Justia Utah Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
University of Utah Hospital v. Tullis
A four-year-old child suffered severe brain damage due to a massive air embolism during surgery in July 2018. The child's parents, John and Amelia Tullis, sued the healthcare providers, including the University of Utah, in 2019, alleging negligence and seeking damages for pain, anguish, and future medical expenses estimated to exceed $22 million.The University of Utah sought to limit the potential recovery by invoking the 2017 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), which capped damages at $745,200. The Third District Court of Salt Lake County denied the University's motion for partial summary judgment, reasoning that the decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital, which found a different damages cap unconstitutional as applied to University Hospital, necessarily determined that the 2017 GIA’s damages cap was also unconstitutional as applied to the University.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether Condemarin controlled the current issue. The court concluded that Condemarin, a plurality decision with a narrow holding, did not control the case. The court noted that Condemarin’s holding was limited to the specific statutes at issue in that case, which imposed a $100,000 cap, whereas the 2017 GIA set a higher limit and included a mechanism for adjusting for inflation. The court emphasized that Condemarin’s holding did not automatically apply to the revised statute with different terms.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court should consider the Tullises' request for discovery on the applicability of the damages cap. View "University of Utah Hospital v. Tullis" on Justia Law
Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau
Ron Griffin filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM). On the last day for timely service, Griffin’s process server attempted to serve SCM’s registered agent but was unsuccessful. Instead, the process server left the complaint with Dawn Chapman, SCM’s administrator. SCM moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Chapman was not authorized to receive service under rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on an officer, managing or general agent, or other authorized agent. The district court agreed, finding that Chapman did not exercise general power involving judgment and discretion in her role.Griffin appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court, relying on previous cases Beard v. White, Green & Addison Associates, Inc. and In re Schwenke, held that Chapman was a managing or general agent because she was more than a mere employee and had some responsibility for the firm’s affairs. The court also found that it was fair to conclude that service on SCM was proper under the circumstances.SCM petitioned for certiorari review, and the Utah Supreme Court granted the request. The Supreme Court concluded that Chapman was not a managing or general agent under rule 4(d)(1)(E). The court defined a managing or general agent as someone with general power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, which Chapman did not have in her role as an administrator. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
State v. Andrus
A thirty-four-year-old man engaged in a months-long sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl, whom he met online. The relationship involved repeated sexual encounters, the exchange of nude photographs and explicit video calls, and the provision of marijuana and offers of other gifts. The girl reported the relationship to police, who struggled to identify the perpetrator due to his use of pseudonyms and anonymous messaging apps. State detectives, working as part of a federal task force, requested that federal officers use federal administrative subpoenas to obtain electronic records from service providers, which ultimately led to the identification and arrest of the defendant. A search of his home yielded physical evidence linking him to the victim.The Second District Court in Davis County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the electronic records obtained via federal subpoenas, rejected his motions to arrest judgment and for a directed verdict on several charges, and admitted evidence of uncharged conduct from another county. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court partially granted a post-trial motion to arrest judgment, but left convictions for human trafficking of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor intact. The defendant appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act (EIDPA) does not require suppression of evidence lawfully obtained by federal officers under federal law and then shared with state officers, and that the Utah Constitution does not mandate exclusion of such evidence. The court vacated the conviction for human trafficking of a child, holding that the statute requires proof that something of value was actually given or received in exchange for a sexual act, not merely offered. The court affirmed the convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor and distribution of a controlled substance, and found no reversible error in the admission of evidence related to uncharged conduct. View "State v. Andrus" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Star General Contractors, Inc. v. Dumar
New Star General Contractors, Inc. (New Star) filed a lawsuit to enforce its construction lien on twelve condo units in a large development in Grand County after the developer, Sage Creek at Moab, LLC (Sage Creek), failed to pay for New Star’s construction work. The units’ owners, Dumar, LLC, and Duane Shaw (collectively, Dumar), challenged the lien on multiple grounds. The district court ruled in favor of New Star, allowing it to enforce its lien. Dumar appealed the decision.The Seventh District Court, Grand County, initially heard the case and ruled that New Star could enforce its lien. The court found that New Star’s preliminary notices were sufficient and that the lien was valid despite New Star’s failure to allocate expenses between the units and the common areas. The court also concluded that Dumar was responsible for the full amount of the lien, which included the costs of constructing Building C and its common areas. Dumar’s excessive lien claim was dismissed, and the court awarded attorney fees to New Star.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. The court held that New Star’s second preliminary notices, which were specific to Building C, substantially complied with the Construction Lien Statute despite not listing the correct parcel numbers. The court declined to analyze the first preliminary notices. The court also held that New Star’s failure to allocate expenses between the units and the common areas did not invalidate the lien. However, the court found that the district court erred in calculating the amount owed under the lien by treating Dumar as owning all the common areas of Building C, rather than only its ownership share in the development. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine the correct amount Dumar owes based on its ownership share.Additionally, the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Dumar’s excessive lien claim and the attorney fee award for New Star. The court directed the district court to reconsider both issues on remand. View "New Star General Contractors, Inc. v. Dumar" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Construction Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Carter v. State
