Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1988, a defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Decades later, after exhausting his appeals, he was diagnosed with vascular dementia, a progressive neurocognitive disorder that impairs memory and cognitive function. When the State sought an execution warrant in early 2024, the defendant filed a petition asserting that his dementia rendered him incompetent to be executed under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits executing individuals who cannot rationally understand the reason for their execution.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, held an evidentiary hearing with multiple expert witnesses. Although it was uncontested that the defendant suffered from vascular dementia and had experienced cognitive decline, the court found him competent to be executed, concluding he retained a rational understanding of the reason for his death sentence. The defendant appealed and requested a stay of execution, which the district court denied. Subsequently, he filed a petition for reevaluation, supported by new expert reports and observations indicating further rapid decline and an inability to understand the connection between his crime and punishment. The district court denied this petition, finding no substantial change in circumstances and no significant question about competency.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed both the appeal of the first competency order and the denial of the reevaluation petition. The court held that a successive competency petition must make a prima facie showing of a substantial change of circumstances and raise a significant question about competency. The district court erred by weighing rebuttal evidence at this threshold stage and by concluding the defendant failed to meet the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying reevaluation and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal of the first competency order and one petition for extraordinary relief were deemed moot. View "State v. Menzies" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault, after an incident in which a woman alleged he raped her at gunpoint in his car. At trial, the woman and the defendant gave conflicting accounts: she described a violent, non-consensual encounter involving threats and physical force, while he claimed the encounter was consensual. Physical evidence, including injuries documented by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), and corroborating witness testimony supported the woman’s account. The jury convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.Following his conviction, the defendant pursued posttrial motions in the Third District Court, including claims of a Brady violation and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied these motions after an evidentiary hearing. On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of the State of Utah later affirmed on certiorari, rejecting arguments related to jury instructions and the alleged Brady violation.The defendant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, later amended to include claims of due process violations, the right to present a complete defense, and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The State moved for summary judgment, and the defendant filed a combined opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The postconviction court granted the State’s motion, struck the defendant’s cross-motion as procedurally improper, and found the defendant’s claims either procedurally barred or lacking in prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the postconviction court’s grant of summary judgment for the State and its decision to strike the defendant’s cross-motion. The Court clarified that while postconviction petitioners may not combine a response and a motion in a single document, nothing in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act or Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits petitioners from filing their own motions for summary judgment. View "Newton v. State" on Justia Law

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so.The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment.The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property in Utah. The lenders, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P., foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt. Talisker later discovered that the lenders had entered into a Common Interest Agreement with the court-appointed receiver, allegedly colluded to depress the sale price, and deterred potential bidders. Talisker claimed that the lenders bundled properties in a way that made them less attractive and that the receiver stalled a third party’s interest in purchasing some of the collateral.The Third District Court, Summit County, reviewed Talisker’s complaint seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, arguing that the lenders’ conduct violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and common law principles. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss but found that Talisker had broadly waived its rights related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The court concluded that the lenders’ actions, while possibly unfair, were not unlawful under the terms of the agreements and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s waivers in the loan documents were broad and explicit enough to encompass all rights under Rule 69B(d), including the requirement that property be sold in parcels likely to bring the highest price. The court further held that Talisker had also waived any equitable or common law claims related to the foreclosure sales. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding no error in its conclusion that Talisker’s waivers precluded relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

