Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Utah Code 76-10-503 criminalizes possession of a “dangerous weapon” by a restricted person. Defendant was convicted under section 76-10-503 for having a pocketknife among his personal belongings, which he carried with him in a shopping cart. On appeal, Defendant argued that his pocketknife did not qualify as a dangerous weapon under the statutory definition of "dangerous weapon" in subsection 76-10-501(6) because the statute permitted consideration only of a knife’s actual use, not its intended use. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) an object’s intended use may be considered in determining whether an object is a dangerous weapon; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant’s knife was a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) subsection 76-10-501(6) permits consideration only of how the object was actually used; and (2) therefore, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the knife in Defendant’s shopping cart was a dangerous weapon as defined by statute. View "Salt Lake City v. Miles" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several crimes involving sexual conduct with a minor. L.N., the alleged victim on each charge, sought to intervene by filing a notice of a claim for restitution. The State filed a parallel request for restitution, seeking travel costs and lost wages incurred by L.N. and her mother to attend hearings. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to strike, holding (1) crime victims are not parties to criminal proceedings and thus lack standing to file requests for restitution; and (2) the travel expenses and lost wages incurred by L.N. and her mother fell beyond the scope of recoverable restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a crime victim has standing to file a request for restitution, but the district court’s error in denying L.N.’s filing was harmless, as restitution is allowed only for the pecuniary damages that a victim could recover in a civil action arising out of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Thus, the restitution at issue in this case was not properly compensable. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a minor arising out of his attack on his wife in the presence of the parties’ four-year-old daughter. During voir dire, defense counsel used all five of his peremptory challenges on female members of the venire. The prosecution objected, and because Defendant failed to give nondiscriminatory explanations for two of the strikes, the trial court reinstated those two jurors. The court, however, did not restore the two peremptory challenges Defendant used to strike the jurors. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant had not shown he was actually prejudiced by his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance or by the trial court’s alleged errors. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that any prejudice arose from any arguable deficiency in his counsel’s performance or that there was a basis for a presumption of prejudice; and (2) Defendant failed to establish the elements of plain error in regard to the trial court’s decision to reinstate the two jurors and its failure to sua sponte restore the peremptory challenges used to strike them. View "State v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Nearly twenty years ago Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. After Appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Appellant unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Appellant’s post-conviction petition and allowed him to amend his petition. Ultimately, Appellant filed a fifth amended petition for relief under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), which the post-conviction court (PCC) denied. Appellant appealed the denial of his fifth amended petition, raising numerous claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA failed because he did not establish he had a constitutional right to funded post-conviction counsel, and the PCC did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant further PCRA funding; (2) the PCC did not err in rejecting several of Appellant’s post-conviction motions; and (3) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-phase, penalty-phase, or appellate proceedings. View "Menzies v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction because the court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah’s aggravated kidnapping statute. The court of appeals upheld Petitioner’s LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner’s sentence of LWOP, holding that the district court erred when it considered only those aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission instead of broadly considering the interests of justice required by the aggravated kidnapping statute. Remanded. View "State v. Lebeau" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five securities law violations and one count of maintaining a pattern of unlawful activity related to an investment scheme. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s five securities law convictions, concluding that Defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to a jury instruction stating that a “note is presumed to be a security” because that instruction impermissibly relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of the securities crimes with which Defendant was charged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s five securities law convictions, holding that the instruction at issue was an accurate statement of law and not a burden-shifting evidentiary presumption. View "State v. Kelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to patronizing a prostitute in Layton City after negotiating a plea in abeyance agreement. The agreement contained the condition that Defendant would commit “no violations of law.” Defendant was subsequently charged in Sunset City with sexual solicitation. The action was dismissed after Defendant entered into a diversion agreement with Sunset City. Thereafter, the Second District Court held a hearing to determine whether Defendant violated the plea in abeyance agreement condition requiring that he commit no further violations of law. The district court concluded that the “no violations of law” condition in the plea abeyance agreement required a conviction, and entering into the diversion agreement did not constitute a conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecution may show that the defendant failed to comply with the condition through evidence of misconduct other than a conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution need not provide proof of a conviction to establish that a defendant failed to comply with a plea in abeyance condition prohibiting further violations of law; and (2) the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant failed to comply with a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement. View "Layton City v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner entered a plea in abeyance to a charge of lewdness that ultimately culminated in a conviction. In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of a second act of lewdness. In 2011 and 2012, Petitioner was subject to further lewdness charges. Petitioner was charged with felonies in light of his prior convictions. At this point, Petitioner sought to challenge his 2010 conviction, alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal the 2010 decision under the standards set forth in Utah R. App. P. 4(f) and Manning v. State. The justice court denied Petitioner’s motion. On de novo appeal to the district court, the court determined that Petitioner had waived the right to assert the denial of his right to appeal under Manning by waiting too long to assert that claim. Petitioner sought extraordinary relief challenging the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Rule 4(f) governed Petitioner’s motion to reinstate his appeal from justice court to district court in a manner foreclosing the district court’s waiver analysis; (2) the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion; and (3) the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable. View "Ralphs v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The district court neither conducted a preliminary hearing nor obtained a waiver of Defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter his guilty plea because he was neither afforded the right to a preliminary hearing nor did he expressly waive his right to a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as set forth in State v. Smith, which the Court also issued today, a district court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing, obtain a waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, or issue a bindover order is a nonjurisdictional defect. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

Under the terms of a plea agreement Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a second-degree felony. Defendant and his wife appeared in court for their joint preliminary hearing, but a preliminary hearing never occurred. Eventually, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that because he was never bound over following either a preliminary hearing or an express waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, the district court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant, determining that the guilty plea was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is error for a district court to accept a guilty plea without holding a preliminary hearing or obtaining an express waiver from the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing, but (2) such an error does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law