary rule to a fact pattern involving an unlawful detention leading to the discovery of an arrest warrant followed by a search incident to arrest. Defendant in this case entered a conditional plea to drug-related charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress and reconsider. The court of appeals affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. After noting that the lower courts are in “disarray” in their application of the attenuation doctrine to the outstanding warrant scenario and the lack of direction from the U.S. Supreme Court on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded (1) the attenuation exception is limited to cases involving intervening acts of a defendant’s free will, as in a confession or consent to search; and (2) because this case involved no independent act of a defendant’s free will, the attenuation doctrine was not implicated, and Defendant was entitled to suppression of the evidence secured in the search incident to his arrest. View "State v. Strieff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of murder and two counts of aggravated robbery. Upon sentencing Defendant, the trial court failed to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)(1) by not informing Defendant of his right to appeal and of the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Over two years later, Defendant filed a motion seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because neither the trial court nor defense counsel informed Defendant of the thirty-day deadline, Defendant had a valid claim for reinstatement of the right to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that claims for reinstatement of the right to appeal are subject to harmless error review, and the court of appeals in this case erred by declining to apply harmless error analysis. Remanded. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five securities law violations and one count of maintaining a pattern of unlawful activity related to an investment scheme. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s securities law convictions, concluding that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by stipulating to a jury instruction that the court concluded impermissibly shifted the burden to Defendant and relieved the State of its burden to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instruction at issue was an accurate statement of Utah law and not an evidentiary presumption unlawfully shifting the burden of proof to the defense. Remanded. View "State v. Kelson" on Justia Law

Utah Code 76-10-503 criminalizes possession of a “dangerous weapon” by a restricted person. Defendant was convicted under section 76-10-503 for having a pocketknife among his personal belongings, which he carried with him in a shopping cart. On appeal, Defendant argued that his pocketknife did not qualify as a dangerous weapon under the statutory definition of "dangerous weapon" in subsection 76-10-501(6) because the statute permitted consideration only of a knife’s actual use, not its intended use. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) an object’s intended use may be considered in determining whether an object is a dangerous weapon; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant’s knife was a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) subsection 76-10-501(6) permits consideration only of how the object was actually used; and (2) therefore, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the knife in Defendant’s shopping cart was a dangerous weapon as defined by statute. View "Salt Lake City v. Miles" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several crimes involving sexual conduct with a minor. L.N., the alleged victim on each charge, sought to intervene by filing a notice of a claim for restitution. The State filed a parallel request for restitution, seeking travel costs and lost wages incurred by L.N. and her mother to attend hearings. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to strike, holding (1) crime victims are not parties to criminal proceedings and thus lack standing to file requests for restitution; and (2) the travel expenses and lost wages incurred by L.N. and her mother fell beyond the scope of recoverable restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a crime victim has standing to file a request for restitution, but the district court’s error in denying L.N.’s filing was harmless, as restitution is allowed only for the pecuniary damages that a victim could recover in a civil action arising out of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Thus, the restitution at issue in this case was not properly compensable. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law