In 1985, Douglas Carter was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Eva Olesen in Provo, Utah. There was no physical evidence linking Carter to the crime scene, but he signed a confession, and two witnesses, Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, provided testimony corroborating aspects of his confession. Decades later, the Tovars signed declarations stating that the police had threatened them, pressured them to make untrue statements, and instructed them to lie at Carter’s trial about financial support they had received from the police. Based on these revelations, Carter petitioned for postconviction relief.The Fourth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Carter’s trial and sentencing were tainted by serious misconduct by the lead prosecutor, the lead investigator, and another police officer. The court found that the police had suborned perjury, threatened the Tovars with deportation and separation from their son, and provided them with financial assistance, which they were instructed to lie about. The prosecutor did not disclose this information to the defense or correct the false testimony at trial.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court’s findings. The court concluded that the State had violated Carter’s constitutional right to due process by suppressing evidence favorable to Carter and by failing to correct false testimony. The court determined that these violations prejudiced Carter at both the guilt and sentencing stages of his trial. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant Carter’s petition for postconviction relief, vacate his conviction and sentence, and order a new trial. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law
State v. Labrum
Kyli Jenae Labrum was charged with ten counts of rape and one count of forcible sexual abuse after allegedly engaging in a sexual relationship with T.S., a sixteen-year-old boy. The State's case relied on two theories of nonconsent: a special trust theory and an enticement theory. At the preliminary hearing, the stand-in prosecutor only argued the special trust theory, which the magistrate judge rejected, ruling that the State had not shown the relationship was nonconsensual. The State then moved to reduce the charges to a lesser offense but later decided to pursue the original charges, filing a motion for reconsideration and then refiling the charges with both theories of nonconsent.The magistrate judge denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the refiled charges, ruling that the State's actions were procedurally inappropriate and constitutionally barred under the Utah Constitution’s Due Process Clause. The State appealed, arguing that the magistrate erred in its determination.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, clarifying the standard for refiling charges after a dismissal for insufficient evidence. The court held that the State must show that it did not act in bad faith or with intent to harass when refiling charges. The court vacated the magistrate's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings under the clarified standard. The court instructed the lower court to determine whether the State acted in bad faith when it failed to argue the enticement theory at the first preliminary hearing and subsequently refiled the charges. If the State prevails, it may proceed with a second preliminary hearing on both theories of nonconsent. If Labrum prevails, the State may only proceed on the lesser charges. View "State v. Labrum" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
State v. Richins
The State of Utah charged Kouri Darden Richins with aggravated murder and other crimes. The case received significant media attention, with extensive coverage from various media outlets. The State and Richins jointly requested that jury selection be held in person and that the jury venire be expanded to include prospective jurors from both Summit and Salt Lake counties. The Third District Court has a standing order requiring virtual jury selection unless "extraordinary circumstances" are found. The Presiding Judge denied the request for in-person jury selection, stating that media attention did not constitute extraordinary circumstances. The Trial Judge initially granted the request to expand the jury venire but later reversed his decision.The Third District Court's Presiding Judge denied the request for in-person jury selection, concluding that the intense media attention did not constitute extraordinary circumstances. The Trial Judge initially approved the request to expand the jury venire but reversed his decision after the Presiding Judge's order, concluding that Utah law did not permit summoning jurors from multiple counties for one trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. The court held that the Presiding Judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the request for in-person jury selection, as the decision was within the bounds of reasonability. The court also held that the Trial Judge correctly interpreted Utah law, which requires jurors to be selected from a single county. The court affirmed the decisions of both the Presiding Judge and the Trial Judge, concluding that the requests for in-person jury selection and an expanded jury venire were properly denied. View "State v. Richins" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
In re D.S.
The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.S. (Father) and J.S. (Mother) to their two children, D.S. and K.S. At the time, the children were removed from Mother’s custody, and Father was incarcerated. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother (Grandmother), who has cared for them since. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights and later terminated Father’s parental rights, concluding that it was necessary to promote the children’s best interests, which were best served by Grandmother adopting them.Father appealed the juvenile court’s decision, arguing that the children’s best interests could be equally served by a permanent custody and guardianship arrangement with Grandmother, allowing him to retain residual parental rights. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with Father, finding that the juvenile court’s decision was against the clear weight of the evidence and that the reasons for terminating Father’s rights were insufficient. The court of appeals reversed the juvenile court’s order.The Office of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the court of appeals gave insufficient deference to the juvenile court’s best interest determination and misapplied the standard of review. The Supreme Court of Utah agreed with the GAL, stating that an appellate court may reverse a juvenile court’s best interest determination only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court’s best interest analysis was supported by the evidence and that the court of appeals erred in overturning it. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the termination of Father’s parental rights. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State v. Jolley
Seth Clark Jolley was charged with raping T.T. Before his trial, Jolley moved under rule 412 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the admissibility of evidence that he and T.T. had previously engaged in other sexual conduct. Rule 412 generally prohibits the admissibility of a victim’s other sexual behavior but allows exceptions under certain circumstances, such as to prove consent. Jolley filed a motion describing the evidence he sought to admit, stating that either he or T.T. would be its source.The Fourth District Court in Juab County concluded that Jolley had met his burden under rule 412 and that the incidents he wanted to inquire about were proper questions for an in camera hearing. T.T. objected, arguing that Jolley could not use rule 412 to compel her to testify about her alleged sexual behavior at the hearing. The court disagreed and ordered T.T. to testify, reasoning that the purpose of the 412 hearing was to identify the evidence for presentation to a jury.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of rule 412. The court held that a party seeking to admit evidence under a rule 412(b) exception cannot compel a victim to testify at a rule 412 hearing. The court emphasized that the purpose of the rule 412 hearing is to give the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard, not to compel the victim to provide testimony. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of T.T.’s motion to quash Jolley’s subpoena and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jolley" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards
Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law