Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Susie Stohm, the one-time CFO of ClearOne Communications, was charged with eight federal criminal counts relating to an investigation into certain accounting practices at ClearOne. Strohm was eventually acquitted of all but one count. Strohm and her counsel (Counsel) filed this action against ClearOne, alleging that ClearOne was required to indemnify Strohm for her criminal defense costs. The district court (1) ordered ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for her defense costs subject to certain restrictions, and (2) found that a contract between the parties entitled Counsel to charge ClearOne eighteen percent interests on the amounts that were billed to ClearOne but not timely paid and to collect the costs it expended in enforcing ClearOne's contractual obligation to indemnify Strohm. A unanimous court affirmed the district court affirmed the district court's indemnification decisions in large part, its rulings relating to contract termination rights, its reasonableness determination for fees in the criminal case, and its decision to enforce the eighteen percent interest rate. A majority of the court, however, reversed the district court's decision to allow Counsel to recoup its fees in the collection matter. Remanded.View "Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable.View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law

In 2004, Sellers entered into a real estate purchase contract with Buyers. A portion of the purchase price was to be financed through a third-party purchase money mortgage by Bank. Another portion of the purchase price was to be provided through seller financing, known as vendor purchase money mortgage. Sellers executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Buyers. Buyers executed a deed of trust naming Bank as beneficiary and a trust deed evidencing Seller financing. Bank's trust deed was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank. After closing, Buyers defaulted on their obligations to both Bank and Sellers. In 2005, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property. The property was then ultimately conveyed to Defendant. In 2009, Sellers assigned their interest in the outstanding Sellers trust deed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a notice of default, stating that it had elected to sell the property to satisfy the amount owing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant had taken the property as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff, as vendor purchase money mortgagee, may have a superior claim of right, but its claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

Basic Research, LLC marketed the weight-loss product Akavar. Customers who purchased Akavar filed lawsuits against Basic Research claiming false advertising, defective product, and failure to perform as promised. Basic Research was insured by Admiral Insurance under a policy that provided coverage for "personal and advertising injury." After the underlying claims were filed, Basic Research invoked its coverage and asked Admiral to defend it. Admiral refused to defend, alleging that the underlying claims were not covered by the terms of the policy. Thereafter, Basic Research brought this suit for declaratory relief. The district court granted Admiral's motion for summary judgment, finding that the underlying claims were specifically excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the asserted claims were not covered by the policy and were in fact squarely excluded by its terms; and (2) therefore, Admiral had no duty to defend Basic Research. View "Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, Allen Grazer obtained a judgment against Gordon Jones and Richard Barney for breach of contract. To satisfy the judgment, property held by Jones and Barney was sold at a sheriff's sale and purchased by Grazer's attorney on his client's behalf. Jones and Barney assigned their redemption interests to the Olsen Trust, which attempted to redeem the property under Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c). Grazer challenged that attempt as invalid because it was not in full compliance with Rule 69C(c). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust, concluding the Trust had substantially complied with the rule. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on somewhat different grounds, holding (1) Rule 69C(c) cannot reasonably be read to require superfluous service of documents on the party who was ultimately their source; and (2) the Olsen Trust's redemption was valid and enforceable despite alleged deficiencies under Rule 69C(c) because the Trust fulfilled all non-superfluous requirements of the rule. View "Grazer v. Jones" on Justia Law

Shawn Adel, a former employee of Westgate Resorts, a timeshare company, formed Consumer Protection Group (CPG) to right perceived wrongs stemming from Westgate's offer of certificates to consumers that were virtually irredemable. CPG solicited people who had received certificates to assign their claims to CPG. Westgate sued Adel, claiming intentional interference with existing and potential economic relations, conversion, breach of contract, and violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Adel and CPG counterclaimed on behalf of 500 claimants, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violation of the Utah Consumer Protection Act. The jury awarded actual economic damages of between $5 and $550 for each claimant and awarded each claimant punitive damages of $66,666. The Supreme Court vacated the jury's punitive damages award, holding that the award violated Westgate's procedural due process rights under Philip Morris USA v. Williams because the statements made by CPG's counsel during closing argument created a risk that the jury would improperly consider harm allegedly caused by Westgate to nonparties when it fixed its punitive damages award. Remanded for a new evaluation of the punitive damages award only. View "WestGate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law

Chad Jones sued his insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Farmers denied his claim. Farmers defended by arguing that it did not breach its contract because Jones's claim was "fairly debatable." Farmers claimed this defense must be resolved through summary judgment. The district court granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fairly-debatable defense should not be resolved through summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard required for insurance claim investigations. Remanded. View "Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

The procedural background of the extensive litigation underlying this case was discussed in Madsen IV. Following the Supreme Court's decision in that case, Appellant Nancy Madsen filed a new complaint alleging grounds for the same relief that was sought by the earlier complaint. The new complaint was dismissed as barred by res judicata, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the litigation preceding the filing of Appellant's new action definitively resolved her claims and erected a res judicata bar to any subsequent complaint raising claims that could have and should have been raised in that litigation. View "Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Comcast of Utah II, Inc. (Comcast) appealed from the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Commercial Real Estate Investment, LC (CRE). The district court awarded CRE approximately $1.7 million in liquidated damages, plus approximately $2 million in interest, based on Comcast's breach of contract. On appeal, Comcast challenged the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause in its contract with CRE. At issue on appeal was what law governed review of the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) liquidated damages clauses are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny but instead are treated like any other contractual provision; and (2) the liquidated damages clause in this contract were not unconscionable, and CRE did not breach its duty to mitigate its damages. View "Commercial Real Estate Inv., LC v. Comcast of Utah II, LLC" on Justia Law