After a car accident in which the defendant, while driving a marked police vehicle, rear-ended the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital and received an initial bill for $7,175.77 for emergency care and $92 for an eye exam. However, due to a preexisting contract between the plaintiff’s health insurer and the hospital, the insurer paid a reduced, negotiated amount—$4,395.75 for the emergency care—which fully satisfied the bill. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligence, seeking special damages for past medical expenses based on the gross charges listed on the hospital bill.In the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, both parties filed motions in limine regarding the admissibility of the gross charges versus the negotiated charges. The district court ruled that, under the collateral source rule, evidence of the negotiated charges paid by the plaintiff’s insurance was inadmissible, and only the gross charges could be considered. At a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff special damages based on the gross charges, less a deduction for amounts already reimbursed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s car insurance provider.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah addressed whether the collateral source rule requires exclusion of evidence of the negotiated charges for an insured plaintiff’s medical care. The court held that the collateral source rule does not require exclusion of the negotiated charges, because the gross charge does not reflect the plaintiff’s actual loss; neither the plaintiff nor the insurer was ever obligated to pay the gross amount. The court concluded that only the negotiated charge represents the compensable loss for special damages. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Utah vacated the special damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "Gardner v. Norman" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after being found in Oregon with a seventeen-year-old girl who had been reported missing in Utah. Prior to her disappearance, the girl had exchanged numerous messages with the man and discussed plans to be together. After their apprehension, the girl gave statements in both Oregon and Utah, initially indicating that she had lied about her age but later stating that the man knew she was seventeen and had coerced her into leaving and engaging in sexual acts. Based on her statements, the State of Utah charged the man with multiple felonies, including aggravated kidnapping and sexual offenses. A magistrate issued a no-bail warrant, and the district court later denied the man’s motion for pretrial release, finding substantial evidence for the charges and determining he posed a danger and flight risk.The First District Court in Logan, Utah, initially denied the defendant’s motion for pretrial release, and he did not appeal that decision. Several months later, he filed a motion to modify the pretrial detention order, arguing that new DNA evidence constituted a material change in circumstances. The district court denied this motion, finding no material change, and the defendant then filed a direct appeal from this denial.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to modify a pretrial detention order. The court held that under Utah Code § 77-20-209, a defendant has a right to an immediate, expedited appeal only from a pretrial status order that initially orders detention, not from a denial of a motion to modify such an order. Because the defendant did not appeal the original detention order and did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of his motion to modify, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged in 2022 with two counts of sexual abuse of a child, based on allegations by C.R. that the abuse occurred between 1988 and 1990. During the investigation, C.R. recalled being pulled out of class in seventh grade and questioned about the abuse. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired because C.R.’s communication in seventh grade constituted a report to law enforcement, triggering the limitations period under the statute in effect at the time.The Third District Court for Salt Lake County held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The State presented testimony from a detective and a records director, but no records of a report from the relevant period were found, and witnesses explained that recordkeeping practices at the time were inconsistent. The defense called former law enforcement officers who testified that not all reports were documented. The district court, relying on the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Pierce, concluded that because the evidence was not clear enough to resolve the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law, the question should be submitted to the jury. The court denied the motion to dismiss and reserved the issue for trial.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by reserving the statute of limitations issue for the jury. The Supreme Court clarified that under Utah Code section 76-1-306, the judge—not the jury—must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether a prosecution is time-barred. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to make the necessary factual findings and apply the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court left to the district court’s discretion whether to take additional evidence on remand. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case arises from a 2004 automobile accident in which one driver, LaMoin Larkin, died. Larkin’s insurer paid benefits to his estate and then sued the surviving driver, Jared Weston, for negligence, also seeking a declaratory judgment that Weston was insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange at the time of the accident. Farmers Insurance Exchange denied coverage, claiming the policy had been cancelled prior to the accident. Weston filed a crossclaim against Farmers, alleging breach of the duty to defend. Weston and Larkin’s insurer arbitrated the negligence claim, resulting in a finding of liability against Weston and a judgment entered in 2009.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment. It later held a bench trial to resolve whether Farmers had properly cancelled Weston’s policy, ultimately finding the cancellation was valid and that Weston was not insured at the time of the accident. The court also granted summary judgment that Farmers had breached its duty to defend Weston, as the complaint raised a genuine issue regarding cancellation. Subsequent proceedings addressed damages, including emotional distress and attorney fees. The district court found Weston failed to prove emotional distress caused by the breach and reduced damages to zero. The court also ruled that the 2009 judgment had not expired, allowing it to be amended to include interest and costs.The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings on cancellation, breach of duty to defend, and emotional distress, but reversed on consequential damages, holding Farmers liable for the arbitration judgment and related attorney fees. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the 2009 judgment expired in 2017 under Utah law, reversing the court of appeals on that issue and vacating the award of damages and attorney fees based on the expired judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed that Farmers breached its duty to defend but found no basis for damages or attorney fees due to the expiration of the judgment. View "Farm Bureau v. Weston" on Justia Law

A Colorado-based company applied to the Utah state engineer for permission to divert 55,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Green River in Utah, intending to pipe it across Wyoming for use in Colorado. The company proposed to use the water along Colorado’s Front Range but had not finalized a delivery location or obtained any approvals from Colorado authorities. The application was subject to both the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, which governs interstate water allocations, and Utah’s statutes regulating water appropriation and export.After receiving the application, the Utah state engineer published notice, received protests, and held an administrative hearing. The engineer ultimately denied the application, finding that the company had not demonstrated compliance with Utah’s Export Statute, particularly the requirement to show that the water could be beneficially used in Colorado. The engineer also noted the absence of any guarantee from Colorado that the water would be counted against its compact allocation. The company’s request for reconsideration was denied by default. The company then sought de novo review in the Eighth District Court, Daggett County.The district court granted summary judgment for the state engineer, ruling that the Upper Compact did not preempt Utah’s water laws and that the applicant failed to show beneficial use as required by Utah’s Export Statute. The court also found, in the alternative, that Colorado was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Utah’s Export Statute is not preempted by the Upper Compact and that the applicant failed to establish a reason to believe the exported water could be beneficially used in Colorado. View "Water Horse v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law