Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property in Utah. The lenders, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P., foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt. Talisker later discovered that the lenders had entered into a Common Interest Agreement with the court-appointed receiver, allegedly colluded to depress the sale price, and deterred potential bidders. Talisker claimed that the lenders bundled properties in a way that made them less attractive and that the receiver stalled a third party’s interest in purchasing some of the collateral.The Third District Court, Summit County, reviewed Talisker’s complaint seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, arguing that the lenders’ conduct violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and common law principles. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss but found that Talisker had broadly waived its rights related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The court concluded that the lenders’ actions, while possibly unfair, were not unlawful under the terms of the agreements and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s waivers in the loan documents were broad and explicit enough to encompass all rights under Rule 69B(d), including the requirement that property be sold in parcels likely to bring the highest price. The court further held that Talisker had also waived any equitable or common law claims related to the foreclosure sales. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding no error in its conclusion that Talisker’s waivers precluded relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property, which they had borrowed to develop parcels in Utah. After several loan modifications and assignments, the lenders—Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P.—foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, where they were the only bidders. The sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt, and the lenders continued to pursue the deficiency. Later, Talisker discovered information suggesting that the lenders, in coordination with a court-appointed receiver, may have taken actions to depress the sale price, including deterring potential bidders and bundling properties in a way that made them less attractive.Talisker filed suit in the Third District Court, Summit County, seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, alleging that the lenders’ conduct during the foreclosure process violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and constituted fraud or grossly inequitable conduct. The lenders moved to dismiss, arguing that Talisker had broadly waived any rights or defenses related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but concluded that the waivers were enforceable and covered the rights Talisker sought to assert, including those under Rule 69B(d). The court found no unlawful irregularity in the sales and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s broad and explicit waivers in the loan documents encompassed all rights and defenses related to the foreclosure sales, including the right to challenge the method of sale or seek equitable relief based on alleged unfairness or irregularities. The court concluded that, regardless of the alleged conduct, Talisker had contractually relinquished any basis for relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

A customer, Davie Montes, purchased a used car from National Buick GMC (National) and signed two agreements: a Purchase Agreement and an Arbitration Agreement. The Purchase Agreement included an integration clause stating it was the complete and exclusive statement of terms. The Arbitration Agreement, which did not have an integration clause, covered disputes related to the purchase or financing of the vehicle. After experiencing issues with the car, Montes sued National, which then moved to compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Agreement.The Fourth District Court in Provo denied National's motion, ruling that the Purchase Agreement's integration clause made it the sole agreement between the parties. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, interpreting Utah precedent to mean that the integration clause precluded consideration of the Arbitration Agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that contemporaneous, executed agreements related to the same transaction should be construed together, even if one contains an integration clause. The court found that the Purchase Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement were part of the same transaction and should be considered together. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Montes v. National Buick GMC" on Justia Law

Erik Schnibbe, an attorney, worked at the law firm of Magleby, Cataxinos, and Greenwood. After a client of the firm won a large damages award, the firm paid Schnibbe $1 million for his share of the contingency fee via direct deposit. Schnibbe believed he was promised a greater share and kept the $1 million. Years later, after leaving the firm, he sued for the additional money he claimed he was owed.The Defendants, including the firm and two of its attorneys, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Schnibbe had accepted the $1 million as full settlement of his share of the contingency fee, thus barring his claims under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the Defendants.The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that all three elements of accord and satisfaction were met: an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over the amount due, a payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. The court focused on the acceptance element, determining that Schnibbe's retention of the $1 million for four years without attempting to return it or registering a protest constituted acceptance of the payment as full settlement.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the lower courts that Schnibbe's conduct indicated acceptance of the payment as full settlement. The court clarified that acceptance could be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the creditor's retention of the funds, even if the payment was received passively via direct deposit. The court held that Schnibbe's knowing retention of the $1 million for several years, without attempting to return it, constituted acceptance of the proposed accord as a matter of law. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Magleby v. Schnibbe" on Justia Law

The case involves a 2009 loan transaction between TNE Limited Partnership (TNE) and the Muir Second Family Limited Partnership (the Muir Partnership) at a time when the Muir Partnership was dissolved. The plaintiffs, including the Muir Partnership, Dorothy Jeanne Muir, and Wittingham, LLC, sought to void the transaction. After a seven-day bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the transaction void and denying their request for attorney fees.TNE appealed, arguing that the transaction was voidable, not void, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court, in Wittingham III, agreed with TNE that the transaction was voidable and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the transaction bound the dissolved Muir Partnership and whether TNE was entitled to legal or equitable remedies. The court also instructed the district court to reconsider the attorney fees issue if plaintiffs renewed it on remand.On remand, the district court concluded that Nick Muir, who executed the transaction on behalf of the Muir Partnership, lacked both actual and apparent authority to bind the Partnership. The court also found that the plaintiffs were injured by the transaction and could void it. However, the court again denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, interpreting the trust deed's fee provision as not applicable to the plaintiffs' action to invalidate the transaction. TNE's subsequent rule 60(b) motion, arguing that new authority from the Utah Supreme Court changed the controlling law on apparent authority, was denied.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that TNE failed to show any manifestation of the Muir Partnership’s consent to Nick’s authority, either direct or indirect. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing the Muir Partnership to void the transaction and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees under the trust deed. View "Wittingham v. TNE Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

Weston Bennion was injured when his apartment deck collapsed and subsequently sued his landlord, Dale Stolrow, for negligence. The parties settled, with Bennion agreeing to release Stolrow and his insurer from all claims in exchange for $150,000. The settlement was subject to related subrogation claims and healthcare liens, and Bennion promised to indemnify Stolrow from liability for any such claims and liens. Before making the payment, Stolrow informed Bennion that he intended to distribute the payment in two checks: one payable to Bennion and the other payable to a collection agency that had a healthcare lien on the settlement funds. Bennion objected and filed a motion to enforce the parties’ agreement, arguing that its terms did not allow Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds to a third party.The district court disagreed with Bennion and suggested that Stolrow issue two checks: one jointly to Bennion and the third party for the amount of the lien, and another to Bennion for the remainder of the funds. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Bennion then petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the parties’ agreement permitted Stolrow to issue a portion of the settlement funds jointly to Bennion and the third-party collection agency. The court agreed with Bennion, stating that the plain language of the release provides for payment to Bennion in exchange for his release of claims against Stolrow and his assumption of responsibility for third-party liens. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower courts. View "Bennion v. Stolrow" on Justia Law

In this case, a doctor, Dr. Gabriel Fine, sued the University of Utah School of Medicine, alleging that the University deprived him of his clinical privileges without following the procedures required by its bylaws. The University moved for summary judgment, pointing to a provision in its bylaws where Dr. Fine had agreed not to sue "for any matter relating to appointment, reappointment, clinical privileges, or the individual’s qualifications for the same." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, agreeing that Dr. Fine had released his claims against the University.Dr. Fine appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the release to apply to his case. He asserted that the release only applied to actions taken during a formal review process and his claims arose from actions taken during an informal process.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah disagreed with Dr. Fine's argument. The court interpreted the release using its traditional tools of contract interpretation and found no textual justification for limiting the release's application only to actions taken during the formal review process. The court held that Dr. Fine’s claims against the University fell within the scope of the release and therefore affirmed the district court's decision. View "Fine v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that the parties' signed voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) should be set aside because of the parties' fraud and a mutual mistake but that Taylor Scott should nevertheless be adjudicated the child's father, holding that there was no error.Sarah Benson and Taylor Scott, an unmarried couple, signed a VDP representing that Scott was the father of Benson's child when both parties know that Scott was not the child's biological father. When Benson later cut off contact between Scott and the child Scott filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. In response, Benson challenged the VDP. The district court set aside the VDP but concluded that, under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, Scott should be adjudicated to be the child's father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in looking to the factors set forth in Utah Code 78B-16-608 to disregard the genetic test results that would have excluded Scott as the child's father. View "Scott v. Benson" on Justia Law

In this real estate case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by Rocky Mountain Hospitality, LLC (Seller) against Mountain Classic Real Estate, Inc. (Buyer) and awarded Buyer its attorney fees on appeal, holding that because Seller failed to release its interest in the deposit before filing its complaint it was barred from pursuing other remedies.Buyer entered into a contract with Seller to purchase a motel. The purchase price included an earnest money deposit. Buyer failed to purchase the motel. Seller brought this action seeking damages but failed to release its interest in the earnest money deposit before filing the complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the contract's default provision, Seller was obligated to release its interest in an earnest money deposit before filing a complaint if Seller wished to pursue a remedy other than liquidated damages; and (2) Seller was deemed to have elected to retain the deposit as liquidated damages and was barred from pursuing its claims. View "Rocky Mountain Hospitality v. Mountain Classic Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law